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Part of the challenges that African Studies instigate are fraught, because of (a) the participation of 
continental Africans in slavery wars in Western, Eastern, Northern and Central Africa; (b) the Data 
Availability and Significance.  
Researching and processing data about currently ongoing processes in Africa represents a twofold 
challenge: On the one hand side – despite great progress in recent years – there are still significant 
deficits in the comprehensive collection and homogenous comparability of data on most topics in 
sub-Saharan Africa. And on the other hand, COVID-19 represents an ongoing and dynamic 
phenomenon, which leads to the issue that the limited available data can quickly become 
outdated. This leads to the fact that the macro trends described here should always be understood 
as an interpretation of the existing data instead of a conclusive, retrospectively fathomable 
phenomena and forecasts made must be treated with caution. 
The production of qualitative and quantitative data regarding the social realities of people during 
COVID-19 (C19) is significantly hindered. STATAFRIC (2020: 13), the statistical division of the 
African Union (AU), recently conducted a survey on the impact of C19 on the production of 
migration statistics in Africa. The subsequent report showed that 70% of the participating 
countries stated that ongoing surveys were negatively affected by the pandemic. Taken as an 
example case that might unveil the overall problematic situation for working with reliable data 
on the situation on the ground in Africa right now.  
Nevertheless, the authors tried involving a vast number of different sources to provide an 
overview that is as reliable as possible. In addition, the global challenges created by C19 in terms 
of the production of statistics lead to a variety of unconventional, but from scientific perspective 
highly interesting sources of data, for instance, the so called “COVID-19 Community Mobility 
Reports” by Google (GCCMP). These reports are based on a publicly accessible database that 
processed the aggregated tracked location data of people using Google services on their 
smartphones to be able to make statements about how patterns of movement in individual states 
and regions have changed. But of course, also those new “innovative” forms of data must be 
contextualized in its informative value: There might be less people in the Global South using 
services such as Google Maps and the geographical categories chosen by Google such as “park 
visits” might not be the most suiting ones for the Sub-Saharan context. A further approach of the 
usability of this particular dataset will be given in chapter 5.1.3. All in all, this study is an attempt 
to collect and bring together the diverse but fragmented sources on the broad topic of mobility in 
the times of C19 in order to create a large-scale snapshot of the processes on the ground. 
Due to the limitations of a desk study without verification in the field the data on policies imposed 
by governments is based mostly on official governmental restrictions that are published. Main 
sources were the respective countries’ websites of the health ministries and data collections that 
were composed by international organizations and research institutes such as the Blavatnik 
School of Government (BSG). Accordingly, most of the information that is published and discussed 
here should not be misunderstood as reports about the actual enforcement of these restrictions 
on the ground and thus the reality of restricted individuals, but it is merely the evaluation of 
response policies. Some of the data will represent the actual manifestations better and other will 
be less representative: School closures for example had evident effects (WORLD BANK 2020a: 67), 
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Workplace closure policies should not be overstated in their informative value due to the 
widespread informality in the West African context. Yet especially the broadly used Oxford 
Coronavirus Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) by the BSG is a systematic analysis of 
available data on policies that resulted in various indexes and sub-indexes that this study aims to 
utilize for further interpretation. 
In some cases, there was no West Africa-specific data available yet, but only global data broken 
down in continents or cross-regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa. In these cases, the data with the 
broader geographic scale was presented to indicate potential developments in West Africa (WA), 
but it must not be understood as evident regional specific evidence. Border regimes were mostly 
assessed through various International Organization for Migration (IOM) data verified by 
secondary sources and capital mobility mostly outlined through International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) data from their regional economic outlook (IMF 2020e). All in all, this baseline study should 
be approached as a collection of available information on an ongoing phenomenon that might 
enable further explorations concerning pandemic-related changes in the Economic Community of 




























In a globalized world of flows, each part of the world, each country and each individual is 
entangled in networks of movement, albeit in divergent manners. The mobility of people, goods 
and capital has become a backbone of the constitution of today’s global political economy. Thus, 
the movement through time and space, on a path between people, cities, states, and continents is 
something to be examined in a deep and assiduous way. This is particularly true when there are 
observable external shocks, such as the COVID-19 (C19) pandemic, that cause sudden changes in 
the patterns of mobility. Movements – especially the transnational ones that are entangled in the 
networks of global capitalism – represent not only the major reason for the rapid speed with 
which the pandemic was able to spread worldwide (cf. LAWRENCE 2020: 353, MOUTON ET AL. 2020) 
but are also what need to be governed in order to intervene as a political force on the interplay 
between the imperatives of mobility resulting from global capitalist logics and the will to produce 
certain kinds of immobilities to fight the virus spread. Thus, C19 might be considered as the 
catalyst for governing institutions to potentially reshape the ways in which they are trying to 
impose power to produce and suppress certain mobility patterns.  
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Approaching a current global pandemic that affects different world regions in distinct ways, and 
the associated governmental and civic responses, which also vary significantly, demands research 
with regional foci. And it is vital to not turn a blind eye on regions of the world that seem less 
affected by the virus, since the global disruption of people, goods, and capital affects every place 
in an interdependent and entangled world. One of these regions is West Africa. At the time of an 
ongoing global health crisis, it is essential to maintain an overview of regional macro processes 
and possible related sudden changes in order to adapt research and policy making accordingly. 
This study aims to shed light on the bigger picture of recent developments in terms of mobility 
patterns and their linkages to the global health crisis in Western Africa, here conceived as the 
region of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member states. 
One year has passed since the spread of C19 developed into a pandemic. It seems appropriate to 
say that the immediate effects of the virus and the related responses have more or less already 
played out, so one could say that we are in a phase in which an interim evaluation seems to be 
appropriate. To provide such an overview, this report attempts to classify observable changes in 
mobility patterns into the categories of people, goods, and capital. In doing so, a special focus is 
on official regulations, border regimes and transport. With a situational embedding as 
introduction, an overview of current developments regarding the spread of the virus in West 
Africa is given. 
The authors see their main task in this research as providing a baseline study that reveals 
materialised (im)mobilities in the context of the pandemic. In addition to providing a broad factual 
basis to enable an overview for future, more in-depth analyses, we want to explore in a first 
analytical step the extent to which current mobility processes can be understood by expanding 
the concept of (im)mobility regimes. In its basic conception, it refers primarily to the regulation 
of migration by ruling political institutions, which plays a particular role in the context of West 
Africa and the migratory movements towards Europe taking place there. If such an intervention 
of powerful institutions on mobility, as is demanded and practised in the case of the confluence of 
West Africa and Europe, is also demanded in the context of mitigating the effects of the pandemic, 
to what extent do similar practices and logics appear with COVID-19 to influence the mobility of 
the population and not only that of migrants, but also the movements of goods and capital?  
 
 Analytic Framework 
This study aims at gathering, analysing, and interpreting information on (im)mobilities from 
several perspectives. In trying to do that, the authors have no intention of making a judgement on 
the C19 responses or proving one policy approach to be better than other ones in mitigating the 
spread and impact of the virus. Instead, the study attempts to compile and process mobility 
related data on this very new phenomenon as broadly as is feasible in order to provide an initial 
basis for understanding new patterns of mobility, their potential interwovenness and the regimes 
that shape them. To do so, the authors have adopted some basic assumptions. 
Mobilities are understood as a constitutive medium within the networks of the global political 
economy, but their regulation – or actually the production of immobilities – is at the same time 
seen as a core structuring principle of political globalisation. However, this regulation frames 




different mobilities unequally. There are spaces where mobility regimes work to allow goods to 
pass in certain directions, but not people. Accordingly, the question of directionality is a crucial 
one in assessing the power structures that affect mobility networks in the formations of global 
capitalism. This complexity also calls for a multiscale approach: when assessing dynamics in the 
networks of the global political economy, a focus is needed on the local realities of movements as 
well as situating them in the global context. Therefore, with partial limitations due to data 
availability, in the first place a global perspective on the different topics is always taken, in which 
African and then regional dynamics are placed in relation, in order to proceed from there, through 
case studies or contrasting data on different individual ECOWAS member states, to a 
contextualised but distinct narrowing down of (im)mobility dynamics. 
Regarding the methodological nationalism, it should be stated that even though the authors of this 
study did not want to reproduce perspectives on power structures based on a naturalisation of 
the nation state as a determining analytic category and are additionally aware of the special 
constitutionality of the African and postcolonial state, and are also aware of the current 
exceptional presence of internationalism in coordinating pandemic responses on the African 
continent (cf. WITT 2020), a primarily nation-state based perspective was chosen for this study. 
This is firstly due to the already prevailing methodological nationalism in the global collection of 
data. We could not be fastidious in the choice of their sources due to the topicality of the subject 
and the associated challenging data availability, which thus already had a formative effect on the 
comparative categories presented here. Secondly, despite the aforementioned limitations, 
national governments in the West are one of the most important forces in the pandemic regimes1 
and are thus indispensable as a category for approaching and comparing the C19 regimes.  
However, since the virus and related government-imposed policies do not translate into social 
reality in a one-dimensional way, we use pandemic complex as a term to delineate the forces that 
translate into changing realities in the context of C19. This term includes the virus and the disease, 
but also the various implications of institutions’ responses to the pandemic. Through reshaping 
the use of power, pandemic regimes create phenomena that go beyond the actual biological 
consequences, thus contributing to a pandemic complex that potentially alters social realities and 
transforms observable mobility patterns. Thus, pandemic regime(s) describes the entirety of such 
political responses that were specifically justified by the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and have a 
particular spatial dimension. 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was chosen as the overarching frame 
of reference for this study, both because as an institution it was itself one of the shaping forces of 
the responses to C19, but mainly in order to provide a geographically precise notion of West Africa. 
With regard to further statistical processing of the data used in this study concerning the 
lockdown policies, a first analytical step was taken by means of vector quantification in order to 
cluster the regime approaches, but otherwise only descriptive statistical methods were used, as 
the existing database on this very current topic did not allow for more. 
 
 
1 The worldwide, but much-debated, government approaches based on nationalism as a protective answer 
to C19 were also partially seen in West Africa, as will be shown, for instance in chapter 5.4.  
4   University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 26 
 
Africa Multiple connects 3 
As outlined above, the main task of this baseline study is the processing, visualisation and 
provision of broad data covering West Africa, and not its interpretation, which, due to the size of 
the treated datasets, only allows for a limited perspective on cross-regional patterns. Further 
interpretation of the visualised data is invited. Yet additionally, after each main chapter on people, 
goods, and capital, an interim conclusion is given, that is exploring possible perspectives on the 
previously presented results through an application of the concept of (im)mobility regimes. 
However, this approach is primarily intended to point out follow-up questions. It is therefore not 
intended to be a conclusive analysis, but rather a presentation of initial suggestions for a possible 
qualitative assessment of the baseline research. A more detailed outline of the underlying 
considerations is given in the following chapter. 
 
 New pandemic-related (Im)mobility Regimes in the ECOWAS Region? 
Even before the pandemic, integration efforts in towards free movement in the ECOWAS zone 
were characterized by the incomplete implementation of the 1979 Protocol on Free Movement of 
Persons and by the increasing securitisation of internal borders in the context of an externalized 
fight against so-called irregular migration that gradually restricted freedom of movement of 
ECOWAS citizens. ECOWAS, governments of its member states, various other domestic actors of 
the member states and the European Union are the four political stakeholders that negotiate 
freedom of movement in the region. Different actor constellations and specific historical-political 
backgrounds produce particular drivers that shape and contest free movement in the ECOWAS 
region. 
With COVID-19 another layer is added to this already complex (im)mobility regime: control 
through spatial closure and the blockage of potentially dangerous flows and movements as 
centuries-old methods of infection containment. Like almost everywhere on the planet, the global 
model to respond to the pandemic by restricting and controlling mobility to contain the spread of 
the virus was, and currently is, also translated locally in West Africa. 
The aim of this desk study is to develop a first descriptive inventory of the measures and effects 
of these pandemic-related immobilisations. This inventory forms the basis for evaluating the 
findings in small-scale qualitative studies in a second step, since different modes of immobilisation 
affect the lives of individuals in highly specific ways depending not only on their social and legal 
status, but also on their gender, age, body, race, and sexuality. These various factors determine 
how pandemic-related (im)mobility regimes, and their concrete immobilization measures, are 
embodied differently within a given population, and consequently how effective government 
interventions are on the whole. 
Usually, the concept of mobility regime summarizes the governance of international migration 
that is characterized by the sharp contrast of free movement in and from the Global North, on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, sedentarist imaginations relating to a Global South where 
movement is controlled, sanctioned and generally undesired, especially if these movements target 
the North. The concept of mobility regimes explores “… the relationships between the privileged 
movements of some and the co-dependent but stigmatized and forbidden movement, migration 
and interconnection of the poor, powerless and exploited” (SCHILLER & SALAZAR 2012: 6).  




For this desk study we apply the concept to the ECOWAS region and expand it by including goods 
and capital in the analysis in addition to the (im)mobilities of people. We understand these 
regimes as constituted by a specific set of actors, policies, networks of communication, 
institutions, technologies, practices, powers, and knowledge through which movement is 
contained within national borders or, more generally, through which (im)mobilities are governed. 
Thinking of the relations of mobility and stasis as both an outcome of and the shaping of a regime 
can help, in a next step, to reveal the entangled power relations at work in the respective state-
society relations. 
 
 SARS-CoV-2: Recent Infection Trends 
The following chapter gives an overview about the spread of the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 
and the infectious respiratory disease it causes, COVID-19, in the ECOWAS region to contextualise 
the new mobility patterns and (im)mobility regimes discussed in what follows. In order to provide 
as comprehensive a picture as possible, not only are the infection rates discussed, but also an 
insight into the testing practices is provided to explain the significance of the figures. In addition, 
a comparative perspective of the overall African and global pandemic context is given in order to 
be able to assess the local dynamics. 
 
4.1 Occurrence of infections: ECOWAS Region 
Since the beginning of the spread of the novel coronavirus in the end of the year 2019, COVID-19 
has become a global pandemic with previously untold ramifications in all parts of the world. 
Mainly due to its high degree of contagiousness and China's extensive integration into global 
supply chains, the cluster of pneumonia-like infection that was officially discovered on 31 
December 2019 in Wuhan (OSAYOMI ET AL. 2020: 1) also led to an outbreak in Africa with the first 
confirmation of a case in Egypt of 15 February 2020 (Fig. 1, p. 6).  
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The first case, that was confirmed in the ECOWAS region was recorded in Nigeria on 27 February, 
making it the third country in Africa with a verified occurrence of COVID-19 (IBID.). An overview 
of the spread in West Africa that took place afterwards is given in the following chapter. The data 
on C19 and testing mainly refers to the time until the end of the year 2020, even though for dome 
general figures the time until February 2021 is included to also give an overview about the 
developments regarding the so-called second wave in West Africa. 
 
4.1.1 Pandemic Dynamics in West Africa 
The two main conclusions that need to be made in order to understand the pandemic dynamics in 
West Africa are that there are large local differences within the region, and that there has been a 
relatively low level of pandemic activity yet compared to Africa and the rest of the world with 
resembling typical increase and decline patterns over time. First of all, an overview of the 







Figure 1: Timeline of COVID-19 related events regarding the African context 
Source: WHO (2020a: 9). 




As to be seen in the Fig. 2, all parts of the ECOWAS region have been hit by the pandemic so far. 
Yet, there is a wide gap between the various ECOWAS member states (from now on abbreviated 
as "EMS" for simplicity), with the worst affected state having over 50 times as many cases as the 
least affected one. But these figures are only about the actually proven cases in states with 
different population sizes and different testing policies. So, this can only be a first overview of the 
spatial distribution of the individual cumulative numbers, a more specific assessment of the 
situation in the individual states with a relation to population size and test activity will be given 
later. 
When considering the developments of cumulated and daily new confirmed cases over time in 
Africa and the ECOWAS region (Fig. 3), an active pandemic’s spread with temporary phases of 
exponential growth is evident. Looking at the African continent as a whole one can see the peak 
of a first infectious wave in July induced by a period of approximate exponential growth since 
March, followed by a low one in September and a recurring increase that represents a genesis of 
a second wave. This development culminated in the second wave, which peaked on 11 January 
with a level of 80,3% more new cases per day compared to the peak of the first wave, and then 
also declined at a much faster pace. This drop in new cases is so steep that towards the end of the 
observed period, with increasing deceleration, neither branch reached the level of the minimum 
between the two waves. Contrasting that with the development in the ECOWAS region one can 
recognize the similar pattern regarding the first wave with resembling growth and decline phases 
in terms of daily new confirmations. But in the case of the ECOWAS region, there was a more 
Figure 2: Total number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in individual ECOWAS member states as reported to the 
CDC by each national department of health. As of 24.02.2021 
Source: Own figure. Data: AFRICA CDC (2021a). 
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significant and longer decline, 
leading to a delay of the second 
wave. Even though delayed, the 
pattern of the second wave of 
the pandemic in West Africa 
also resembles the pattern of 
the overall continent with a 
higher pace of growth and a 
significantly higher level of new 
daily cases compared to the 
first wave. Nevertheless, the 
difference in magnitude in 
comparison of the first and 
second wave is a bit less 
pronounced, as the peak level 
of new cases is 71,9% higher 
than the one of the first wave. 
Thus, based on the available 
data, a similar pattern of 
increase and decrease in the 
number of infections can be 
observed over time, with a 
delay in the pattern in the 
ECOWAS region from October 
2020 onwards. In the following 
chapter, these developments 
will be put in relation both to 





In order to be able to grasp the actual magnitude of the figures mentioned, a relation to the global 
scale of the pandemic is helpful. In October 2020, the African continent accounted for 4% of all 
cases reported globally (AFRICA CDC 2020: 1) and less than 3% of verified COVID-19-related 
deaths (WHO 2020a: 3) while inhabiting 18% of the world population (WORLDOMETER 2020). Until 
February 2021, the share of total African cases out of all reported ones globally even declined to 
3.5% (AFRICA CDC 2021b: 1), due to the global numbers also having a peak in beginning of January 
2021 (OWID 2021). This means that Africa is significantly underrepresented in relation to its 
population, hence the pandemic is – at least based on the available figures – comparatively less 
active here. 
Figure 3: Total confirmed vs. daily new confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Africa 
(top) and in the ECOWAS region (bottom) 
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But for contextualisation, one has to take into account the less elaborated health infrastructure in 
Africa compared to most other regions of the world, as this could have an impact in terms of 
unobserved infections due to lower testing capacity. As to be seen in Fig. 4, an actually lower level 
of performed tests in countries with less economic leeway was seen during the pandemic. The 
countries of West Africa, which are at the bottom of the global hierarchy in terms of GDP, perform 
significantly less tests per capita than countries with a higher GDP, so a correlation is discernible. 
But as it will be shown later, 
developments concerning African 
sub-regions seem to be quite hetero-
genous and the narrative of Africa 
‘just testing less’ for explaining the 
lower case numbers should not be 
overstretched as shown in chapter 
4.1.4, which is examining the 
reliability of the figures in relation to 
testing magnitude. So, despite the 
relativisations, it can be said that 
Africa was one of the less affected 





The reasons for that are not yet finally understood, but the mainly discussed ones are:  
◼ Africa is less integrated into the global flows of persons and goods,  
◼ Africa is one of the world regions with the highest expertise in practically dealing with 
pandemics (e.g., Ebola), 
◼ Africa has a comparably young population and younger people being less endangered by 
COVID-19,  
◼ COVID-19 seems to perform worse in hotter climatic conditions and  
◼ That there might be a part of the African population having pre-existing immunity to 
COVID-19 due to preexposure to other diseases (cf. GOLUBSKI 2020).  
It should also be noted that recent findings suggest that the sum of several of the above 
phenomena results in a higher proportion of asymptomatic infections in Africa than in the rest of 
the world (WHO 2020b), which should be taken into account when assessing the figures discussed 
here and could also have a mitigating effect on infectiousness of C19 in the African context. 
Figure 4: Total COVID-19 tests per 1000 inhabitants vs. GDP per capita. 
GDP per capita is adjusted for price differences between countries (it is 
expressed in international dollars). As of 01.01.2021 
Source: Modified from HASELL ET AL. (2020). 
Testing vs. GDP per capita 
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Looking at the total number of 
recent COVID-19 cases in 
Africa, the ECOWAS countries 
belong to the least hit ones. For 
example, in the week from 13. – 
20. October 2020, Western 
Africa accounted just for 5% of 
the total African cases (AFRICA 
CDC 2020). Regarding the 
cumulative numbers, the 
ECOWAS region accounts for 
10.9% of total African cases 
even though inhabiting 29.4% 
of the total African population 
(OWID 2021, WORLDOMETER 
2020). In contrast, Egypt, 
Algeria, Morocco, and South 
Africa accounting for 18 
percent of the continents’ 
population represented over 
half of the confirmed cases 
(ACFSS 2020). 
The comparably minor role, the 
overall ECOWAS region plays in 
terms of documented 
pandemic extent becomes 
apparent when Fig. 5 is 
considered. At no time during 
the entire period of pandemic 
activity did West Africa account 
for a proportion of infection 
numbers commensurate with its population and area. The only time this came close to being the 
case was at the very end of the observation period, but this was due to the delay in the waves. 
Based on the available data and the comparisons made, it can thus be stated that West Africa 
accounts for a comparably miniscule fraction of the total C19 cases in Africa. With Africa already 
being one of the least effected regions of the world, the ECOWAS region's contribution to global 
infection levels thus appears to be marginal, at least for the time being. In the following chapter, 
the scale of the observation will be reduced in order to shed light not only on the region's relation 



















































ECOWAS' Share in African Cases (daily) 
ECOWAS share Rest of Africa
Figure 5: Total (on top) and daily new (bottom) cases (in thousands) and the 
corresponding ECOWAS share 
 Source: Own figure. Data: OWID (2021). 




4.1.3 Occurrences of Infections: Individual Countries 
Despite the previously described low levels compared to the global context, the spatial 
distribution of infections within the ECOWAS region presents a complex and heterogeneous 
picture (Fig. 6). 
Until the end of the year 2020, the total number of observed SARS-CoV-2 infections in relation to 
the population (C/P) highlights the vast differences in severity of pandemic momentum. In the 
observed period, Cabo Verde has a more than 140 times higher cumulative C/P rate since the 
beginning of the C19 spread than the one with the lowest rates in Niger. However, the variations 
in the developments do not only concern the culminated retrospective, but also the activity in 
relation to time. Thus, the line plots in Fig. 7 (p. 12) show the temporal pattern of the assessed 









Figure 6: Proportional number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in the ECOWAS member states as reported to the CDC in 
relation to notional population size. As of 1st of January 2020 (Data published on the 9th) 
Source: Own figure. Data: AFRICA CDC (2021a). 
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Figure 7: C19 cases in relation to population (1 M people) over time regarding each individual ECOWAS member state; 
separated into the group with higher and lower scores due to strongly diverging numbers. Cumulative number of 
cases over the previous two weeks of the respective dates. 
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ECOWAS medium low C/P

































































In general, the comparison of the C/P rates presents a picture of heterogeneous developments 
regarding magnitude and temporal patterns. The majority of EMSs remained consistently below 
the 100 cases per million population threshold, but individual countries temporarily achieved a 
multiple of this value. The phases of sharp increases and decreases in the number of cases varied 
considerably in time, but overall, a shared wave pattern can be identified roughly between April 
and October, with most of the countries recording a significant decline as early as June or July and 
remaining at a comparatively low level since then. The only two clear exceptions to this pattern, 
which are also the two countries with the 
highest maximum values, are Cabo Verde and 
The Gambia. Cabo Verde is by far the most 
affected country, with a maximum of 2543 
cases per 1 million inhabitants as biweekly total 
until the end of the year. The Gambia, after a 
long period in which almost no cases were 
recorded, experienced a relatively  late and 
intense wave with a maximum score of 616 at 
the end of August, followed by an equally 
abrupt decline. Thus, there is a large and 
increasing variation over time between the case 
numbers of the individual states, although a 
clear majority of the EMSs stayed at a similar 
low but individually highly fluctuating level. 
Individual states (especially Cabo Verde) shift 
the average significantly upwards. However, 
the data exhibited the highest dispersion (standard deviation peak) on the 21st of October and 
since then, the values have started to level off again and the average has also been declining in the 
last few months (Fig. 8). If one also takes into account the developments after the end of the year, 
then a second peak with a preceding erratic surge in the variation becomes clear, which, however, 
is less pronounced, and from February onwards leads again to a convergence of the deviation of 
the EMSs’ data. However, it must be noted that due to the enormous differences in the data sets, 
the standard deviation is primarily shaped by the developments in Cabo Verde, since the largest 
deviation from the average was recorded there by far at most times due to the much higher 
numbers. Accordingly, the developments in most countries are characterised by rather low daily 
new case numbers with a few more pronounced jumps upwards. The heterogeneity in the level of 
infection figures is mainly shaped by a few, more severely affected countries, while most show 
dynamic but less intensive developments. However, due to the significantly higher overall 
numbers in the second wave compared to the first, it is clear that further close monitoring of the 
pandemic developments is necessary, as a stronger spread seems possible in the future. 
These overall low infection figures also partly resonate with public opinion in mainland West 
Africa. According to a survey, the majority of respondents do not feel at risk of becoming infected 
with COVID-19. In Côte d'Ivoire 41% and in Burkina Faso 39% of respondents feel at risk of 
becoming infected (L’ECONOMISTE DUFASO 2020). However, a large proportion of the respondents 
base their unconcern primarily on the introduction of preventive measures, which indicates 
Figure 8: The averaged biweekly cases vs. population of 
all EMS together and the standard deviation  






Feb Apr Jun Aug Oct Dec Feb
C/P: Overall Developments and 
Heterogeneity
ECOWAS C/P mean  + 1 standard deviation
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further research on risk perception and individual assessment logics regarding the extent of crises 
might be of interest. 
 
4.1.4 Testing regimes 
This chapter aims at looking at the dimensions of concluded testing, as it is a crucial measure for 
understanding the reliability of data regarding C19 and overall infectious dynamics. Yet, as 
mentioned before, this is not intended to be sufficient for concluding statements on the exact 
magnitude of infections in WA, as the data significance is academically disputed due to substantial 
gaps in the data base. But it should support discussing whether the data is sufficient for an 
assessment of the presumable overall outbreak degree. During the research for this study, 
reliable, gap-free data was only available on a minority of ECOWAS member states. Accordingly, 
it should be noted that the findings presented in this chapter should not be taken directly as an 
overall statement regarding the region as a whole. 
Setting up a sufficient testing 
regime for comprehensive 
tracking of pandemic dynamics 
presents certain additional 
challenges in the West African 
context, e.g., due to less well-
funded health infrastructure, 
which embodies a foundation 
for a broad upscaling of testing, 
but also even more region-
specific phenomena such as the 
similarities of the symptoms of 
malaria and coronavirus di-
sease being similar, which is 
further complicating diagnosis 
(SIGNER 2020). 
To assess a comparison of the 
testing dimension, Fig. 9 
illustrates testing relative to 
the size of population of selected EMSs. This shows a similar initial testing extent with the 
exception of Ghana, which tested a multiple amount in the first two months. Thereafter, a 
tendency to a closer alignment is observable due to a decline in the numbers regarding Ghana and 
an increase in the other countries. This leads to a period of relative stability of levels until the end 
of the year. However, Nigeria in that time shows almost always the lowest rates of the included 
EMSs. Considering that it is the country with by far the largest population of the ECOWAS states 
and the 7th largest population of all nations in the world, it is apparent that an extensive testing 
infrastructure would be required to reach comparable levels. Also, Côte d’Ivoire scores below 
average. After the initial substantially higher levels achieved in Ghana, Togo overtakes form July 

































Figure 9: Number of tests performed each day for selected ECOWAS member 
states with sufficient data availability; relative to population size (1000 
people). CPV not included due to data inconsistencies, but the country has 
significantly higher test rates than the countries presented here. Smoothed by 
7-day rolling average 
Source: Own figure. Data: HASELL ET AL. (2020). 




increase in test capacities can be observed in many of the countries shown here, which is why the 
order shuffles again and significantly more tests are carried out altogether. Overall, differing 
testing capacities in the ECOWAS region are observable with heterodox developments over time. 
Yet, they all perform in a similar dimension, which is at the lowest end of the scale in international 
comparison, as was already evident in Fig. 4 (p. 9). 
However, it is not only the level of testing performed in relation to population size that is relevant. 
A country where infections are almost non-existent may not have to test continuously. The sharp 
rise of testing in the beginning of 2021 also might represent the necessity to respond to the second 
wave. Accordingly, the number of positive tests should be considered additionally in each country. 
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Figure 10: Development of C19 testing in selected EMSs. 01.03.2020 – 06.01.2021. Jumps in Cabo Verde data by the 
end of the year are primarily to be explained by data inconsistencies, which prevents data smoothing.  
Source: Own figure. Data: HASELL ET AL. (2020). 
7-day smoothed daily change per thousand























































































































































































































































































Thus, Fig. 10 (p. 16) shows developments of C19 testing within selected EMSs including the 
number of tests per confirmed COVID-19 case. Here, clearly divergent developments between 
different EMSs with regard to level and temporal changes in testing and reaction to increasing 
numbers of cases per test become evident. The available data on Côte d’Ivoire is characterised by 
a comparably low level of testing. Nevertheless, the level did not significantly decrease, when case 
numbers went down. This implies an established extent of testing infrastructure that is 
continuously utilised, but not further developed yet. For Ghana, the data shows the highest level 
of testing in the beginning while there were fewer cases, but the test per case rate (T/C) is the 
lowest of all included EMSs in December, making it the country with highest fluctuations. 
Considering that although Ghana is one of the countries with stronger outbreak dynamics, it had 
a low level of infections in the last months of 2020 compared to the first wave, an inconsistency 
in the initial significant capacity building can be inferred. 
Regarding Nigeria, the data shows a low level of T/C in the first months due to comparably high 
outbreak dynamics, but much higher rates since September due to relatively stable level of testing 
and simultaneously decreasing case numbers. Senegal is by now among the highest T/C rates of 
EMSs due to comparably high levels of testing and a very low outbreak dynamic during 2020. But 
a significant change around the end of the year is observable. A noticeable reduction of testing 
capacities was recorded as an answer to the initially continuously low number of new infections, 
which was followed by a strong increase in new cases. This was answered by an increasing testing 
activity, but not to an extent that was sufficient to keep the T/C rate at a constant level. Togo, 
through continuously increasing 
testing capacities, showed the second 
highest rate of tests per population 
by the end of the year. Nevertheless, 
the T/C rate is not above average. 
Cabo Verde, the EMS with the by far 
highest infection numbers, which 
was not covered in the initial 
comparison due to data 
inconsistencies, also stands out in 
terms of testing regime. Here, the 
sharp inconsistency of simulta-
neously scoring the highest C/P 
figures in comparison to the other 
enlisted countries and also, over the 
largest part of the observation 
period, showing the lowest number 
in terms of tests per C19 case. This 
dissimilitude can be explained by the 
very high infectious rates recorded in 
Cabo Verde – at least in relation to the other regional levels – because the testing regime in place 
was consolidated to react to the higher activities (leading to a higher T/P rate), but the infectious 
spread compensates (or partly overcompensates) this effect, which then leads again to a 
deterioration of the positive rate. And this is the interplay that is critical for assessing the validity 
Figure 11: COVID-19: Daily tests vs. Daily new confirmed cases per 
million. Logarithmic scale on both axis due to significant differences 
(E.g., Poland tests approx. 35 times as many people per million but 
also has a 950 times higher case rate than Senegal). The figures are 
given as a rolling 7-day average. State: 1st of January 2021 
Source: Modified from HASELL ET AL. (2020) 
Scale of testing vs. Scale of outbreak 
18   University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 26 
 
Africa Multiple connects 3 
of the data. A country with few new infections does not need to test to the same extent as another 
country with exponential growth in the number of cases in order to provide figures that can be 
used to draw approximate conclusions about the overall extent of the local development of the 
pandemic.  
According to the WHO that suggests around 10 – 30 tests per confirmed case as a general 
benchmark of adequate COVID-19 testing, the number of tests per confirmed case is the relevant 
indicator for evaluating the significance of overall results (WHO 2020c). To enable a 
contextualisation of the data presented, this is the global situation: For the 1st of December, the 
international T/P data ranged in between 15.51 (Luxembourg) and 0.004 (Madagascar) with a 
mean of 1,83 and a median of 1.21. 90 reporting countries, 97% lower than 6 and 67% lower than 
2. For the same reporting day, the T/C data ranged in between 3552.9 (Australia) and 2.6 
(Macedonia) with a mean of 89.51 and a median of 12.9. Eighty-six reporting countries with 97.7% 
lower than 185 and 66.3% lower than 20. 
With regard to West Africa, this means, that the covered EMSs rank in terms of T/P among the last 
20% (fewest tests per thousand inhabitants) but among the first 30% in terms of T/C (most tests 
per C19 case). The only exception to this is Cabo Verde with their deviating infectious incidence. 
However, in the case of Cabo Verde, it is important to consider the particular terrestrial conditions 
with the multi-island setting and high population density on some islands and high dependency 
on maritime connectivity, which have a wide variety of influences on outbreak dynamics and 
control possibilities. Furthermore, the number of inhabitants is less than 1 million, which as well 
needs to be considered when assessing numbers in relation to population size and when 
weighting in the consideration of overall West African developments. To conclude, the data in 
combination with the WHO guidelines indicate, that the extent of testing is sufficient to depict an 
overview of trends in actual infection patterns. All EMSs covered meet or even exceed the WHO 
criteria at almost all times, only Cabo Verde and Nigeria partly underscore. Although it should be 
mentioned again that this statement is based on a study only of a minority of the economically 
strongest ECOWAS member states, further hampering representativity. Yet, other available, but 
less elaborated databases on testing that also include the other EMSs hints at similar dynamics in 
the whole ECOWAS region. Looking at the cumulated number of tests in relation to population 
size, some countries have tested even more than the EMSs highlighted in the diagrams (cf. OECD 
2020a), which further underpins the evidence. Fig. 11 (p. 17) summarizes the overall results by 
















If looking at the development of the testing policies in the ECOWAS region, we see in almost all 
cases a gradual expansion of the provisions relating to the test framework (cf. Fig. 12, p. 19). 
Particularly during the second wave of pandemic’s spread, some EMSs expanded their testing 
strategies and initiated open public testing. Of course, this is only a representation of the policies 
and not their enforcement, but there is a shared desire to intensify the testing regimes. According 
to the OxCGRT database only Benin and Nigeria still had a limited approach to testing at the 
beginning of the year. A similar picture emerges when approaching the contact tracing policies 
(cf. Appendix 10.2), where all but 2 EMSs were labelled as having introduced a comprehensive 
tracing strategy. One of these two is Burkina Faso, which just eased their previously 
comprehensive (score 2) policies from February 2020 on, leaving just Niger as the only country 
with a long-term limitation on contact tracing. It therefore can be concluded that there is a shared 
approach to intensive measures in terms of policy frameworks for COVID-19 tracking and, in 




ECOWAS Testing Policy 
Figure 12: Tilemap of COVID-19 testing policies of the individual ECOWAS member state in relation time. One tile 
represents a 7-day median of the daily index scores. 11.03.2020 - 23.02.2021. Color-Coding from green (0) to red (3) 
according to the source: testing conducted for 1: only those who both (a) have symptoms AND (b) meet specific 
criteria (e.g. key workers, admitted to hospital, etc.); 2: anyone showing Covid-19 symptoms; 3: open public testing 
 Source: Illustration byJannis Viola. Data: OxCGRT (2021c). 
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4.1.5 Conclusions on the status quo  
Testing capacities and policy approaches were outlined in order to give a first insight into the 
source of the infection figures discussed. When synthesising the data presented here so far, it 
seems appropriate to say that, especially when comparing the situation to other parts of Africa 
and the world and the historical spread of other diseases in the region, the C19 pandemic 
represents a phenomenon of rather modest magnitude in terms of the infections so far observed. 
The testing numbers in the ECOWAS region support that stance through hinting that the reported 
case numbers are thought to be reasonably accurate to draw conclusions about the actual 
dimensions of the pandemic and its temporal dynamics. 
Nevertheless, the case numbers should not be misunderstood as holistic representations of the 
C19 spread. They are still only the officially reported numbers of confirmed cases in countries 
with comparatively weak health and tracking infrastructure. Even though the figures treated here 
underpin the impression of ECOWAS being hit considerably less than other parts of Africa and 
especially other parts of the world so far, the factual dimension is in all probability bigger and the 
pandemic in West Africa should not by any means be presented as being harmless. Until 26 
December 2020, there were 3143 confirmed deaths in connection with C19 in the ECOWAS region, 
and the second pandemic wave has already been shown to be of a bigger magnitude than the first 
one. This means that the status quo presented in this study must be seen as just a snapshot of an 
ongoing dynamic process and should therefore continue to be closely monitored in the future. 
This is especially true since new variants of SARS-CoV-2 have also been detected in West Africa 
(DJIGO 2021, WHO 2021a), but their impact will only be observable over time. In terms of the 
snapshot, West Africa is a region in which the manifestations of the global and local effects of the 
public responses concerning the pandemic are much more observable than the pandemic itself. 
And this provides a particular basis for this study, which, in the following chapters, will show some 
significant changes within the political economy and movement patterns of people in the region, 
which is interesting in the context of the admittedly smaller scale of infections. 
So, all in all, a mixed picture in terms of infectious dynamics emerged. There are various, partly 
contradictory, publications on the actual number of unreported cases and the challenges 
regarding data availability, further complicating an assessment of the real magnitude. But, at the 
same time, Africa has been declared numerous times to become the next epicentre of the global 
pandemic. However, at least up to the time of writing, this has not proven to be true. On the 
contrary, the continent, and West Africa in particular, is even less affected than average. So, for 
the time being it should be emphasised that these figures only reflect a universalistic level of 
comparison, and do not encompass the societies that are severely affected by this biological threat. 
On a level of global hierarchy, but also within the countries under discussion, the virus itself and 
its effects struck more harshly societies where there is inequality (cf. LAWRENCE 2020: 351). This 
might be represented by the higher than global average case fatality rates many African states 
report (AFRICA CDC 2021b). It is clear that the pandemic regimes established by governments 
around the world differed. This has had implications, manifesting in different outcomes and 
inequalities. Accordingly, the following chapters examine these manifestations and their impacts 
on mobility patterns. 
 




 (Im)mobilities of people 
In this chapter we look at the materialised effects of the pandemic complex (that have so far been 
identified) on the (im)mobilities of people. The majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
and also most ECOWAS member states, implemented lockdown policies similar to the ones 
implemented, for instance, in Europe, even though these steps were accompanied by debates on 
whether or not such concepts were suitable for the SSA context (cf. NEPAD 2020). This was 
questioned, for example, with regard to prevailing socio-economic contexts marked by what 
ADEBANWI (2017) calls “the political economy of everyday life in Africa”: To invent, experiment 
and innovate in the struggle of making a living by day-to-day small-scale mobility (NDLOVU-
GATSHENI 2020).  
The same policy measures can obviously have different effects under these distinct conditions. 
Nevertheless, policies introduced have primarily followed the globally prevailing paradigms of 
mobility restrictions. This is why we use, first and foremost, internationally-comparable 
categories to address the pandemic regimes. We primarily investigate policies that follow the logic 
of using hard power to restrict physical mobility, instead of more indirect or soft power-based 
ways such as information campaigns. However, such campaigns do also exist in the ECOWAS 
region, for example in Togo, where the Government introduced mass broadcasting of messages 
with prevention information via SMS, social networks and mass media (AFDB 2020: 104). For a 
holistic comparison of such categories of implemented pandemic-related policies, see Appendix 
10.1 and 10.2. For assessing the different ways (im)mobilities of people have materialized and 
how they were produced, we first introduce a general overview of mobility-related lockdown 
policies within the individual EMSs to establish a comparative base in terms of regime stringency. 
This is followed by a closer look at the regulation of means of transport and an evaluation of 
mobility data regarding movements of individuals in West Africa. The last subchapters focus on 
the interstate perspective regarding transnational mobilities in terms of border regulation, 
migration, and aviation. 
 
5.1 Specificities of the National Lockdowns and Mobility Regimes 
All ECOWAS member states introduced a diverse range of so-called public health and social 
measures (PHSM) as responses to the spread of COVID-19. Most of them were initially put in place 
in the first weeks after the WHO declared C19 a pandemic on 11 March 2020. Since then, a complex 
set of measures have been introduced in West Africa. In this chapter we compare different 
lockdowns to outline the specifics of the individual pandemic regimes. Yet, it should be noted that 
the national governments were not the only forces shaping those regimes. The individual 
countries are part of regional and global institutions and are influenced by supranational 
discourses and processes as well. In this context the role of ECOWAS as a comparatively active 
institution in the pandemic response and, especially, the subordinate West African Health 
Organization (WAHO), is particularly noteworthy (cf. MEDINILLA ET AL. 2020: 8) 
As the operationalization of something as abstract as the specificities of one lockdown in 
comparison to another one, with a simultaneously challenging situation in terms of data 
availability, the authors will mainly draw on the database of the “Oxford COVID-19 Government 
Response Tracker” (OxCGRT) regarding regulations and lockdowns. OxCGRT seems to be the most 
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comprehensive and extensively processed database available on this recent topic. Several 
hundred international researchers, led by the Blavatnik School of Government, contributed to this, 
making it a global data set on a wide range of measures to tackle the COVID-19 outbreak and its 
effects. Having said that, it is vital to highlight that the OxCGRT and the resultant aggregated policy 
indices do not assess the effectiveness or the practical implementation of measures. It is rather a 
systematic cross-national tracking of how officially mandated government policy interventions 
have evolved over time. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the data and indices2. It 
should furthermore be noted that Guinea-Bissau is not included in the OxCGRT database, so 
statements about the ECOWAS region as a whole are made on the base of just 14 of the 15 EMSs. 
Documenting policies of school and workplace closures gives a first overview of the general 
severity and similarities or differing patterns in the countries. It is vital to keep in mind that these 
classes and indicators are representing qualitative data translated into an ordinal scale that might 
not always have clearly defined boundaries, so differences should not be overinterpreted3. A first 
period of analysis was set from the beginning of the pandemic until 23 November 2020. This 
period is used as a reference for analysing the dynamics of what could be called the first wave of 
infections and response stringency, with an initial increase and a following decrease. Despite large 
differences in the respective policies and countries, a gradual relaxation of the initially strict 
measures can be seen in most cases up to November, after which, in some case, a tightening starts 
again. The subsequent period is also covered, but due to data availability and the topicality of the 
subject, it was followed until different points in time for the various countries studied. The 





2 For a further elaboration on the production and application of the data, see: HALE ET AL. (2020a).  
3 For a comprehensive approach to definitions and possible interpretation see OXCGRT (2021a) and IBID. 
(2021b). 





To make variations and common grounds in government responses vivid and thus describe 
potential fragments of mobility regimes in the ECOWAS region, the first aspect examined are the 
West African school closing policies (Fig. 13). 
In the beginning of the individual ECOWAS member states’ interventions 
concerning school and university visits, the responses resemble strongly with an 
instant total closure instruction in most cases. Most EMSs introduced their 
responses within 16 to 20 March 2020, with Sierra Leone being the last one on 30 
March 2020. This translates into a shared school and university closure policy for 
the whole ECOWAS region from 31 March on. Hence it was an arguably homogenous 
and profound start regarding this subject in West Africa with a comparably fast 
reaction to the WHO characterizing C19 as a pandemic on 11th of March. First 
deviations appear in May with Benin being the first country to gradually relieve this 
policy. Yet, in the end of May still all but two EMSs had a universal closure policy in 
place, but from there on the governments’ responses started to heavily differ in 
terms of stringency and timing. The mean stringency throughout the region 
declined towards the end of the year, but with a relatively 
constantly high level of heterogeneity (see Fig. 15, p. 24). In the 
Figure 14: School closure policy 
classes based on vector quantization 
ECOWAS School Closure Policies  
Figure 13: Tilemap of time-related changes of the stringency of closings of schools and universities. One tile 
represents a 7-day median of the daily index scores. 11.03.2020 (day of WHO pandemic declaration) - 03.02.2021. 
Color-Coding from green (0) to red (3) according to the source: 0: no measures; 1: recommend closing or all schools 
open with alterations resulting in significant differences compared to non-Covid-19 operations; 2: require closing 
(only some levels or categories, e.g. just high school, or just public schools); 3: require closing all levels; Grey: no data 
available 
Source: Illustration by Jannis Viola. Data: OxCGRT (2021c). 
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last months one can observe a tendency to level off around a comparably low plateau of 
stringency, but with increasing heterogeneity. Burkina Faso and Cabo Verde resembled the most 
extreme contradictions in terms of 
closure policy approaches: While 
Burkina Faso completely eased its policy 
on the 1st of June, Cabo Verde kept it on 
the highest C1 indicator count. When 
clustered with vector quantization4 one 
can create the groups with resembling 
approaches in terms of stringency and 
timing enlisted in Fig. 14. (p. 23) The 
classes created through the individual 
EMS’s C1 indicator on a daily base       
between 01.01.2020 and 23.11.2020 can 
be understood as grading according to 
severity with 3 being the strictest one in 
a long term view. The clustering just aims 
at the time before the second wave of 
infections to treat what we understand as the first “rounded off chapter” of action in the ECOWAS 
region. Towards the end of the year, in most countries a novel increase of policy stringency is 
observable, but during the time this study was written it was not clear yet, how the stringency 
level will develop and if it will follow the same pattern of quasi-continuous steps towards an 
opening after the first peak of policy severity. 
Concluding, there was an observable uniform pattern of action at the beginning of the pandemic 
and increasing differentiation after a few months. Since then, the level of severity has tended to 
decrease, but the level of dispersion has remained relatively constant until mid-November, which 
is the observational period for the clustering. Afterwards, a significant increase in deviation is 
observable again, implying greater differences in policy stringency. This increased dispersion 
seems to be primarily related to the reintroduction of general school closings in Nigeria and Mali 
from December 2020 on, while a majority of EMSs still did not apply any restrictions on schools. 
The question of whether or not schools are open is a powerful shaping force for mobility pattern 
of individuals. This is especially true in very young societies. A representative survey in Côte 
d'Ivoire (L’ECONOMISTE DUFASO 2020) concluded that during school closures, about 70% of 
children spent the time they would otherwise have spent at school at home. Socio-economic 
inequalities are a significant factor, with children from wealthier households tending to be more 
likely to be at home. These are probably not purely temporary changes. In Burkina Faso, only 65% 
of respondents said that their students would return to school permanently. This coincides with 
experiences from previous pandemics. For example, after the Ebola pandemic in West Africa, it 
was observed that 25% of children in Liberia and 13% in Sierra Leone left school permanently. 
 
 






Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov
School Closures: Overall Developments and 
Heterogneity
± 1 SD ECOWAS OxCGRT C1 mean
Figure 15: Mean of all examined EMS in Fig. 11 (p. 17) and 
standard deviation.  
Source: Own Figure. Data: Own calculations based on OxCGRT 
(2021c). 




Accordingly, this is furthermore likely to have a long-term impact on the mobility patterns of 
people (IBID.). 
Furthermore, school closings do not only have relevant impacts on mobility pattern of individuals, 
but also significant socio-economic implications. According to the WORLD BANK (2020a: 67), “in an 
[sic] scenario of four months of lost schooling and no change in educational quality, the lifetime 
earnings of today’s students across the globe will be sharply reduced, representing a loss of 12.4 
percent of the world’s GDP over future generations”. Thus, also a future impact on economic 
development and flows of capital is anticipated, which will be the topic of chapter 7 of this study. 
Ghana e.g., had 10 months of school closing for most students so far (MENSAH 2021), which implies 
that there was a long period of mobility pattern changes and income losses of teachers (IBID.) 
directly imposed by the pandemic regime, but also that there are not yet observable long-term 




Figure 16: Tilemap of time-related changes of the stringency of mandated closings of workplaces. One tile represents a 
7-day median of the daily index scores. 11.03.2020 - 03.02.2021. Color-Coding from brightest (0) to darkest shade (3): 
0: no measures; 1: recommend closing (or recommend work from home); 2: require closing (or work from home) for 
some sectors or categories of workers; 3: require closing (or work from home) for all-but-essential workplaces (e.g. 
grocery stores, doctors); Grey: no data available.  
Source: Illustration by Jannis Viola. Data: OxCGRT (2021c). 
ECOWAS Workplace Closure Policies  
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The heterogeneity of policy stringency and temporal changes is significant when assessing the 
ECOWAS workplace closure regime (Fig. 16, p. 25). Yet, the vast majority (12 out of the 14 
examined EMSs) put some kind of workplace restrictions or at least closure recommendations in 
place within the first weeks after the WHO declared C19 a pandemic (Range: 18.03. - 30.03.2020). 
Apart from Senegal and Niger all EMSs had at 
least a partial closure of workplaces ordered for 
April. In terms of descriptive statistics this 
translates into a short-term plateau of the mean 
of all EMSs’ OxCGRT C2 scores around the value 
2 (most countries have a level-2-rated policy in 
place, and the ones with a stricter and the ones 
with a less strict approach approximately even 
out in terms of the average: cf. Fig. 14, p. 22). 
However, it should be kept in mind that this is a 
calculated average of ordinal data, so it is only a 




From there on, policies started to vary more with an overall tendency of avoiding broad closings, 
bringing the average (Fig. 17) down to a relatively constant low plateau which resembles, that 
most countries had not measures in place or just recommendations or limited restrictions instead 
of required closings. Nevertheless, the variation remains on a high level. Despite the overall 
impression of a rather homogenous and uncoordinated approach that emerges when 
looking at the individual governments responses in terms of working place policies, 
ascertainable pattern of similar governmental behaviour exists. If clustered with 
vector quantization5 one can create the groups with resembling approaches in terms 
of stringency and timing that are enlisted in Fig. 18. The classes created through the 
individual EMS’s C2 indicator on a daily base between in the same observational 
period as in the case of the school closure policies can be understood as grading 
according to severity with 3 being the strictest one in long term view. 
All in all, no uniform approaches where observable but instead significant disparities 
between individual governments approaches and mostly fluctuating trends within 
individual responses over time. Workplace closures do have obvious impacts 
on peoples (im)mobilities and the socio-economic realities, yet the social 
structuring of the governable embeddedness of work is very different in West 
Africa from that in Europe for example, where severe restrictions on formal 
employment would have an enormous impact on the daily patterns of 
individual movement . Given the low proportion of formal jobs, the overall 
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Workplace Closures: Overall 
Developments and Heterogneity
± 1 SD ECOWAS OxCGRT C2 mean
Figure 17: Mean of all examined EMS in Fig. 14 (p. 23) 
and standard deviation 
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impact of such policies on the broader mobility patterns apart from specific socio-economic 
classes must be critically discussed. However, the formal employment in West Africa is important 
as it is interwoven with the informal sphere. Impacts on value and supply chains, for example, are 
to be expected. Either way, the overall pandemic complex has had a major impact on social 
realities in the ECOWAS region, according to the available evidence. According to the IPA survey 
that was conducted in June 2020 and also cited in the context of the school closures (L’ECONOMISTE 
DUFASO 2020), there was a distinct impact of the pandemic complex on employment and working 
conditions. The majority of respondents are unemployed, especially in Côte d'Ivoire. Almost half 
of the sample in Côte d'Ivoire have lost their jobs since February, mainly in the informal sector. 
While 67% were working in February, 20% reported that their business had closed. In companies 
with more than one employee, 65% of respondents are earning less, and 35% of companies with 
more than one employee have reduced their working hours. There is a similar trend in Burkina 
Faso, although the decrease is smaller: 40% of respondents were working in the week before 
reporting, down from 60% in February, with 61% of those still working earning less and 57% 
working fewer hours.  
According to BISSON & HAMBLETON (2020: 9) in the formal sector in Niger, “nearly 70% of people 
have been placed on technical unemployment. At the level of Niger’s employers, it is claimed that 
overall, 50% of private sector employees have temporarily stopped working.” In terms of 
protection measures, only few approaches have been reported from West Africa. “The most 
comprehensive effort is from Senegal, where the president issued an ordinance to prohibit layoffs 
and guarantee income to workers laid off during the COVID-19 pandemic (70 percent of the wages 
of employees laid off during this period). The new decree prohibits the use of dismissal other than 
that motivated by gross misconduct (termination for cause)” (IBID.). Yet, governmental support 
programms or tax reduction policies, as those introduced in Senegal to make the described 
approach realizable for the companies, are just indirectly influencing (im)mobilities of people and 
will be thus examinend in a later part of this study. The last policy field that will be assesed in this 
chapter to give an overview about the (im)mobility regime stringency will be the public event 
regulations. 
As to be seen in the tile map (Fig. 19, p. 28), the approach of the EMSs’ governments regarding the 
question of whether events should be cancelled was again more uniformly handled compared to 
the workplace closures. In the first weeks, the data shows a similarly uniform and stringent 
pattern as in school closings. This is represented through a common score of 2, which means that 
all governments required a cancelling on public events between 27.03. and 12.5. yet. Afterwards, 
Niger suspended that policy and later also Burkina Faso eased their restrictions, yet in the 
beginning of July still 12 of the 14 examined EMSs do have a cancelling policy in place. 
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Afterwards, a bigger variety of approaches emerged, with most ECOWAS member states switching 
to merely a recommendation instead of a requirement at some point. Subsequently, towards the 
end of the year, a re-intensification became 
visible here as well, which, however, remained 
subject to a greater diversification of stringency 
levels. If also clustered with vector 
quantization6, the classes created through the 
individual EMS’s C3 indicator in the same time 
period used in the two thematic fields before 
(first “wave” of governmental responses until 
mid-November) can be understood as grading 
according to severity with 4 being the strictest 
one in long  term view (Fig. 21, p. 29). Class 1 
(Niger) and 2 (Burkina Faso) hereby represent 
the only EMSs that, according to the database, 
stopped imposing conditions regarding public 
events and did not reconfigure until the end of 
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Event Policies: Overall Developments 
and Heterogeneity
± 1 SD ECOWAS OxCGRT C3 mean
Figure 19: Tilemap of time-related changes of the stringency of policies regarding the cancellation of public events. 
One tile represents a 7-day median of the daily index scores. 11.03.2020 - 03.02.2021. Color-Coding from green (0) to 
red (2): 0: no measures; 1: recommend cancelling; 2: require cancelling; Grey: no data available 
Source: Illustration byJannis Viola. Data: OxCGRT (2021c). 
ECOWAS Public Event Policies  
Figure 20: Mean of all examined EMS in Fig. 17 (p. 26) 
and standard deviation. 
Source: Own Figure. Data: Own calculations based on 
OxCGRT (2021c). 
 




the classification period. The other class allocations are also mainly driven by the 
moment of easing the restrictions, and the hierarchy resembles the one of the school 
closing stringency in large parts.  
Concluding on public event policies, the data shows the same pattern of uniformity of 
action at the beginning of the pandemic and increasing differentiation after a few 
months. Despite the commonalities mentioned above, over time there has been a 
greater divergence between the states in comparison to the school closures, but also 
an overall longer persistence with a restrictive approach and also an earlier 
reintroduction of restrictions. However, it should be noted that in the heatmap 
regarding school closures (Fig. 13, p. 23) not only level 3 (red) but also level 2 (orange) 
includes at least a partial closure. As for the public event policies, towards 
November 2020 most EMSs settled for recommendations of closures instead of 
bans. Fig. 20 (p. 28) supports this analysis of a downward trend in the stringency 
of workplace regulations until the end of the first interpretative period (mid-




When all results of the individual policy fields discussed above 
are consolidated, a distinct continuity in class assignment can 
be observed (Fig. 22). Even though the respective classes must 
not represent an equivalent level of comparison because each 
sub-index was clustered individually and due to the source 
database being an ordinal scale, still an ongoing pattern is 
observable when putting the three policy fields in relation. 
There is a broad continuity in class allocation throughout the 
topics and all class levels, with e.g., Niger and Burkina Faso 
always being in the lowest (less strict) and Cabo Verde, The 
Gambia and Liberia always being in the highest (most strict). 
When putting these results in the context of the infectious 
dynamics in the individual EMSs, one can see some correlation 
between stringency and C/P with for instance Cabo Verde and 
The Gambia also having had the highest numbers in terms of 
cases in the respective observation period. It seems 
remarkable how different the approaches were in the last 
months before December even though the C19 cases seem to 
be comparable low in almost all EMS in that particular period 
while they were relatively similar first.  
Cluster Comparison 
Figure 22: Merging of the results of 
clustering with vector quantification 
for comparison of class assignment to 
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Since the data is solely a representation of policies and not of their impacts, the results should not 
be read as factual mobility patterns. The manifestation of the governments’ regulations in terms 
of (im)mobilities relies on different political and socio-cultural factors. When looking at school 
closing policies for example, the ECOWAS member states’ executive assertiveness and monitoring 
capacities play an apparently significant role. Furthermore, the basis for the regarding policies to 
have an impact on mobility is a considerable diverging one. The mean years of schooling as 
recorded by the UNDP range in between 1.6 (Burkina Faso) and 7.2 years (Ghana) for 2019 
(ECOWAS ET AL. 2020: 22) and the expected duration of schooling varies from 6.5 (Niger) to 12.6 
years (Togo and Benin). And in terms of rural pre-primary education attendance, the numbers 
range from 2% (Burkina 
Faso) and 98% (Ghana). 
The data basis and 
timeliness of these 
statistics vary 
significantly and may no 
longer reflect current 
conditions, but the point 
is to show how different 
the bases of school 
systems and attendance 
among individual 
ECOWAS member states 
are. Accordingly, when 
examining the influence 
of policies on actual 
mobility patterns of 
groups of individuals, one must also take into account the potentially degenerating spatial context 
and socio-political embeddedness, e.g., actual pre-Covid school attendance of certain groups or 
the enforcement of targeted prevention of attendance. Nevertheless, the results show a certain 
tendency of how the diverging mobility regimes influenced human mobility pattern. This is only 
an exemplary contextualisation of the OxCGRT data and can also be applied to the other sub-areas 
of the pandemic regimes examined here. Despite the considerable level of abstraction and the sole 
consideration of policy implications, the data can be used to approach the shape of the C19 regime, 
including commonalities and differences based on the different political spaces they are aimed at. 
Complementary, the manifested changes of human mobility will be discussed in chapter 5.3.  
When dealing with government approaches in terms of policy severity, the significant 
differentiation within the ECOWAS region leads to a further need of structural comparison. The 
OxCGRT did not only publish the indicators analysed above, but also created a set of indices, some 
of which were partly, and some were totally generated on the base of the OxCGRT indicators. One 
of those is the Response Stringency Index, which represents a systematic approach to the 
discussion on policy severity. 
 
Figure 23: EMS rural pre-primary education attendance. Broken up in range of most 
privileged (right side) to most deprived (left side) group as defined by the UNESCO  
Source: UNESCO (2021). 
ECOWAS Pre-Primary Education Attendance 




5.1.1 Overall Response Stringency 
The OxCGRT Response Stringency Index is composed of the following sub-indices: C1 (School 
closing), C2 (Workplace closing), C3 (Cancel public events), C4 (Restrictions on gatherings), C5 
(Close public transport), C6 (Stay at home requirements), C7 (Restrictions on internal movement), 
C8 (International travel controls) and H1 (Public information campaigns). The data has been 
rescaled to a value from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest). Thus, the index represents a more 
comprehensive approach than the specific one chosen in the chapter before, which enables 
highlighting general developments. This perspective on individual EMS’ Stringency Index rating 
over time enables to set the general lockdown severity in relation within the ECOWAS region. 
In general, the impressions discussed above are emphasised. Until the end of March, there are 
diverging but just moderate measures, followed by a pattern of a sharp rise in policy stringency 
in April, leading to an average score around 80. With 100 being the highest achievable score within 
the framework of this index, this represents a comparably robust response before a significant 
differentiation begins. An overall tendency of slow easing over time is seen, which shows as an 
approximately 50% decline in mean ECOWAS Stringency Index score from April to November and 
results in a mean around 40 in November (Fig. 24, p. 31). Yet, this just represents the biggest 
cluster representing the many EMSs with a score around the mark of 40. But at the same time, 
compared to the uniform approach in the first months there are also a lot of other EMSs with a 
significantly more or less severe response, which translates to a considerable scattering in 
Figure 24: The development of the ‘Stringency Index’ over time. Guinea-Bissau not included in database. 01.01.2020 
– 01.03.2021. 
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between 22.2 (Burkina Faso) and 71.3 
(Cabo Verde) at the end of the 
observation period (Fig. 26, p. 32). If one 
looks at which countries have made the 
greatest dispersion in severity, that is, 
developments that would show up as 
strong fluctuations in the graph in Fig. 25 
(p. 32), the EMS that stand out between 
June and November are of interest, hence 
after the period of great uniformity. 
These are Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia and 
Guinea in particular (standard deviation 
of 14.6, 14.4 and 14.6 if measured in the 





All in all, it should therefore be 
noted that the a complex 
landscape of response regimes 
have developed. Despite the 
complexity, and although the scale 
is ordinal and the averages shown 
here are only useful for 
understanding patterns and 
dispersion, a trend can be 
discerned. After the initial severe 
response, there has been a 
continuous consolidation that, 
despite the continued complex 
deviations, shows a levelling off 
around the value of 40 on average 
(Fig. 25, p. 32) even until early 
March 2020. 
 
This perspective aimed at the complex developments over time, but when summarizing the 
average score since the beginning of the pandemic, the following picture emerges:  
 
 
Figure 26: OxCGRT Stringency Index Score vs. time. 01.06.2020 - 
23.11.2020. Same colour allocation as in Fig. 24  (p. 31). 
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Stringency Index: Overall Developments and 
Heterogeneity
± 1 SD
ECOWAS OxCGRT Stringency Index mean
Figure 25: Mean of all examined EMS in Fig. 24 and standard 
deviation.  
Source: Own Figure. Data: Own calculations based on OxCGRT 
(2021c). 
 








Spatial patterns of stringency show an uncertain patchwork without clearly locatable clusters in 
the sense of sub-regions acting in the same way or a division between francophone versus 
anglophone states. The only loose division, with the exception of Mali, which was always part of 
the lower half of the ECOWAS-compared stringency spectrum, is between inland and coastal 
states. The other two landlocked countries Niger and Burkina Faso make up the lowest class in 
terms of stringency. Overall, the differences in severity are enormous, resulting in distinct 
demarcations from adjacent pandemic regimes. Yet, it is important to note that this is still 
representing policies put in place only. It does not need to be per se that crossing a border from a 
state marked here as above-average stringent to one with very low stringency translates into a 
perceivable difference in actual exercise of PHSM. There is no clear correlation between GDP and 
the stringency level shown in the map7 (Fig. 27, p. 33), nor a simple one between total C19 cases 
and totalled stringency over time8. Nevertheless, in the extremes, there are similarities, as Cabo 
 
 
7 Pearson’s r: 0,38 with the data used for the map and GDP (PPP) per capita 2020 estimates (IMF 2021). 
8 Pearson’s r: 0,45 with the data used for the map and the numerical ranking of the cumulated C19 cases in 
relation to million inhabitants as of 01.03.2020 (OWID 2021). 
Figure 27: Map of the spatial distribution of pandemic regime stringency based on the OxCGRT index as mean from 
01.01.2020 – 01.03.2020. White colouring = no data 
Source: Own figure. Data: OxCGRT (2021c). 
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Verde has both the highest average stringency index score (58.7) and the highest number of 
infections9, and Niger has both of the lowest scores10 of all ECOWAS member states. 
The point of view taken with the Government Response Stringency Index is insightful yet lacking 
the contextualization needed for an embedded comparison because of it not including the 
individual country’s situation concerning the C19 case developments with its fluctuations over 
time. For instance, it was shown that the policy stance of Cabo Verde is a significantly more severe 
one than the one of Côte d’Ivoire on 23 November. Yet, when merging this information with the 
data on recent trends in infections, it seems to be appropriate that Côte d’Ivoire has a more “open” 
C19 regime because of them having a far lower C19 infection rate11 at that time. For a systematic 
approach to this perspective, the upcoming chapter will discuss the ‘Risk of Openness Index’ 
followed by a merging of the two sets of data to contextualise severity with pandemic risk. 
 
5.1.2 Risk of Openness 
The Risk of Openness Index was designed to calculate a measure of risk to which a country would 
be exposed by easing their current level of C19 related policy stringency. The index draws itself 
from data on C19 testing and cases as well as the already mentioned OxCGRT indicators, which 
means it overall includes the current governments stance on physical distancing measures as well 
as the developments regarding the infectious dynamics concerning one point in time to compile a 
risk of easing lockdowns12. It is based on the categories developed by the WHO regarding 
governmental measures that need to be in place for pandemic risk reduction (cf. WHO 2020d). 
Fig. 28 (p. 35) maps the risk index scores over time, which relates the previously discussed 
response stringency to the individual EMSs’ COVID-19 situation including level of control of the 
spread of infections, the testing and trace regimes, the management of transnational export and 
import of cases and the populations’ level of understanding and behaviour changes, which is 
operationalised though governmental public information campaigns and mobility data from the 
GCCMP dataset. It can thus be noted that this index already provides a much more complex picture 
that is more situated in the world and not just one based purely on policies. However, the 
limitations of the poor quality of data included here, especially in the West African context, should 




9 27756 C/P as of 01.03.2020 (OWID 2021). 
10 25,0 mean Stringency Index score and 195,8 C/P (OWID 2021). 
11 In terms of confirmed C/P for that day: CPV 1588,2 and CIV 11,9 (OWID 2021). 
12 For a comprehensive description of the included data and the methodology, see HALE ET AL. (2020b).  





The relatively high values for almost all EMSs in the first weeks of the observation period are due 
to the way the index is calculated. It certifies a high risk for all countries at the very beginning of 
the pandemic’s spread, even if there were only a few cases globally, as long as they had not yet 
taken any measures, since a case could have been imported at any time by chance. To be able to 
approach the country-specific risk development, the period analysed here is primarily from the 
beginning of April, when C19 cases appeared and all countries in West Africa had already 
introduced PHSM. The most noticeable aspect of the data is, that the predominant part of the plot’s 
area shows low or medium risk. The mean daily score, when assessing the data since 1 April 2020 
which is a point of time where all EMS introduced initial PHSM, is between 0.25 in The Gambia 
with a comparably strict C19 regime and relatively low case numbers apart from one pronounced 
spike, and 0.55 in Nigeria with continual discovery of new clusters of infection, which did not 
necessarily produce above-average levels in relation to population size but posed a persistent 
threat of major waves of spread. Such particular causes for higher or lower risk can be seen in a 
consideration of the development of the individual RoOI sub-indexes over time (Appendix 10.3). 
For example, in the case of the low values for The Gambia, a very low value in the category "move" 
is also evident, which indicates a high level of travel disruptions, but also that the category "info" 
does not contain any data, as no reliable information on public information campaigns or 
movement data of the population was available. This limits to a certain degree the comparability 
of the overall RoOI score of the two countries and suggests a closer look at the small-scale 
dynamics in the states as expressed through individual RoOI sub-indexes. However, an in-depth 
ECOWAS Risk of Openness  
Figure 28: Heatmap of Risk Index indices of individual ECOWAS member states over time. 28.02.2020 (date of first 
conformation of an C19 case in the ECOWAS region) until 23.02.2021 
Source: Illustration by Jannis Viola. Data: HALE ET AL. (2021).   
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textual description of all the dynamics shown is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it is 
recommended to examine the appendix to gain an in-depth impression of the various aspects. 
Overall, the slow opening in most ECOWAS states seems to have been adapted to the infectious 
situation (HALE ET AL. 2020b), if the data is compared with the situation in European countries, 
where values approaching 1 have dominated in almost all countries since October 2020 (cf. IBID. 
2021). Yet, the question of whether and how the regime stringency was adapted to the respective 
contemporaneous infectious risk will be analysed in more detail in the following chapter. 
Exceptions that have also shown a significantly increased risk in the ECOWAS region in recent 
months are first of all Cabo Verde as the only temporary exceptional case that had almost reached 
the maximum score13 of 1, due to its high number of cases. Additionally, Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and Guinea followed reaching a higher score than 0.7 in the period. On the whole, an 
increase in the risk factor can be seen in almost all countries during the second wave around the 
turn of the year. It decreased again from February onwards in many of the observed countries and 
never exceeded a value of 0.78 except for Cabo Verde, i.e., never rose to the level of countries like 
in Europe with a strong spread due to the continued comparatively low total C/P. 
 
5.1.3 Stringency vs. Risk: Adaption of Responses to Infections 
In this chapter, we aim to contrast the previously elaborated findings regarding governments' 
responses to C19 and the observed contemporary risks. Fig. 29 (p. 37) shows a line plot for each 
EMS with the Risk of Openness Index and the OxCGRT Stringency Index compared over time to 
yield information on the responsiveness of the policy severity to the actual pandemic threat. 
Overall, one could define 3 broad phases of risk and stringency pattern over time that resemble 
the analytic period established in chapter 5.1. The first one is ending around the end of March with 
the shared implementation of severe measurement and the second one is ending roughly around 
November with a second wave of differentiation that is linked to further developments concerning 
the shape of regimes and pandemic’s spread. 
In the first phase, regarding the Risk of Openness, the general score of 0 before the 22nd of January 
as well as the overall high level of risk afterwards on is explained by the methodology of the 
indices. This is due to some sub-indices of the RoOI just begin on that date, which means that there 
is no calculation done before, and afterwards the shared high level is attributable to the fact that 
countries did not have any C19-related measures in place while the pandemic’s spread began, 
which is expressed by a high level of risk despite the low levels of transmission in the index.  
 
 
13 The maximum index score reached in October 2020 was 0,99. 































ECOWAS Stringency Index and Risk of Openness Index  
Figure 29: Line 
plots of 
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and RoOI vs. time. 
1st Jan 2020 – 
17th Jan 2021. 
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OxCGRT (2021c).  
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The more substantial part of this comparison starts with the actual introduction of governmental 
responses, which is reflected by the initial rise of the stringency score and can be understood as 
the second phase. A clear reaction of the risk value to the initial measures can be seen, which can 
be attributed to the low pandemic activity in West Africa and the simultaneous introduction of the 
regimes. The RoOI value is reduced to about a quarter of the total index scale for all EMSs 
examined. This is followed by a differentiation, which can be attributed to the already discussed 
differences in the characteristics of the pandemic regimes and in the local pandemic’s spread. 
Groups of countries can be identified where the adjustment of the severity of the measures - both 
in the form of tightening and loosening - has tended to stabilise the risk level as expressed through 
the RoOI. In the phase up to November 2020, the initial introduction of a relatively strict regime 
until June and the subsequent significant gradual opening up in Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, and 
Togo have led to a stable risk level that ranges between 25 and 50 most of the time. In addition, 
the data sets for Benin, Burkina Faso, the Gambia and Niger behave similarly, but with higher 
inconsistency including stronger temporary fluctuations over a RoOI value above the 50 mark. 
The last group, apart from Cabo Verde, includes Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria, where 
a relatively continuous, gradual relaxation of stringency is followed by a clear increase in risk, 
which is accompanied by a stabilisation above 50 towards the end of the phase. The only exception 
is Guinea, where the risk value is constantly above 50 instead of following the pattern described. 
Cabo Verde is the only state to reach a risk of almost 100 for a short period of time, despite 
permanently above-average stringency. 
The third phase towards the end of 2020 and the beginning of the new year is characterised by a 
continuity of the developments described in phase two in some countries, but in many other 
countries an increase from the level of the second phase can also be seen. There is also a part of 
the EMS which, in this latest phase, for the first time is tightening the measures again instead of 
the previous continuous easing. Countries that tend to remain constant in terms of risk compared 
to the middle of the year include Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal, albeit at 
different levels. For the other countries, there is often a relatively sudden increase in the risk level. 
However, the extent to which an increase in the RoOI score can be attributed to rising pandemic 
risks or declining stringency varies considerably even within the groups formed. Particularly in 
the two countries that have had the highest levels of new infections to date, there is an obvious 
commonality between trends in RoOI and trends in the number of cases during highly infectious 
periods (e.g., August to October in The Gambia and July until the end in Cabo Verde). This can be 
attributed to the "endemic factor" indicator in the index, as it is intended to reflect the increasing 
danger to society as a whole with generally high case numbers and the resulting need for greater 
stringency from a pandemic restriction perspective. In other cases, reactions of the risk value to 
pandemic developments are also visible, but here the general level of risk is also more clearly 
influenced by the level of stringency, since even with low infection numbers, significant 
relaxations increase the potential risk that further openings would cause. When it comes to 
forming groups where, irrespective of the general level of the two indices, it is a question of 
whether a reduction in the severity of the measures has responded to the actual pandemic hazard 
development, and thus the RoOI does not increase as a result of the opening, a different picture 
emerges. The strictness of the regime in the case of Senegal, for example, can be described as 
reactive on the basis of this data, since the risk value was kept stable with the distinct opening 
from May to June, from then on, the risk was further reduced by slight tightening, and towards the 




end, with the renewed increase in risk due to the new number of cases, the reaction was again to 
increase the strictness. Benin also stands out as showing a unique pattern of stabilisation of the 
risk score within the ECOWAS region, albeit in the middle of the scale. The data set for Liberia also 
implies an adjustment of the easing to the actual development of the risk, as the clear opening has 
not been accompanied by a significant increase in the RoOI value. Counterexamples include 
Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana, where further easing of overall stringency is most evident 
during periods of rising risk levels. Another example is The Gambia, where, despite a 
comparatively high level of stringency during most of the period, a significant drop in stringency 
is evident during the greatest increase in risk. 
Regarding opportunities and limitations of this type of data processing and data basis, one can 
state that the juxtaposition of the two indexes as graphs should neither imply that both are based 
on a uniform nominal unit of measurement, nor that there is an ideal way of interaction of the two 
data sets that is worth striving for as a government - for example that a regime only ever must 
keep the Stringency Index score above the Risk of Opening Index score. Moreover, there is no 
universally better way to deal with pandemic threats, since any kind of measure can always have 
undesirable side effects. Moreover, the data basis for the indexes still needs to be critically 
assessed, as despite the relatively solid sources, comparability is hampered by, for example, 
different levels of COVID testing and the varying political contexts from which differently 
formulated policies originate. After all, this is still a one-dimensional view of stringency in the 
common global categories, which can unfold differently in local contexts. It is for example 
discussed whether lockdown measures also had contrary effects in the sense of an increase in 
infections in dense informal settlements that can be widely found in urban West Africa. “In Accra, 
for example, about 53% of households live in a single room, while an even larger proportion relies 
on public toilets, where PD and home confinement cannot be practically observed.” (HAIDER ET AL. 
2020: 8). Forced immobility could have intensified these housing conditions, in which the barriers 
to infection have potentially been lowered. However, most parts of the current state of research 
supports the assumed negative correlation between the tightening of mobility restrictions and the 
spread of the virus (cf. KRAEMER ET AL. 2020), but the previous example should just exemplify the 
diversity of possible social and pandemic manifestations when applying the same executive 
categories in divergent contexts. Hence, this study is not about an evaluation of infection control 
strategies, but about the influences on mobility patterns and the shapes of governance that are 
(re)produced in this context. Moreover, it should also be emphasized here that the stringency is 
the de jure perspective on the regimes, and the dataset does not address manifest implementation, 
as already outlined in the previous chapters. However, despite these limitations, the datasets, and 
the amalgamation of the two made here are considered useful by both the originators of the 
indexes (cf. HALE ET AL. 2020b: 9) and the authors of this study, as statements can still be made 
about the reactivity of regimes and tendential risk implications. 
As the studied region is too large and the local contexts too diverse it is not possible to give a 
representative impression of the actual implementation and the population's response at this 
point. The following chapter aims at bringing together the perspective on the legal framework and 
available data on materialized immobilities.  
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5.2 Public Transport Regimes  
This chapter analyses restrictions on public transport as key for small and large-scale movements. 
Data used here is a combination of the C5 and C7 indicators of the OxCGRT database and the 
‘transit stations’ indicator of the Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Report (GCCMP). The 
Google data shows how visits of and length of stay at bus and train stations change compared to a 
baseline composed of 5 weeks around January 2020 (during the 5-week period 3 Jan. – 6 Feb. 
2020). Yet, the OxCGRT database is missing data on Guinea-Bissau and the GCCMR on The Gambia, 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, so only the ECOWAS member states covered in both sets will be 
treated. 
 






ECOWAS Public Transport Regimes  
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Figure 30: Public Transport Closures, Restrictions on internal movement and change of transit station visits. 1st Jan 2020- 8th Jan 2021. GCCMR data indicates 
changes in number of total daily visitors in transit hubs. Proportional trends of mobility data should not be compared between different nations or regions due to 
potentially differing quality of data collection and processing by Google Maps. But the graph is aimed at illustrating general tendencies in mobility, broad trends 
such as increases, and decreases can therefore also be compared between different countries. Regarding the OxCGRT data represented by the orange and yellow 
bars, the label ‘recommended’ stands for: C5 – database score 2: recommend closing (or significantly reduce volume/route/means of transport available); C7 – 
database score 2: recommend not to travel between regions/cities. And the ‘required’ label indicates: C5 – database score 1: require closing (or prohibit most 
citizens from using it); C7 – database score 1: internal movement restrictions in place. “no measures” represents a score of 0 in the database. Cited according to 
Oxford Policy Tracker Codebook (OxCGRT 2021a) 
Source: Own figure. Data: OxCGRT (2021c) and Google (2021). 
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Changes in the mobility data could be also due to factors other than policy changes. However, the 
recent state of research implies that governmental restrictions are the most influential factor, 
significantly succeeding public information (cf. MENDOLIA ET AL. 2020). Thus, the C5 and C7 sub-
indices were chosen, as public transport closures and restrictions on internal movement 
represent the most impactful policy fields within the OxCGRT categories concerning specifically 
the use of public transport within certain states or regions. 
Fig. 30 (pp. 41-43) might represent this very approach of assessing the individual EMS’ regimes 
on public transport and their potential manifestations through mapping the policies on public 
transport and internal movement as well as presenting the change of transit station visits. It is 
evident that all observed EMS put in place some kind of mobility restriction in the first phase of 
responses, with the majority restricting public transport as well as internal movement and all of 
them putting in place an internal movement policy that was rated level 2 in the database, which 
translates to actual instructions being in place, not only recommendations. In terms of this 
indicator this may for instance refer to road closures, prohibiting or banning travel from certain 
regions, requirement of negative test result or such. At times Cabo Verde and Guinea required a 
negative result of a PCR test that was not older than 72h(cf. IATA 2020b). Especially with regard 
to the limited testing infrastructure, applicability, and enforceability of such a policy could be 
questioned. Nevertheless, there was an ECOWAS-wide policy approach with strict limitations on 
domestic mobility and public transport. However, this only applies to the first weeks after the 
initial wave of government responses. After that, we see a certain fragmentation. The stringency 
of the first weeks also seems to have manifested itself in an overarching response of public 
transport mobility patterns, at least as far as such a statement is possible on the basis of the cross-
national data available so far. The Google mobility data shows a significant decline in all countries 
in visits to locations that are understood by the company's map material as public transport hubs. 
This response shows as a heavy decline that usually begins shortly before the introduction of the 
mobility-related policies discussed here. This behaviour of already significant decline during the 
period of initial restrictions before general lockdown impositions is also seen in other mobility 
data that was published (VODAFONE ET AL. 2020: 4). Although it is significant everywhere, the level 
of decline in visits during the first intense restriction period varies. For example, there are EMSs 
such as Benin, where despite short-lived spikes, a 10-day moving average of visits never drops by 
more than 30 percent compared to the January baseline, and other states such as Cabo Verde 
where a drop of more than 80 percent in the 10-day moving average has been observed. It should 
be noted, however, that Google states that its data should not be used for cross-country or cross-
regional comparisons, as the basis for data collection may differ in divergent contexts. Therefore, 
the focus shall be on the general patterns, and these show a similar appearance in the form of the 
abovementioned decline. The data also reveals a relatively uniform pattern in terms of a rather 
continuous but slow increase of visits after the initial drop, resulting in a level that even surpasses 
the baseline in many cases towards the end of the year. When visually evaluating the google data 
in relation to the OxCGRT restrictions, there seems to be some correlation in the form of a 
response of the mobility data to the mobility constraints. Thus, the interpretation of the present 
data suggests a powerful effect of the regime on the actual movements and flows of individuals. 
Nevertheless, erratic developments in mobility data that are not obviously related to the two sub-
indexes presented here point to equally effective external influencing factors. A clear example of 
this is the behaviour of the graph of public transport hub visits from Nigeria, where the hard cut 




at the end of October has to be explained with the curfews following the violent escalation of a 
police operation at the End-SARS protests14. The C19 regimes are constantly embedded in the 
socio-political space, meaning that they always just coexist with the variety of other regimes 
shaping mobility patterns. And in that context, while comparing the manifestations of powerful 
institutions on such human behaviour in different socio-spatial contexts one should also consider 
the effect of the diverging physio-geographical determining factors on the way, policy may 
translate into reality. Cabo Verde, with its multi-insular setting, provides an obvious example of 
this, as flows of travellers between islands can be managed differently than on the mainland. But 
also dependencies on certain types of mobility differ regarding an island. A combination with the 
above-average stringency of the public transport regime might explain the bigger extent and 
slower recovery regarding the presented immobilities. Another finding is that the correlation of 
the C5 and C7 sub-index restrictions and the google mobility data seems to weaken or disappear 
over time, because the observable reactions of the mobility data regarding countries that fully 
eased C5 and C7 polices after their first introduction and then after some months imposed new 
restrictions is much less evident. Even though there are countries such as Benin and Niger where 
a correlation is observable, however significantly weaker than in the first wave of restrictions. 
There are also countries like Togo and Burkina Faso, where no clear relevant decline is visible 
concerning the second wave, but at least an interruption of the public transport growth in the 
form of a temporary plateau. In Cabo Verde, the google mobility data even shows a continuing 
increase of activity even though a second wave of restrictions on internal movement was 
introduced. This overall tendency of a weaker correlation regarding second waves of policies 
might hint at either a lower level of acceptance or compliance in this later phase of pandemic 
response. Additionally, or instead, it might mean that the more pronounced interaction during the 
first phase is due to the sum of the C5 and C7 restrictions with other simultaneously introduced 
restrictions connected to the initial exuberant response and possibly also greater caution within 
the population due to the novelty of the pandemic scenario. 
There are varying reports on the implementation and feasibility of the public transport measures. 
Regarding Senegal, there are hints on scooter taxis (called Jakarta) being regularly used to 
circumvent restrictions on inter-city travel (NDEYE 2020). There are also reports on minibus taxis 
bypassing gendarmerie roadblocks to move between regions despite the state of emergency, with 
a temporary curfew from 8pm to 6am in Senegal, which has led to the suspension of interurban 
transport and the closure of bus stations as PHSM (DIENG 2020). For instance, it is not only the 
dependence of many individuals on interregional mobility due to trans-local work structures that 
is decisive, but also the lucrativeness of continuing mobility offers despite restrictions (cf. MBAYE 
ET AL. 2020). These bypasses of regulations of intraurban mobility were reported for several EMS, 
but an at least temporary significant decrease of mobility through public transport still seems to 
be evident, as shown in Fig. 30 (pp. 41-43). It seems that policies with approaches of adjustments 
with certain provisions worked more efficiently compared to general prohibitions within the 
tension between informally dominated public transport, individuals’ dependencies of mobility, 
limited state enforcement capacity, and governmental approaches to mobility regulation (cf. IBID). 
There is also information from The Gambia that the mobility of poorer communities and regions, 
 
 
14 The so-called “2020 Lekki Shooting”, 20 October 2020. 
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which were generally more affected by the lockdowns anyway, decreased more during the period 
of restrictions than in regions with lower poverty rates (KNIPPENBERG & MEYER 2020), indicating 
further complexity of materialized immobilities in the inequality of socio-economic relations.  
 
5.3 Individual Immobilisation and Residential Dynamics  
In this chapter we take the approach of the previous one further in not only presenting policy 
stringency, as this is a vital source for outlining mobility regimes but not for mobility itself. 
Instead, we draw on the GCCMR data to assess everyday mobility patterns of individuals in the 
ECOWAS region. 
As to be seen in Fig. 31, all EMSs but Niger introduced a restriction on gatherings concerning the 
number of maximum attendees in the main observational period until November at most or all 
times. A majority of these restrictions were in the range of 10 or less to 100 as maximum number 
of participants, which means a ban on any larger events such as music festivals and large sport 
events in the sense of the policy. Although it highlights wide variations in the stringency and 
timing of these policies shown, and there is an uncertainty about the implementation of these 
Figure 31: Tilemap of time-related changes of the stringency of stay-at-home restrictions. One tile represents a 
7-day median of the daily index scores. 11.03.2020 (day of WHO pandemic declaration) - 03.02.2021. Color-
Coding from green (0) to red (4) according to the source: 0: no measures; 1: restrictions on very large 
gatherings (the limit is above 1000 people); 2: restrictions on gatherings between 101-1000 people; 3: 
restrictions on gatherings between 11-100 people; 4: restrictions on gatherings of 10 people or less; Grey: no 
data available. 
Source: Illustration by Jannis Viola. Data: OxCGRT (2021c). 
ECOWAS Restrictions on Gatherings 




policies15, conclusions can be drawn. In combination with the restrictions outlined in previous 
chapters, an attempt by the C19 regimes to influence the residency behaviour of individuals in 
terms of increasing the amount of time spent immobile in places of residence is exposed. 
On the other hand, Fig. 32 shows the strongest form of policy-based immobilisation of individuals: 
state orders not to leave one's place of residence. Probably due to the scope of such an order, the 
limited means of enforcement and the potential inadequacy of such an order for people who, for 
example, reside informally or earn their living on a daily mobility basis. Such an order has either 
not been introduced in most EMS at all, or only in a weakened form. Senegal was the only ECOWAS 





15 However, compared to other policy fields, there are little reports of violations concerning the restriction 
of gatherings. 
ECOWAS ‘Shelter-in-Place’ Policies 
Figure 32: Tilemap of time-related changes of the stringency of restrictions on gatherings. One tile represents a 
7-day median of the daily index scores. 11.03.2020 (day of WHO pandemic declaration) - 03.02.2021. Color-
Coding from green (0) to red (4) according to the source: 0: no measures; 1: recommend not leaving house; 2: 
require not leaving house with exceptions for daily exercise, grocery shopping, and 'essential' trips; 3: require 
not leaving house with minimal exceptions (eg allowed to leave once a week, or only one person can leave at a 
time, etc); Grey: no data available 
 Source: Illustration by Jannis Viola. Data: OxCGRT (2021c). 
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In general, the Senegalese policy response to COVID-19 was widely discussed in international 
media and was several times rated as one of the best in the world16. Whether this reception was 
accompanied in all cases by a profound understanding of the situation in West Africa may be 
doubted on the basis of the arguments chosen, but it is nevertheless not unreasonable to conclude 
that there are certain peculiarities in the Senegalese C19 regime that can also be identified in an 
intra-West African comparison. While the national response to C19 does not have above-average 
rigour when all potential policy fields are taken together, as seen in chapter 5.1.1, some specific 
measures with particular force, such as the stay-at-home order described here, have been 
introduced, accompanied by a well-received publicity campaign that included official and civil-
society actors. This impression is also supported by the fact that Senegal is the EMS with the best 
average score over time for the RoOI sub-index "community", which focuses on the public 
information campaign and the increase in mobility of the population. In order to approach such 
reductions in public mobility systematically, the following section will use the Google data to 
examine the everyday mobility patterns. 
Within the GCCMR database, we have chosen the category “residential” to analyse the overall 
genesis of immobilities in West Africa as it is the most representative in these terms (cf. LAPATINAS 
2020: 7). It shows a change in duration regarding time spend by people in places of residence on 











16 Cf. PARTIDGE-HICKS (2020), WOODS (2021), FOREIGN POLICY (2020), DE SAM LAZARO (2020) and SPINNEY 
(2020). 
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Figure 33: Individual EMS' GCCMR 'residential' score vs. time. Data representing changes (%) in the daily time 
(duration in hours) people spend in places of residence. 15.02.2020 – 05.02.2021  
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The line plots (Fig. 33, p. 48-49) indicate a percentage change of the total duration, individuals 
stayed at what the underlying Google geospatial metadata infrastructure understood as places of 
residence. Thus, if the average person included in this dataset in Senegal stayed at home for 12 
hours in the pre-C19 baseline timeframe in January and then afterwards stayed at home for 18 
hours, that would show in a score of 50% growth in the respective line plot. Due to the potentially 
different user base of google services and possibly varying information density and accuracy in 
the recording of residence sites, the percentage scores showed here should not be put into direct 
relation between different countries. Yet the data can provide insights into the manifest 
implications of ECOWAS lockdown policies on the small-scale mobility behaviour of people. And 
beyond that, comparisons can still be made between states, albeit in terms of broad patterns 
rather than exact proportions. Despite the limitations of interpretability described in more detail 
in the following chapter, the available data prove an evident influence of the C19 complex on 
individual mobility patterns. In conjunction with the findings on the most influential factors on 
personal C19 responses (cf. MENDOLIA ET AL. 2020), it is very likely that this is primarily the 
influence of the C19 regime. The effect shows a similar pattern across all EMSs: an initial large 
reactivity that shows up as a strong increase in the time people spend at home, which is also the 
highest increase compared to baseline in most cases. This is followed by a much slower decline in 
excess time spent at home compared to the steepness initial increase. This is followed by a certain 
diversification, as some countries (Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo) never 
fall below the initial level (i.e. a reduction in time at home compared to the baseline) to any 
relevant extent during the observation period. The other group (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) 
reach the baseline or sometimes fall significantly below it, which indicates higher mobility. In 
general, the countries also differ more in the behaviour of the data in the second half of the period 
under consideration, although this generally happens closer to the baseline than in the first half. 
In general, the countries also show a larger diversification in the second half of the period under 
consideration, although the range of fluctuation is closer to the baseline than in the first half. 
However, this fluctuation is less clearly linked to the influence of the C19 regime. There are also 
other factors influencing individual mobility and the patterns are less pronounced and the 
pandemic regime stringency is lower in most cases. Despite this more ambiguous nature of the 
corelation, a simultaneity of the smaller observable highs around the turn of the year and the re-
introduction of mobility restrictions associated with the second wave of infection can be observed, 
which hints at the pandemic complex being a partial reason.  
All in all, findings of this chapter include the general evidence of the correlation of the GCCMR data 
and the lockdown policies, especially in the first months, which is supporting the hypothesis of 
new shapes of mobility-related governance and (im)mobilities themselves linked to the pandemic. 
The prominent similarity of these mobility data within the entire ECOWAS region is why we can 
speak of interlinked macro developments in terms of pandemic-related changes in mobility 
patterns. 
 




5.3.1 Mobility Data Limitations 
In recent months, there has been a proliferation of publications using the Google dataset17 or 
similar databases. This is reasonable given that this is a specific type of comprehensive mobility 
data that was not publicly accessible in pre-C19 times, as it requires both a significant degree of 
surveillance and an external incentive for companies to publish this commoditised data. Although 
potentially valuable and otherwise unproducible insights could be gained, it is important critically 
evaluate these datasets. 
As indicated earlier, Google LLC is not the only multinational technology company that has 
released such databases during the COVID-19 pandemic. Also, Facebook Inc. (FACEBOOK 2021) and 
Apple Inc. (APPLE 2021) published similar data sets based on tracked mobility data of individuals 
that were using their services and aggregated to indicate population movement trends. For these 
both alternatives, a usage for this very study was not possible as Facebook’s and Apple’s data sets 
do not include West African countries, implying a first limitations of data availability in the sub-
Saharan context. In addition, as for Ghana (VODAFONE ET AL. 2020), Nigeria (WORLD BANK 2020B), 
and The Gambia (KNIPPENBERG & MEYER 2020) surveys of mobile phone providers have also been 
published. This illustrates that in the context of the pandemic, there has been a sudden availability 
of such data, which is usually not publicly accessible, and an interpretation in terms of changing 
mobility patterns of people seems evident. Nevertheless, when assessing data quality, certain 
limitations occur. Some are related to peculiarities of the socio-technological embeddedness of 
this type of production of data in specific spaces such as Western Africa, others also reflect the 
inherent nature of the underlying logic of these datasets in general. 
A general limitation regarding the databases published by companies such as Google LLC is 
exclusive reliance on a specific kind of smartphone users, which might overrepresent certain age 
and gender groups and especially certain wealth classes. The varying technological habits and 
socioeconomic composition of societies thus limits comparability. This is due to the technical 
implementation of the data collection, since, for example, in order to be mapped by the Google 
dataset, you must have a smartphone with a specific app (Google Maps), a specific setting enabled 
in it, and then be travelling or staying in areas that are recognised by the company as one of the 
categories of places mapped in the database (cf. GOOGLE 2021). Additionally, during this tracking, 
you need a connection to the provider's server. This clearly shows a strong bias regarding the 
layers of population surveyed. The specific national datasets based on mobile phone surveys 
partly circumvent the limitations on the incomprehensibility of the significance through covering 
a broader and probably more diverse group of tracked people. However, a comparability between 
countries was no longer given for these individual studies, as the methodologies and study 
samples sometimes differed significantly. 
The explanation of the requirements for being mapped by the Google dataset reveals a second 
potential weakness: the quality of the first stage of metadata interpretation when the data are 
processed by the supplier before publication. As the focus of Apple and Facebook datasets on the 
coverage of the Global North shows, there continues to be a quality gradient in location-specific 
 
 
17 Cf. OLIVIERA ET AL. (2021), WEN ET AL. (2021), and LAPATINAS (2020). For 08.03.2020, Google Scholar lists 
343 publications mentioning the GCCMR at least once since 2020.  
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digital services along general global power hierarchies, at least when examining the large 
multinational providers. Thus, companies such as Facebook are less likely to address countries in 
the Global South in their e.g. “Facebook Data for Good” when it comes to map- and user data-based 
analysis as there is more uncertainty about the information density and reliability of digital maps 
and digital usage behaviour. This discrepancy in quality follows the market logic of global 
capitalism, as the production of higher quality maps is more easily economically exploited in 
countries with more economic leverage, leading in this case to a possible poorer data reliability of 
the GCCMR data for countries in West Africa. Although the quality of digital maps in major cities 
in West Africa has improved in recent years, partly due to the wider use of digital taxi formats, 
mapping of rural areas is still inadequate. It is precisely this map information on which the 
processing of google movement data is based in order to assign it to certain categories, for 
example whether a geolocated point is in a place of residence or in a park. The categorisation itself 
is another limiting level. "Parks" or fixed workplaces are categories that cannot be directly 
translated in West African settings.  
Overall, however, the biggest constraining factor is the unverifiable level of impact of the 
limitations described above. The authors of the Google data publication state, that country-
specific datasets were not published if the data or respective the underlying digital 
geoinformational infrastructure is not reliable (cf. GOOGLE 2021). This implies that all published 
information might be used to yield interpretational results. But there is no individual opportunity 
for researchers to verify that as no information on the size of the sample or other indications 
which allow conclusions to be drawn as to the reliability of the data are published. Without 
information on what the published mobility trends exactly refer to in terms of number and spatial 
distribution of tracked individuals, precise statements based on these trends are difficult to make. 
However, it must be said that all the problems mentioned are only limitations and not exclusion 
criteria for the general use of such data. After all, it still seems to be a valuable data set with which 
new insights into mobility patterns and group-specific movement behaviour can be generated. It 
should also be emphasised that not all EMSs are covered by the GCCMR, which hints at a pre-
evaluation of reliability of the individual country-related samples by the publishers and the extent 
of the global distribution of google services indicates a sufficient sample size. Even if it would be 
more appropriate to verify this on an individual basis, there is evidence to suggest that the data 
can also be used in relation to the ECOWAS region if findings are always framed according to the 
limitations mentioned. The focus should always be on identifying broad patterns rather than on 
specific comparisons of proportions. 
 
5.4 Border Regimes 
After the previous introduction to mobility-related developments within countries, the focus will 
now be placed on inter- and supranational trends that were observable in the context of pandemic 
responses whose impact on global border regimes is still evident. According to the IOM (2021a: 
5), in November 2020 19 percent of points of entry examined in their global survey infrastructure 
were fully closed and 26 just partially operational. Thus, globally almost half of all border crossing 
points were still at least limited. When the border closures are broken down by type of crossing 




point, it is shown that globally 23 percent of the assessed land border crossing points were fully 
closed, as well as 14% of airports and 11% of maritime border crossing points.  
However, there was a significant differentiation regarding the overall situations in varying regions 
of the world. The regions with the highest share of fully closed Points of Entry according to IOM’s 
analytic framework were West and Central Africa with a total closure rate of 48 percent, followed 
by South America with a significantly lower 28%. ECOWAS member states show the by far most 
restrictive pandemic-related border regimes in the world, underpinning the need for closer study.  
This is particularly relevant as the ECOWAS is an 
organisation of regional integration in which the 
free movement of people is key. It is already 
practised or facilitated to an above-average extent 
compared to comparable African regional 
organisations (cf. Fig. 34). According to ZANKER ET 
AL. (2020: 5), “the protocols reflect the region’s 
culture of mobility”. While “the  free  movement  
protocols  are  widely  praised  for  their  technical  
setup  and  comprehensive policy framework for 
regional mobility, especially in comparison with 
other regional mobility frameworks in Africa” 
(IBID.: 5), not only the pre-C19 implementation but 
also the figures regarding current border closures 
compared to other regions of the world paint a 
different picture.  
 
 
West Africa states have introduced border closures and travel restrictions since mid-March. 
Initially, the restrictions were limited to a national level, later getting a transnational and 
multilateral dimension, with continental and regional organisations, such as the African Union, 
the ECOWAS, and the European Union, as well as international and UN agencies, including the IOM 
being involved (SCHÖFBERGER & RANGO 2020: xxviii). 
All EMSs but Benin initially implemented severe national measures (cf. Fig. 34, p. 53). However, 
in the following months, multilateral regional measures were approved resulting in an ECOWAS 
statement from June 2020, which includes an agreement of the member states to gradually reopen 
borders by the end of July and to resume the free movement of goods and people. This would 
involve facilitating internal transport within member states as a first step, then opening land and 
air borders between them, and opening borders with countries with low and controlled COVID-
19 contamination as the last one (ECOWAS 2020). 
ECOWAS Regional Integration Score  
Figure 34: ECOWAS’s Scores on the Five Dimensions 
of Regional Integration. Dotted line represents 
Africa's overall scores 
Source: AFRICAN UNION ET AL. (2020).  
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Figure 35: Rows represent the country/territory/area that are imposing the restrictions and Columns are the 
countries/territories/areas to which restrictions are imposed upon. Colour coding: Red -Total restriction - 
country/territory/area has imposed a total entry restriction for nationals and/or passengers coming from restricted 
country/territory/area, irrespective of the period of restriction; Yellow - Partial restriction - country/territory/area 
has imposed some restrictions to nationals and/or passenger coming from restricted country/territory/area. Those 
partial restrictions could be also related to visa changes, medical measures, among others; Grey - No official 
restriction reported to IOM. *EU is marked with a colour if the respective country did impose restrictions concerning 
several member states of the European Union, not necessarily all. No linear time interval, points in time chosen due to 
notable policy changes. 
Source: Own Figure. Data: IOM (2021b). 
ECOWAS Travel Restrictions Matrix 




The heatmap (Fig. 35, p. 54) indicates ECOWAS travel restrictions regarding certain points in time, 
thus allowing a retrospective analysis. Eight days after the WHO declared C19 a pandemic, the 
majority of EMSs did not introduce transnational mobility restrictions yet, but some introduced 
total bans for travellers from the EU. Sierra Leone and Benin were the exceptions, having already 
introduced partial restrictions regarding a majority of other West African states. 17 days later, 
most of EMS (ten out of 15) already imposed total restrictions regarding all other member states 
and the EU. Benin is the only EMS that never reported a total restriction to the IOM, with all other 
West African States having implemented such a policy by the end of April. This situation continued 
until the beginning of June with Liberia being the first other country, whose ECOWAS-related 
travel regime was being categorised as partial by the IOM. Usually, a partial restriction in the 
ECOWAS region means medical measures such as a PCR test upon entry, but in some cases, it also 
means mandatory quarantine (cf. IATA 2020b). From then on, the situation diversified between 
total and partial restrictions, so that by the end of August slightly less than half of the EMS had 
relaxed their requirements. Only a part of the entire bilateral travel and border policies is shown 
here, whereby most of the EMS in this period, if they are only shown as red in the figure, also 
denied entry to the citizens of all other states in the world with individual exceptions. This trend 
continued, and by mid-October only 2 countries were still reported as total. These two states (The 
Gambia and Cabo Verde) are also the ones with above-average C19 outbreaks. By the end of 
November, there were no more total restrictions between the EMS, only the total entry ban 
imposed by the EU, which was only reciprocated by Senegal and Guinea. The situation has since 
stabilised, and the part of the figure portraying the travel matrix for the 30.11.2020 is still the 
same as of 01.03.2020.  
 
The plots (Fig. 36) illustrate the share of entry restrictions vs. share of entry conditions; global 
and regional to contextualize the dynamics treated above. A decline of hard restrictions (red) after 
a peak of approximately 80 percent share in total reported travel regulations is observable. This 
indicates that the developments in the ECOWAS region regarding an initial sharp increase in 
border regime stringency and afterward a gradual relaxation represent a global phenomenon – 
the West African dynamics seem to be no exception. Yet, the peak of hard restrictions with almost 
100% share in Central and West Africa and the speed of the decline are exceptional. When looking 
 
Entry Restrictions vs. Conditions 
Global Overview 
Figure 36: Share of entry restrictions vs. share of entry conditions; global and regional 
Source: Modified from IOM (2020a). 
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at the region-specific developments, the special characteristics of the ECOWAS border regime 
dynamics (represented here by the IOM spatial category "Central and West Africa") become 
apparent: the EU is still characterised by a high level of hard restrictions and the other SSA regions 
never even reached such a high level of hard restrictions but do also show a significantly slower 
reduction of regime severity.  
It is important to note that non-reported are not included. The figure represents the share of hard 
restrictions versus less severe ones concerning all reported kind of border crossing measures but 
does not take openness in account. Still, the data represents a vast majority of entries in the 
database: the proportion of global CTAs (Country/Territory/Area) that are tagged as “no reported 
restrictions” accounts since March 2020 to September for a stable share of approximately 15%, 
the number of confirmed “no restrictions” has increased from 0% in March to 3% by the end of 
September (IOM 2021c). Thus, representativeness can be concluded and the overall 
developments of the West African C19 border regimes can be outlined in relation to the rest of the 
world. 
However, this perspective just assesses the region’s dynamics as a whole, so an examination of 
specific implementations within West Africa is also needed. Fig. 37 underlines the impression of 
a robust closure as the initial reaction of almost all ECOWAS member states, which was then 













Figure 37: Tilemap of time-related changes of the stringency of international travel control policies. One tile 
represents a 7-day median of the daily index scores. 11.03.2020 (day of WHO pandemic declaration) - 03.02.2021. 
Color-Coding from green (0) to red (4) according to the source: 0: no restrictions; 1: screening arrivals; 2: quarantine 
arrivals from some or all regions; 3: ban arrivals from some regions; 4: ban on all regions or total border closure; 
Grey: no data available 
Source: Illustration by Jannis Viola. Data: OxCGRT (2021c). 
 
ECOWAS International Travel Policies 




The period of greatest deregulation to date was between November 2020 and January 2021, with 
the majority of EMS calling only for C19 screening on arrival and others demanding a mandatory 
quarantine, at least for travellers from certain regions. The only country at the time that made an 
exception was Senegal, where entry of citizens from the EU was still prohibited18. There are 
contradictory reports on the handling in Guinea, and the latest tilemap entries for Benin seem to 
be erroneous. Nevertheless, these sets of data serve as a general overview of policy approaches, 
but do not consider the situation at specific border posts. 
 
Figure 38: Status of entry and exit points by EMS. Grey colouring = unknown. As of 10.12.2020.  
Source: Own figure. Data: IOM (2020b). 
Fig. 38 illustrates the status of entry and exit points in the ECOWAS region as of 10.12.2020 to give 
an overview of the dynamics. An easing of the entry restrictions within the ECOWAS region does 
not inevitably mean that the borders are open. Despite closed borders, people from Togo for 
example were allowed to enter Ghana in December when complying with the medical measures 
(IOM 2021b). The map underlines that the ECOWAS region shows highly regulated border 
mobility with distinct local differences in terms of stringency. 
Yet, closed land border posts do not necessarily mean that cross-border mobility came to a stand-
still. IOM reports indicate that closed borders within the ECOWAS region continue to be crossed 
undocumented (cf. e.g., IOM 2020c). There is also a sharp difference between the handling of 
airports and land border points. Most airports listed are presented as fully operational or open. 
By the end of 2020, all airports (IOM 2021d) in the ECOWAS region were operational with all but 
 
 
18 However, inconsistencies between the OxCGRT database and that of the IOM become apparent, as the 
latter, for example, continues to record a travel ban for European countries for Guinea around the turn of 
the year, but has no information on the sudden strong regulation of Benin noted here (cf. IOM 2021b). 
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one being totally open. That does not mean that the number of incoming flights is back on the pre-
C19 level. In terms of maritime border points, a majority is reported as being fully operational 
again, but the division is less sharp: three of the 18 examined crossings are labelled as partially 
operational and three as “fully closed”. Restrictions here have been predominantly eased but there 
are still noticeable restraints. The situation regarding land border crossings heavily differs from 
the two other types with a slight majority of border points still being fully closed. Just 9% of are 
reported to be totally open. For mid-March 2021, the regarding numbers almost did not change 
at all (cf. IBID.). Still, there are no fully closed airports, 16% fully closed blue border crossings, but 
55% closed land border points. 
It is noteworthy that the extent of monitored border crossing points for individual EMS database 
does not correlate with country size. Senegal for example is represented by 67 points in this 
particular database, and Nigeria just with three. The proportional data mentioned above should 
therefore not be understood as absolutely accurate, but they are useful for identifying general 
patterns. When set in a global context, Western Africa was in January 2021 among the regions 
with the highest share of fully operational airports (cf. IOM 2021a: 8). With maritime border 
points the ECOWAS region is placed in the middle of all regions surveyed (cf. IBID.: 10) and remains 
by far the region with the highest reported share of land border closures (cf. IBID.: 11). Thus, there 
is a clear tendency of the overarching ECOWAS C19 border regime to give clear preference to the 
connectivity to international air transport over intra-regional border openings, thus contradicting 
the strategy called for in the communication of the ECOWAS Ministerial Coordination Committee 
on Transport, Logistics and Trade mentioned at the beginning of this chapter (ECOWAS 2020).  
In terms of enforcement of border regulation policies during the first weeks of lockdown, in Ghana 
for instance, ECOWAS citizens, who usually would be allowed to cross ECOWAS borders due to 
the free movement protocol were arrested (NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION AUTHORITY 2020). Within 
ECOWAS, there is a distinct variation in the individual governmental interests in a reinforcement 
of border control or instead a strengthening of free movement of people independent from the 
pandemic, which adds a further dimension to the complexity of C19-related border regimes. The 
governments of Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, and the Gambia have been reported to have a 
partial individual interest in strengthening border controls (ZANKER ET AL. 2020: 7). Thus, an 
intricate picture of competing incentives is produced by these particular interests in combination 
with the initial concept of free movement represented by the protocols, demands for so called 
migration management, well established informal border mobility and trade, pastoralism, and the 
topical efforts to mitigate imports and exports of SARS-CoV-2 fomites. Informality is key for 
contextualising these border regimes in the West African situation where official regulations 
impact socioeconomic realities in a rather dialectic way. If they were actually enforced, they would 
have a primarily negative impact on the informal sphere, if only because official regulations 
always follow the logics of the form, omitting the residue in the sense of HART (2015). At the same 
time, the informal in itself draws its scope of agency from acting in extraformal spaces. Thus, 
creating a formal framework aimed at limiting cross-border flows of people and goods might as 
well produce the opposite. States with an entrepôt role such as Benin or The Gambia see the 
volume of their informal trade with their neighbours (Senegal and Nigeria) increase significantly 
whenever the latter tighten trade restrictions on certain products to protect them. For example, 
Nigeria's long history of restricting exports of subsidized oil products to Benin and recurrent 
border closures by the Nigerian side due to various (trade) political disputes (GOLUB & MBAYE 




2019) have played a major role in the genesis of a parallel economy concerning the trade in these 
products, which employs as many people in Benin as the country’s civil service. (MBAYE & DIAGNE 
2020).  
Therefore, one has to not only study specific border regimes but also the context of heterogeneous 
spatial distribution of cross-border interdependences within the ECOWAS region. Impacts of 
border closing and related mobility restrictions vary due to different levels of integration in 
transnational flows of people and goods. Thus, the 16-month closure of Nigerian border points 
towards Benin took place before the pandemic, was not based on economic and security-related 
issues and had an extensive influence in other nations of the ECOWAS region (and beyond) due to 
Nigeria’s position in trade and transport regimes and regional distribution logics. The impacts and 
the partial reopening on 16.12.2020 (NDA-ISSIAH ET AL. 2020) will be further discussed in latter 
parts of the study. In general, this impactful case of border closures illustrates the scope of such 
measures within the ECOWAS region but also the political embeddedness of these that goes 
beyond questions of pandemic mitigation. 
 
5.4.1 Cross-Broder Migration 
In this chapter we outline C19-related changes in cross-border mobility patterns. Due to the 
complexity of the topic, the focus is on key developments with regard to migration. Overall, the 
pandemic complex “has dramatically changed the global migration and mobility landscape and 
added a layer of complexity to migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean” 
(SCHÖFBERGER & RANGO 2020: xx). Studying changes concerning migration as one of the most 
formative intersectional phenomena in West Africa, is essential when trying to outline mobility 
patterns in the region. Key figures will be given to outline major trends followed by a case study 
of relevant points of migratory movements in Mali, which represents an important but volatile 
transit point for migrants in the region. 
Following the introduction of mobility restrictions in March 2020, overall migration flows in West 
and North Africa and from these regions to Europe have decreased by 40% between March and 
April. Due to the dominant directionality towards the north in transnational long-distance 
migration, West and North Africa form a migratory system and are partly considered together in 
this chapter. We rely primarily on the IOM's global data collection infrastructure for registering 
cross-border movements (Displacement Tracking Matrix), as there is a lack of alternatives with 
similar translocal comparability and data density and continuation during C19 restrictions. 
Between March and May 2020, the decrease of flows through transit points in West and Central 
Africa recorded by the Flow Monitoring Registry (FMR) of IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix 
(DTM) lessened by more than a third. Yet towards May, a significant increase followed already 
(IBID.: xxii). Within this overall pattern, internal flows have increased more rapidly than cross-
border movements.  
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These key trends of migratory 
movements, especially in the Sub-
Saharan context needs to be 
understood as entangled with 
local and transnational socio-
economic developments in 
diverse manners. It is not only the 
case that sudden, significantly 
shrinking emigration movements 
have implications for the socio-
economic situation in the country 
of origin (e.g., less remittances), 
but also that external socio-
economic changes have a direct 
impact on migration, as a certain 
level of prosperity is the basis for 
transnational migration. 
Accordingly, for example, a 
pandemic related economic crisis 
in the West African countries 
could lead to a longer-term 
decline of migration movements 
(cf. CLEMENS 2020 and BUETTNER & 
MUENZ 2020).  
 
According to the IOM (2020c), migrants have to use informal ways of border crossing on the main 
south-north routes, due to the official checkpoints being closed because of C19 regulations in mid-
2020. People on the move must either cross at official but closed checkpoints or at nonofficial 
points of the border when severe regulations were put in place. Thus, the border regimes do not 
directly translate into the immobilisation of migrants and furthermore, the established demands 
for disease screening and health precautions are also not given in the context of such forms of 
migratory flows (cf. IBID.).  
The initial decline of flows through transit points identified and monitored by the IOM in West 
and Central Africa in March was 40 percent and for the following month 39 percent. Yet towards 
May, a significant increase of 65% was already monitored again (SCHÖFBERGER & RANGO 2020: xxii). 
If visualised as the weekly number of recorded movements of Flow Monitoring Points in Chad, 
Mali, Niger, and Nigeria (Fig. 39, p. 60), which represent the only countries that had permanently 
active IOM flow monitoring points in the WACAF region during the pandemic, the pandemic 
impact becomes evident. Between week 11 and 12 (second half of March), the slump accounts for 
a decrease of 60% of recorded individuals. Yet, the initial drop is followed by a consistent rise, 
leading to the observed individuals count already approaching the level of March in July again. 
The succeeding fluctuation indicates a return to regular mobility in the region according to the 
IOM (2020d: 1). In terms of observed movements, cross-border flows as well as internal 
Figure 40: Weekly recorded movements in FMPs in the region West and 
Central Africa (WACAF) 
Source: Modified from IOM (2020d). 
Figure 39: Comparison of cross-border flows and internal flows as 
recorded by the WACAF FMR 
Source: Modified from IOM (2020d). 




movements were both impacted by the pandemic complex (Fig. 40, p. 60). Thereby, the extent of 
the initial impact reflected by the data is similar both in terms of decline and subsequent recovery. 
However, from June onwards, a differentiation emerges in which cross-border movements 
continue to increase, but the observed internal flows decrease again. The aforementioned growth 
in cross-border movements was primarily due to surges in Arlit (Niger) in July and Kano (Nigeria) 
in September. The substantial increases regarding people on the move after the downward trend 
following the first introduction of border closings ultimately overtook the figures of the previous 
year, resulting in an overall growth of 4% on year-to-year basis (IOM 2021f: 1). It can thus be 
noted that intraregional migration in West Africa was initially severely affected by the policy 
responses to the pandemic, which resulted in a massive decline in observed mobile migrants. 
Towards July 2020, however, the overall figures rebounded.  
In the field, these disruptions materialised in the form of “several dozen thousand migrants being 
stranded while attempting to cross borders from one country to another or being quarantined 
after entering a country” (IOM 2020d: 2). For April 2020, the IOM (2020k: 3) already estimated 
these cases of forced immobility to over 21,000. Several programs aiming at supporting people on 
the move halted due to the pandemic complex, especially in the first months of the spread (MMC 
2020: 9). The disruptions of migratory movement possibilities led to chartered flights in the 
ECOWAS region organized by the IOM to bring people home.  
Despite already mentioned subversion of border restrictions, the comparably harsh approach 
towards border closures in Western Africa still seems to have had an impact, but when putting 
the main migratory routes towards Europe (2020 versus 2019) into relation, a more complex 
picture emerges. The Western Mediterranean Route19 was recorded to have significant declines 
(-29%) while the previously less frequented central one20 even grew substantially (+185%). But 
the Eastern Mediterranean Route21 was the one with the biggest decline of -47 percent 
(SCHÖFBERGER & RANGO 2020: xxiv). But within the Western Mediterranean Route, which despite 
the decreases still represents the most frequented one, there were significant shifts observable, 
and an accelerating growth towards the end of the year. As a result, the Western Mediterranean 
Route via the Canary Islands became the main route to Europe with a total share of 61% in Q4 
2020. Due to the strong growth towards the end of the year, more than twice as many people 
arrived in Europe22 via this route in Q4 2020 than in Q4 2019 (IOM 2021e). Recent dynamics on 
the route to the Canary Islands play an important role in these shifts of migration patterns. 
Compared to 2019, in 2020 there was a multiplication in numbers of migrants that were moving 
from Senegal to the Canary Islands. For the year 2020, the figures already showed an increase of 
more than 1100% compared to the 2019 counts (IOM 2021e: 3). This drastic change in routes 
calls for further research, but current information hints at the reasons being a combination of 
impediments to freedom of movement regarding the other potential migration routes, more long-
 
 
19 WMR towards Spain and Canary Islands (also called “The Western Mediterranean and the Western  
African Atlantic routes”). 
20 CMR towards Italy and Malta. 
21 EMR towards Bulgaria and Greece. 
22 Note that the IOM classification of regions is based on the UN DESA approach that relies on national 
borders, which means that the Canary Islands are in that sense understood as part of Europe. 
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term socio-economic vulnerabilities but also economic impacts of the pandemic. The revival of 
this route, that was not heavily frequented in the years before, already began after interventions 
of the EU immobility regime in 2018 along Morocco’s northern coast, which led migrants to seek 
for alternative routes (SHRYOCK 2020). Nevertheless, the drastic increase took place during the 
pandemic, which implies certain causal links amplified for instance by fisheries shortages in 
Senegal and a drought in Morocco. The impacts of the pandemic did not only increase disruptive 
forces on cross-border movement possibilities and seemingly enforce certain causes for 
emigration but did also increase pressure on the migratory management infrastructure on the 
Canary Islands themselves, because due to C19 both transfers to the Spanish mainland as well as 
deportation flights were halted (MMC 2020). Surveys suggest the high incidence of COVID-19 was 
even used as a narrative to drive further interest in immigration towards Europe from Senegal (cf. 
SHRYOCK 2020). But in addition to Senegal as the main starting point of flows towards the island 
from the ECOWAS region, boat movements were also observed from Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia 
and Guinea (IOM 2020e). 
In surveys conducted between July and September 2020, 77% of respondents stated that “COVID-
19 was not a factor in their decision to leave or that they had left before the pandemic began” 
(MMC 2020: 11). Nevertheless, 76% reported an increased difficulty of crossing borders and 34% 
disruptions of movements within countries in West Africa. Additionally, 24% of questioned 
migrants stated that they were “too afraid to continue on due to the virus” (IBID.: 13). The 
pandemic heavily impacts movements but is not a mayor driver for departures yet. Nevertheless, 
in another survey carried out in the same period (IOM 2020f), 26 percent of respondents indicated 
that they had experienced difficulties in continuing their economic activities since the beginning 
of the pandemic. Accordingly, only a few months after the emergence of West African C19 regimes, 
the pandemic was already profoundly influencing socio-economic structures. According to the 
first survey, migrants in Burkina Faso were the one stating the most that C19 increased the 
difficulty of crossing borders and also were the ones with the highest negative impact in terms of 
monetary resources for a continuation of the journey, but the respondents in Niger represented 
the majority of migrants indicating difficulties of movements within a country (MMC 2020: 12).  
Regarding fluctuations of such movements within EMS and on border-crossings, a significant 
variation between different points of examination is evident (cf. IOM 2020g: 3). Thus, a more 
detailed perspective is needed, which shall be given through examining a case study of border-
crossings in Mali. Four exemplary points in the country, that constitutes an important location in 
south-north migration routes, were chosen to represent developments regarding mobility pattern 
of transnational migration (Fig. 41, p. 63). These four spots are high-traffic flow monitoring points 
(FMPs)23 in the inner part of the country and on the borders with Algeria, Niger, and Burkina Faso. 
 
 
23 FMP Timbuktu: Located in a migration-relevant place in the city, most migrants passing by here travel to 
/ from southern Mali and northern Algeria, some of whom want to continue to other parts of North Africa 
and Europe, FMP Gao-Wabaria: Located in a migration-relevant place in the city, same main direction of 
flows as above, different route; FMP Heremakono: Border post between Mali and Burkina Faso in Sikassa 
region, mainly flows from southern and central Burkina Faso to southern Mali; FMP Menaka: City close to 
Niger, mostly flows towards Algeria. 





Figure 41: Daily Movements of migrants recorded by four exemplary IOM DTM Flow Monitoring points in Mali, 1 
August 2017 – 31 October 2020.  
Source: Modified from IOM (2020d).  
When examining overall pattern concerning the IOM DTM FMP in Mali, one can see significant 
changes of mobility patterns, especially in the first months of the pandemic. Yet, the governmental 
restrictions did not just generally lead to reduced migrant flows in all places. The example of Mali 
rather suggests a shift of routes than a universal spread of immobility. Nevertheless, there was a 
significant reduction in total numbers at the same time. The two FMPs of the selection covered 
here that mainly track flows to and from Algeria are the one in Timbuktu and the one in Gao-
Wabaria. In Timbuktu, one can observe a significant slump in daily movements, whereby the 
extent of outgoing flow drops more severely than the ingoing one. But all in all, a temporarily 
massive reduction in all movements in observable compared to the previous years covered here. 
At the same time in Gao-Wabaria one can see a significant increase in in- and outgoing flows. This 
hints at shifting migratory routes related to the simultaneously acting mobility regimes. The 
substantial declines observed in Timbuktu, an important but more inland point on the main 
routes, underline the assumptions of a temporary significant decline in the absolute numbers of 
mobile migrants and also the parallel shift in routes, as at the same time a massive yet unsteady 
increase in numbers is observed at the border with Burkina Faso in Heremakono. However, if one 
looks more closely at the origin and direction of the flows, the phenomenon is not a just a simple 
shift in the paths chosen by migrants. This can be seen, for example, in the case study of the Gao-
Wabaria FMP (Fig. 42, p. 64) which is generally an important transit point for migration between 
North and West Africa (cf. IOM 2020h: 5). As mentioned above, it has seen a great increase in flows 
during the period of mobility restrictions. However, the information provided by the individuals 
migrating regarding their final destination has changed radically. Whereas in the months before 
64   University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 26 
 
Africa Multiple connects 3 
the pandemic around half of the 
respondents still indicated a 
European country as their desired 
destination (in December 2019, 
for example, 29% alone said they 
wanted to go to Italy), this 
changed completely from March 
and April onwards. At first, the 
majority still wanted to go to 
Algeria, but no longer to Europe. 
In May and June, Mali itself was 
predominantly mentioned as the 
final destination. If we look at the 
countries of origin of the 
interviewees there was a massive 
increase in the number of people 
coming from Burkina Faso. Before 
the restrictions, it was mainly 
people from Mali, with Burkina and 
Mauritania also accounting for a significantly smaller but still relevant proportion. It can therefore 
be concluded that the changes are not purely quantitative and directional, but also qualitative. 
Other monitoring points show comparable developments. There was an almost complete 
cessation of West African domestic transcontinental migration movements towards Europe, and 
instead an increase in primarily regional and transnational labour migration24. In terms of 
regional mobility patterns, two further dimensions are relevant. On the one hand, a larger scaling 
of the consideration of migration routes does not show a general complete stop of movements 
towards Europe, but a larger-scale shift from West African routes to the waterway to the Canary 
Islands. On the other hand, there was an increase in forced movements due to the armed conflicts 
in the central Sahel. Accordingly, despite the clear temporal correlation of the described changes 
and the pandemic-related mobility restrictions, the overall West African C19 regime cannot be 
held solely responsible, but other influencing factors such as migration control and internal 
displacement must be taken into account.  
There are also disruptions in the global dimension of West African migration. “While some are 
stranded in some destination countries, especially in the Middle East, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that many of the popular destination countries have reduced the number of visas issued to West 
Africans, as only essential travel is allowed in some cases. At the same time, many of the migration 
schemes through which West Africans are recruited for job placement in some of the emerging 




24 A vast majority of the cross-border migration discussed here is primarily caused by the search for 
employment (cf. IOM 2020f: 6). According to IOM, the here discussed rise of people on the move from BFA 
is mainly due to job possibilities (often connected to gold mining and panning) (cf. IOM 2020h: 6). 
Figure 42: Proportional main intended final destination of migrants vs. 
time as recorded by the IOM FMP in Gao-Wabaria 
Sources: Own figure. Data: IOM (2020i). 




The data discussed in this chapter focused on types of cross border migration and mobility that is 
primarily caused by the search for employment (cf. IOM 2020f: 6). But beyond this, other forms 
such as transboundary flows due to internal displacement in violent conflicts need to be 
considered. In the case of the ECOWAS region, this primarily concerns the multidimensional 
conflicts in the Central Sahel region, where displacement is currently concentrated in the Liptako 
Gourma region of Mali and Burkina Faso. Around this region alone for example, there were 
173,139 cross-border refugee movements between January and November 2020 (IOM 2020j). 
How mobility patterns related to the situation in this region and IDPs in the ECOWAS region in 
general have been influenced by the local COVID-19 regimes requires future specific study. 
Nevertheless, there are already reports on several ways in which a pandemic might drive 
displacement (cf. UNSDG 2020: 21). Furthermore, an increase in undocumented migration and 
trafficking in West Africa was reported (TEYE 2020). However, this increase in informal and 
potentially exploitative practices should also be recognised as a fragmentary constituent of the 
wider phenomenon of changing patterns of mobility in West Africa. 
To conclude: COVID-19 should not be presented as a direct, monocausal driver of migration in the 
ECOWAS region as undocumented migration is becoming increasingly complex, elaborate and 
mosaic. Nevertheless, from what could be observed so far, the pandemic impacted migration 
systems in several, distinct ways reinforcing a reshaping of mobility pattern in the region.  
 
5.5 Aviation 
Western Africa is entangled in networks of different types of transnational aviation-based 
mobility (cf. GABRIELLI ET AL. 2019: 18). Air travel represented the major medium for COVID-19 to 
spread globally (cf. MOUTON et al. 2020a) and the annual growth of passenger traffic (in RPK) is 
estimated to shrink by 66.3% for 2020 after averaging +6.9% in the 5 years before (cf. ICAO 2020: 
70). This translates to a yet unseen phenomenon in the development of worldwide carried 
passengers (Fig. 43, p. 66). International passenger air traffic was hit harder with an overall 
reduction of 66% of seats offered by airlines, domestic traffic saw a seat reduction of 38% for 
2020 on a year-on-year basis (ICAO 2021a: 4). 
In relation to other regions of the world, it is evident that Africa was the most affected region in 
terms of total seat capacity in the first months following the initial wave of regime stringency 
(IBID.: 7). Also, when comparing the monthly number of international passenger flights by region 
for June 2019 and 2020, Africa is the region of origin with the strongest losses (-91.33%), although 
all other regions were also severely affected, with a drop of more than 80% in all cases (UN CSSA 
2020: 68). However, this was followed by a slightly steeper rebound than the average for the 
industry as a whole (IATA 2020: 1). In terms of capacity, the African continent was also the one 
with the biggest decline in domestic travel, that was almost as big as the international one from 
Africa (AFDB & ALG 2020: 5). Therefore, it is noteworthy, that in Africa, international travel is 
estimated to recover significantly slower compared to the domestic one (ICAO 2020: 74). 
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Even though states in Western Africa were reported not to be among those with the highest risk 
of importing C19 cases through air travel (GRISSOM ET AL. 2020), the majority of the traceable 
imports of cases that have led to internal spread in EMSs are due to air movements. Various 
restrictions on air traffic have been introduced as well as influences of the recent global 
disruptions have been noticeable. Accordingly, the ECOWAS also experienced, at least 
temporarily, a significant decline in air travel. When observing all scales of passenger travel (inter-
continental, inter-regional, regional, domestic) together in terms of seating supply, Western and 
Central Africa (WACAF) as a region is less hit than Eastern and Southern Africa. Yet, the decreases 
are compared to the figures of the respecive months of the year 2019 still substantial with -70% 
for May 2020 and -46% for October 2020. In Southern Africa these numbers were -90% and 
respectively -69%. Northern Africa shows similar but slightly more severe numbers then WACAF 
(AFDB & ALG 2020: 8). When assessing route offers from the different regions, a slightly different 
picture emerges, because WACAF is one of the two regions with the biggest decrease for May 2020 
(-64%) in the intracontinental comparison. But WACAF at the same time is the region with the by 
far fastest recovery in this category (-24% y-o-y for October). In terms of just inter-regional and 
regional traffic, an overall similar impression appears when applying the same categories (seating 
supply and route offer), with West and Central Africa being the African region with the fastest 
recovery (IBID.: 9). 
 
Figure 43: Number of passengers carried worldwide in millions, 1945-2020 
Source: Modified from ICAO (2021a). 







Figure 44: Active commercial, scheduled Flights as published by Airportia. 09.03. – 02.02 of the regarding years.  
Source: Own figure. Data: AIRPORTIA (2021). 
When breaking down the before mentioned regional dynamics on the country level in terms of 
flights per country on a pre-COVID versus pandemic time frame (Fig. 44), a more diversified 
picture emerges. In all of the three observed EMSs, that represent the ECOWAS member states 
with the three busiest airports25, the same initial pattern is observable: steep drop in observed 
 
 
25 Measured as by scheduled departures of passenger flights daily regarding countries biggest airport as of 
04.02.2021 (cf. CTRAVEL 2021). 
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flights in the second half of March, approaching zero towards the end of March. Afterwards until 
the beginning of July almost no active flights were recorded in all three cases. From then on, 
gradual increase of flight activity with sporadic irregularities. Recovery of approximately half of 
2019’s average activity level in October in the case of Nigeria, making it the slowest increase. Côte 
d’Ivoire and Ghana reached that level in August already, with Côte d’Ivoire having a slower 
recovery afterwards resulting in a level of active flights that is still less in January 2021 compared 
to the previous year, whereas the steeper increase in the case of Ghana even leading to a 
























Year-on-year data is only available for Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria. For the other states, 
however, a similar pattern appears to be generally evident based on daily departures from the 
biggest international airport of each individual EMS in 2020, that was published26 by the ICAO 
 
 
26In this database, it should be noted that for all countries and regions, the lowest number of daily flights 
ever shown is 1, so there has never been a case of 0 flights per day. The authors of this study assume with a 
high certainty, on the basis of other available data, that there is an error in the database, in which complete 
settings of air traffic are also shown as 1 flight per day. Until the publication of this study, however, the ICAO 
had not commented on this issue.  
Figure 45: Daily number of total departures from all international airports of in Western 
and Central Africa as an overall region and Cabo Verde as a case example. ADS-B data 
published by ICAO. 13.10.2019 – 19.01.2021 
Source: Modified from ICAO (2021b). 
COVID-19 Airport Status 




(2021b). Only the data on Ghana draws another impression, because in terms of daily departures 
from Kotoka International Airport (DGAA), the daily figures on departures just reached half of the 
level of the months prior of the pandemic impact. Most countries show a similar pattern of severe 
collapse - usually a complete shutdown of air traffic - followed by a slower phase of recovery, 
which is also represented by the overall figures for the whole WACAF region (cf. Fig. 45, p. 68). 
However, it should be noted that there is also an ECOWAS member state, Cabo Verde, that has not 
yet entered a recovery phase by the end of the observation period, as to be seen in the line plot. 
Different patterns can be distinguished in the available data. Most of EMSs follow the pattern of a 
clear collapse, followed by a short-lived recovery that so far only levelled off at about half the daily 
numbers recorded in the months before C19. These include Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Mali, and Niger. As mentioned, Cabo Verde is still in a complete shutdown and The Gambia 
and Guinea-Bissau still just show marginal departure activity. Then there are some EMSs, that 
showed an increase that even rose to more than 50% of pre-C19 level towards end of the year 
2020 in the available database but showed a decline again in 2021. This group includes Guinea, 
Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The data on Liberia is almost back on pre-C19 standard and Togo is the 
only EMS covered in the database (all but Senegal) that has reached a higher level of daily 
departures from its main airport then in the months before the pandemic. 
Overall, the data presented here outlines a phenomenon of enormous magnitude. The ECOWAS 
region as a whole has experienced a phase of recovery after the severe drop, although on average 
it is still well below the level of the previous year. Looking at the individual EMSs, there is also a 
clear diversification, ranging from a continued complete suspension of the air service to even an 
increase compared to 2019. 
 
5.6 Initial Outline: Pandemic (Im)mobility Regimes and People 
The broad overview of new immobilisations and the regimes that shaped them reveals similarities 
and differences but also historical continuities. Taking a structural perspective, the responses and 
their constituting regimes inherently follow a similar logic as the “conventional” (im)mobility 
regimes, that are conceptualized around migratory movements and the complex ways powerful 
institutions try to regulate these. There are various reports that the policies described here are 
not always directly translated into practice. When considering that the lockdown policies were 
often not adapted to the local socio-economic and cultural conditions, the occasionally observed 
violations by the population against the provisions made by the mobility regimes become 
comprehensible. However, the mobility data indicates a comprehensive immobilisation of people 
in the ECOWAS region shaped by specific pandemic-related regimes. The extent of the 
immobilisation is in stark contrast not only to the still relatively low level of documented SARS-
CoV-2 infections but also to the prevailing Western framing of West African post-colonial states 
as institutionally weak. In this context, a perspective worth exploring further would be the 
framing of local C19 regimes as an extension of migration-focussed immobility regimes in WA, 
driven by European concerns in recent years. Powerful notions of wanted and unwanted 
migration and their entanglement with and (re)production of asymmetrical power structures 
have produced knowledge, institutions, and technologies for migration control in West Africa. In 
the pandemic, the set of immobilising strategies and practices are potentially applied to the 
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population as a whole, rather than exclusively to migrants, resulting in a broad immobilisation of 
the population.  
Scholars should further explore what dangerous mobility, as a western narrative, means in this 
new context in which everybody is a potential fomite. This universalistic notion of the danger to 
be stopped through immobilisation should only be understood as a formative conceptual 
foundation of the regimes but should not be overstated in its translation into materialized 
practice. Regimes are embedded in the power structures and politico-economic dependencies at 
all levels. This partly explains why Europeans, for instance, were allowed to re-enter the ECOWAS 
area earlier than were people from West Africa to Europe. There are specific practices of 
subversion and exceptions, which implies that further research is needed on area-specific 
imagination of systemically importance of certain movements and certain people. The production 
of immobility is situated in a field of tension and differing economic logics, that translate into a 
situation whereby movements of certain people are considered more desired than those of others. 
This might explain contradictions in the simultaneities of policies that have been introduced, such 
as a multi-layered effort in Burkina Faso to restrict people's movements, while at the same time 
trying to make hotel visits and holidays more attractive through proposed price reductions (cf. 
AfDB & ALG 2020: 24). 
Hence the question of directionality becomes apparent again in the sense that the regimes, with 
their nation state-based approach, determine which spatial orientation of mobile flows is desired 
and which is not. If, in general, globalization might be understood as a mobility regime, and the 
mobility regime itself as constitution of “a conceptual blueprint for the organization of global risk‐
management strategies” fighting realities, and individuals constructed as suspicious (SHAMIR 
2005: 197), then the response to C19 can be understood as an extension of mistrust to a larger 
group of individuals or even to all people. It is no longer about perceived fears around concepts 
such as immigration and terrorism, but about the human body as threatening through its ability 
to be a virus carrier and spreader. However, it is also an extension of mistrust to the global, as the 
globalisation of mobility is now read as a source of harm and the local as shelter. Regarding the 
question of directionality and origins of movements, an unusual perspective of reversing the 
structures of actual migration-related immobility regimes emerges as a fragmentary observation. 
In the context of an uneven global spread of the virus, there is an imagination of the North as being 
what needs to be immobilised, due to the significantly higher infection figures in, for instance, 
Europe. When images of public health crises in Europe, based on the invisible contagious potential 
of each individual, dominated the media in the South in April 2020, one could speak of at least a 
temporary shift in perception. However, the fact that this narrative shift is not as powerful as the 
global (im)mobility regimes is shown by the earlier opening of the borders in West Africa to 
Europeans than to neighbouring countries. 
By focusing on West Africa as a whole, multiple local asynchronies and uneven developments 
should not be ignored. Even the physio-geographical conditions between tropical coastal states 
and landlocked Sahelian countries (re)produce different starting points. In addition, there are 
divergent social contexts that the pandemic encounters and, therefore, also power imbalances in 
the regional interdependencies. This is particularly true for the context of the Sahel region with it 
multi-layered complex of conflicts leading to another key impact on mobility patterns. Due to the 
lack of data on the concrete implementation of lockdown policies, this study can only be an initial 




step in outlining and distinguishing the different materializations. Nevertheless, solely based on 
policy response stringency as conceived by the OxCGRT, a complex spatial distribution of varying 
regime severity was shown. As the example of the C19 response of the government of Senegal 
shows, the response stringency discussed here also represents only the sum of various levels that 
can be perceived to very different degrees in everyday life by individuals, so that policy response 
stringency should not be confused with imposed regime stringency in the sense of materialized 
power over the movement of individuals.   
The application of the PHSM in the West African context bears features of securitisation, which is 
reflected not only in the usual vocabulary of warfare, but in militarised enforcement of policies 
with various reports of police brutality that primarily affects the poor (DWAMENA-ABOAGYE 2020). 
This underlines the initial argument since, in this practice, logics of the violent imposition of 
immobilities in the context of migration control can be recognised. All countries but Ghana27 and 
Senegal are reported to have introduced C19-mitgation measures that violate human rights due 
to being assessed as either disproportionate, unnecessary, or indefinite. These include reports on 
bans of demonstrations (Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea), excessive force in applying lockdown measures 
(Liberia), imprisonment or targeting of people leaking C19-related information (Benin, Niger, 
Nigeria), blanket authorizations for the president (Togo) and the use of the C19-related state of 
emergency for authoritarian power consolidation in Guinea (IDEA 2021). It should therefore be 
acknowledged that the C19 (im)mobility regimes that are developing in the ECOWAS region are 
also taking place in the context of consolidating violent state power, and thus, despite the low 
numbers of infections, are affecting the lives and mobility behaviour of individuals and the 
political-institutional structure in different, temporally dynamic, and multi-faceted ways. 
What has been presented in this chapter should be read as a set of initial thoughts and 
recommendations of fields for further investigation and not as a comprehensive summary of 
previously observed phenomena. The density of information contained in the various datasets 
and digressions exceeds the scope of a conclusion, but it is precisely this that provides the basis 








27 But even in Ghana, a debate on violations of the constitution in the context of C19 mitigation measures 
and the development of totalitarian government tendencies arose (cf. APPIAGYEI-ATUA 2020). 
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 (Im)mobilities of goods 
Movements of goods are entangled in complex networks of various mobilities, making them 
sensitive to the restrictive pandemic responses described above. However, as the mechanisms 
involved differ, a closer look at recent mobility patterns in West Africa is needed since the region 
is comparatively less in focus when it comes to global flows of goods. Due to data limitations the 
overall focus is on formal trade and the circulation of goods. 
 
6.1 Structural Impacts of restricted Cross-Border Mobility 
The worldwide implemented PHSM-related mobility barriers heavily impacted the flows of goods 
on various scales (cf. WTO 2020a: 6f). Border closures or controls, mandatory quarantines and 
travel restrictions had especially disruptive effects. In the African context, this materialized in an 
abrupt and significant slowdown with substantial delays in cross-border trade “often 
characterised by disputes between neighbouring countries, long lines of trucks awaiting clearance 
and the divergence of trade to less safe unofficial routes” (BANGA ET AL. 2020: 11).  
These reductions were well noted in West Africa, despite various exceptions being made to enable 
the trade of goods. While such exceptions typically affect only formal trade, this has led to severe 
implications for informal cross-border trade too. Large trucks were allowed to pass while smaller 
ones and individual traders were stopped, which reveals the particular vulnerability of small-scale 
and informal cross-border trade (ROSS 2020). Particularly in the first months of policy, an 
unquantifiable, but seemingly severe immobilisation of small-scale informal trading systems was 
experienced. On top of that, a failure of coordination during the first wave of severe lockdown 
measures seems to have been an aggravating factor, leading to the different area-specific 
lockdowns “compounding their economic impacts.” (BOUËT & LABORDE 2020). Imposed curfews in 
general contain grave implications for cross-border immobilities of goods. “For example, in West 
Africa, because of daytime heat, fresh produce, meat, and other perishable products are usually 
transported at night. Yet curfews make this practice impossible” (IBID.). 
The disruptions have also resulted in greater possibilities and incentives for non-policy-based tax 
enforcement and bribery to allow a bypassing of C19-related border regulations. According to a 
study by the Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS), the 
collection of illegal taxes increased by almost 50% in West Africa in the midst of the genesis of the 
initial robust C19 border regime (ROSS 2020). At the same time, bribe collection at set up 
checkpoints along the central trade corridors increased by 30% per truck in March 2020 (BOUËT 
& LABORDE 2020). This shows that the influences on mobility patterns of goods are multi-layered 
and that the production of immobility can also in some cases adopt indirect characteristics and 
might materialise on a competitive level, in which the question is, ‘Which actors still have enough 
influence or money to maintain mobility in conflict with the C19 regime?’. A general conflict is that 
between pastoralism and the nation state-based pandemic mitigation logics. A pastoral 
monitoring system developed by Action Contre la Faim and Réseau Bilital Maroobé (ACF & RBM 
2021) showed a severe impact on pastoral mobility conditions that peaked towards the end of 
May 2020 and has slowly normalized since then. 63% of examined relays in West Africa reported 
a reduction of movements and 26% reported tensions at water points. By March 2021, these 
numbers went down to 36 and 11% respectively. There were several reports of herds not 




returning home due to C19 restrictions. Several herds, stuck in northern Togo, could not move to 
their Sahelian pastures, for instance (CILSS 2020: 5). According to a survey in May 2020, economic 
activities for 42% of West African herders were at a standstill (ROSS 2020). But overall, the 
situation in the ECOWAS region started to stabilize again after most EMSs ended their states of 
emergency in August 2020.  
However, it is crucial to emphasise that not all recent disruptions to the mobility of goods at 
borders in the ECOWAS region can be attributed to pandemic responses. In particular, the 
unilateral closure of the Nigerian border with Benin has had a significant impact on the mobility 
of goods in West Africa. As already stated above (chapter 5.4.1), these regulations were already 
introduced towards the end of 2019, and were primarily justified as a means of combating 
smuggling. Despite that, there were public debates about the regulations rather going back to 
fulfilling the interests of major national entrepreneurial actors or being more of a geopolitical 
strategy then actually an approach to mitigate illegal practices (cf. DUHEM 2020). This closure had 
severe impacts on regional informal and formal supply chains, for example altering mobilities of 
food and petrol (MILLECAMPS 2021). Towards the end of the year 2020, the Nigerian regulations 
were partly eased. This example illustrates that government-led immobilisations impact hard on 
complex small-scale cross-border mobility systems for goods in the ECOWAS region. 
A case example here is the disrupted flows of cashew nuts for which West Africa is the world’s 
largest producer (TRIDGE 2021). According to official figures, more than 80% of the population in 
Guinea-Bissau directly depends on the cultivation of cashews for subsistence (BISSON & 
HAMBLETON: 6). The initial mobility restrictions and border closures had an evident impact on the 
mobility of cashew nuts. In Benin, for example, 80% of nuts are usually exported unprocessed. 
Due to the closure of markets and the restrictions of the internal mobility of middlemen and 
sellers the flows were heavily disrupted. At the same time, foreign buyers could not enter to 
organize exports. In Guinea-Bissau the restrictions in the two main countries of destination for 
cashews, India and Vietnam, led to a market shutdown (UNDP 2020: 9). Overall, the disruptions 
led to a temporary collapse in prices. In Benin, for example, the price fell to $0.17/kg, even though 
the government had decided on a farm-gate floor price of $0.55/kg (BISSON & HAMBLETON: 7). 
On the Aflao-Kodjoviakope border point between Togo and Ghana, large trucks carrying bulky 
goods are allowed to pass outside the curfew times (20:00-6:00.), but informal cross-border trade 
conducted on foot has abruptly ceased. Since the erection of the C19-related border regimes, there 
has been an increasing trend of petty traders banding together, pooling their wares, and paying 
truckers fees for clearance and transportation. Because of this, prices for key staples such as 
tomatoes, rice and peppers have temporarily increased by about 50% in Ghana's border towns 
(BANGA ET AL. 2020: 12).  
In summary, there was a clear trend towards immobilisation of goods through border restrictions, 
but the main phase of broad impact seems to have been between April and June 2020. 
Nevertheless, as indicated in chapter 5.4, there were still various constraints and border closures 
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6.2 Production of Goods 
Production is a starting point for assessing potential mobility trends of the mobilities of goods. In 
this chapter we give a broad overview on recent developments of production in the ECOWAS 
region. The focus is on selected important branches where the pandemic complex has so far been 
reported to have a discernible impact. 
For agriculture mobility restrictions for people can have considerable impacts. Reliable and 
comparable data on agricultural output in the EMSs during the pandemic is rare, yet some reports 
have been published. According to a survey in Nigeria in May 2020, 88 percent of farmers stated 
that they cannot access their farms (SAA 2020a). In Mali, smallholder farmers stressed that the 
pandemic has disrupted the provision of agriculture-related services, such as extension and 
advisory, leaving farmers with limited access to training and capacity building opportunities, and 
also necessary technologies (SSA 2020b: 4). In both cases, a significant majority of farmers 
reported that they have witnessed sharp declines in agricultural production and/or are expecting 
a particularly poor harvest (cf. SSA 2020a). In Senegal, where the C19 responses hit at a moment 
of peak agricultural production, the marketing of cold-season harvest was heavily curtailed (SALL 
2020). In Nigeria too, significant reduction of agricultural output and spoilage of ready-to-harvest 
farm products were observed (ILESANMI ET AL. 2021: 2). Farmers were reported to not have been 
able to go to their land for three months during the initial mobility restrictions (PUNCH 2020). 
Nevertheless, recent WORLD BANK (2021c) data suggests that the number of households involved 
in agriculture increased after the outbreak.  
In Nigeria, the crude oil production decreased significantly from march onwards with the low 
point being reached in December 2020 with 1174 BBL/D/1K28 from 1799 in March 2020. Despite 
this substantial drop, the output has almost reached but not underscored the previous lowest 
point for the last three decades in 2016, (TRADINGECONOMICS 2021a). Estimates are that Nigeria 
will be the African country with the highest revenue losses in crude oil (BOURAIMA & ZONON: 4). 
Due to the oil revenues accounting for about half of the governmental income, the government 
proposed to shrink the 2020 health budget by 43% in the beginning of June 2020 despite the 
pandemic (UNCTAD 2020c). 
Despite the negative impacts of the pandemic complex on different factors for manufacturing 
production, the growth of the industrial output volume stays on a comparably stable level (Fig. 
46, p. 75). This phenomenon is particularly protruding when compared to the IIP of China, 








28 Thousands of standard barrels per day. 





Manufacturing export in the total ECOWAS region represents only 15.5% of all merchandise 
exports on average29. Despite Togo with 52% in 2019 being the only country exceeding 25%, most 
EMSs do not rely on such exports. This shows a resilience in production pattern that is salient 
from global developments. Even though they are much less pronounced, slight negative 
 
 
29 Country wise data published by the WORLD BANK (cf. 2021b), ranging from 2016-2019. Excluding Liberia 

















Total Manufacturing (Global Comparison)



















Côte d'Ivoire Ghana Niger Nigeria Senegal
Figure 46: Development of ECOWAS Index of Industrial Production and global comparison 
over time. The UNIDO IIP measures growth in volume of industrial production in real terms, 
free from price fluctuations 
Source: Own figure. Data: UNIDO (2021). 
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influences, which correlate temporally with C19, can also be seen in the ECOWAS region, 
especially in Ghana and Nigeria. In Nigeria significant disruptions where observable in processes 
of the manufacturing industry, even though they were not overly reflected in the eventual 
production. These disruptions were mainly caused by the restrictions of cross-border trade, 
especially due to the high dependency from Chinese imports for manufacturing supply chains 
(BOURAIMA & ZONON 2020: 4). 
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, there were significant obstacles in the field of 
pastoralism and the related production of biomass. In all EMSs with substantial pastoral activity, 
a significant reduction in production and trade was observed within the first months of initial 
mobility restrictions. Towards August 2020, this situation normalized in most states, but pastoral 
biomass production was still distinctly limited in Cabo Verde, Sierra Leone and some areas of The 
Gambia, Senegal (Saint Louis) and Nigeria (especially Kaduna, Yobe and East Sokoto) (CILSS 2020: 
5). However, it can be presumed that despite border restrictions that have made transnational 
transhumance difficult or at times impossible, within the states, at least in the Sahel region and 
Nigeria, it seems that the multidimensional conflicts in the Central Sahel region and the Lake Chad 
Basin region have had a greater influence on pastoralism than the C19 restrictions (ibid.: 6).  
Overall, the data on goods production is still poor, but so far, the overall picture is one of major 




In a next step, we outline major trends in the movements of products, aiming at outlining already 
observable key trends in (im)mobilities of goods and their value chains. In this concern Africa in 
general is “primarily involved upstream, providing intermediate products and services to a wide 
range of global supply chains” (BANGA ET AL. 2020: 7). Africa's initial condition in relation to an 
external shock to global commodity-related mobility patterns is a vulnerable one, as it relies 
heavily on few products for export and at the same time has a significantly limited number of main 
export markets, namely India, the US, South Africa, and the European Union (WFP et al. 2020: 3). 
These trading partners are upon the states with the highest recorded numbers of observed SARS-
CoV-2 infections to date (OWID 2021) which is further implicating a challenging situation for 
exports from West Africa. In order to provide a comprehensive picture of the dynamics that have 
occurred, cross-border trade will be examined on different scales before discussing mobility-
related developments within the EMSs. 
Globally, the initial abrupt contradiction of overall trade was deeper than the one observed during 
the financial crisis of 2008-2009 (UNCTAD 2020a: 12). This is resembled by a sharp drop in trade 
growth in Q2 2020. Yet, when looking at the whole year’s figures, because of the better-than-
expected numbers in the second half of the year, the predicted overall magnitude is even slightly 
smaller than the one recorded during the financial crisis (WTO 2020b, COMUNALE ET AL. 2021). 
Since the global C19-altered GDP contraction is expected to be more than three-times as big as the 
one caused by the financial crisis, and the geographical and temporal variations in the novel 
phenomenon are a lot more significant the C19-related economic crisis dynamics are particularly 
different than the ones observed from 2008 on (IBID.).  




 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3 2020 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
World -6 -21 -5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 8 1 -28 -24 -5 -13 
East Asia -8 -1 -6 -12 4 -4 
“Developed countries” -5 -6 -24 -22 -9 -8 
W. Asia & N. Africa -9 -2 -42 -25 -25 -15 
South Asia -16 -10 -40 -48 -12 -24 
Figure 47: UNCTAD calculations according to on national statistics. Changes are year-over-year. Categorisation of the 
regions according to the source. Data excludes intra-European Union trade. Q3 figures are preliminary.  
Source: UNCTAD (2021d: 2). 
When situating Sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Fig. 47), the negative impact that emerged delayed with 
SSA being the only region globally that still had positive growth numbers in imports and exports 
in the first quarter of 2020. For Q2, also SSA experienced a pronounced decline with comparable 
numbers to the one recorded as a mean of all countries labelled as “developed” by UNCTAD 
criteria. This magnitude of contraction for Q2 is considerably stronger than the one in East Asia 
but the import numbers for the MENA region and import as well as export figures for Southern 
Asia looked even substantially worse. Thus, from a global perspective, an abrupt, yet spatially 
diverse impact hit the overall trade dynamics. But this cannot be directly translated in an impact 
on the pattern of transnational flows of goods as services are also included. Additionally, at least 
for the year 2020, the recovery seems to have been faster than for instance during the financial 
crisis, which represents a v-shaped increase and reduction of the immobilisation of trade flows.  
 
Figure 48: Heatmap of annual exports of goods and services for each ECOWAS member state as percentage 
of the GDP. 2020 and 2021 figures are estimates from Q3 2020. 
Source: Illustration by Jannis Viola. Data: IMF (2020d). 
ECOWAS Total Exports vs. GDP 
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When assessing the total export dynamics (including goods and services) of the individual 
ECOWAS member states (Fig. 48, p. 77), both a sharp overall difference between 2019 and 2020 
and a significant level of differentiation are visible. The by far biggest decreases compared to the 
2019 export share in GDP were estimated for small EMSs with rather stringent C19 governmental 
responses (Cabo Verde 2020 y-o-y: -79.2%; Guinea-Bissau: -77.9%; The Gambia: -70.6%). The 
2020 ECOWAS total is estimated to be at -24.8% compared to 2019 level with only Burkina Faso, 
Liberia, and Mali showing positive growth rates.  
For an ECOWAS-related 
examination of (im)mobilities of 
goods, a breaking down of trade 
segments is needed. Thus, Fig. 49 
shows only the merchandise 
export and import growth 
dynamics for Western Africa30. 
West African commodity inflows 
and outflows are generally more 
volatile due to the low 
diversification of trade products, 
i.e. mainly export of certain com-
modities with dynamic world 
market prices and more unstable 
socio-economic conditions mostly 
due to the dependent integration 
into the world market and the 
higher incidence of external 
influences such as armed conflicts. 
Therefore, in the case of imports, a 
significant drop can be seen in Q2 
2020 (-4.1% from +11.1% Q1'20 
and +21.6% Q4'19), but similarly 
strong fluctuations in the quarters 
and years before. To some extent 
this sets West Africa's goods 
mobility dynamics apart from the 
overall and global dynamics, where 
the C19-related decline is more 
pronounced. This should be emphasised because the developments for the three scales of 
observation were still very similar during the financial crisis in 2008. On the basis of the available 
data, it is therefore not possible to see any behaviour that deviates from the usual region-specific 
standard deviation. However, the developments are also subject to strong intra-regional 
 
 
30 Which as a geographical composition in the sense of UNCTAD is representative for the ECOWAS region 
because only Mauretania and Saint Helena are additionally included (UNCTAD 2021f: 2).  
Figure 49: World quarterly merchandise exports (on top) and imports 
(bottom) growth Years 













































World Africa Western Africa




differences. For example, in Sierra Leone, due to C19-related emergency imports of medical 
equipment, there was a massive increase in imports in April31, while Nigeria experienced a 
significant decline (NGA NTL BUREAU OF STATISTICS 2020) because of the disruptions of border 
regimes (IMF 2020a: 4; FAO 2020: 6). 
In the case of exports, however, the 
situation differs, although the C19-
related contraction is initially 
smaller than in the comparative 
scales (Q2 WA -12.3%, Africa -
21.8%, World -16.4%) and 
represents a delayed pace of the 
collapse. While the extent of the 
negative growth figures in Africa 
and the world as a whole is already 
decreasing again in Q3, Western 
Africa reaches an even more 
severe decline at the end of the 
observation period with an 
annualised negative growth rate of 
-24.2 percent. 
In Ghana, where non-oil 
merchandise imports, similar to 
Nigeria, took a hit in February but 
stabilized afterwards (cf. BANK OF GHANA 2020: 19), the overall West African export dynamics are 
also represented (Fig. 50, p. 79). Compared to the 2019 baseline, but even especially to the 
stronger start in January 2020, a distinct decline and a low-level fluctuation until June can be 
observed. The contraction for March 2020 in relation to March 2019 is -24% and compared to the 
level of January 2020 even -32%. This reveals a materialised decline in flows of goods on the cross-
border networks of global marketization from the perspective of Ghana as the nucleus. 
However, a more complex mobility landscape emerges with regard to the breakdown of these 
export figures. In terms of the whole observational period, but especially during the first months 
of global C19 responses, a massive impact in oil exports is visible (cf. Fig. 51, p. 80). Yet, the impact 
in cacao flows is less significant. Simultaneously to a rise in global gold prices due to the 
uncertainties caused by the pandemic gold exports show even a minor increase. This issue will be 
discussed more in detail in chapter 7.6. Cocoa bean exports seem very similar to 2019, but when 
 
 
31 The increase was from an average and relatively stable level of US$ 118.6 million in the previous 10 
months to US$ 908.6 million in April 2020 (TRADINGECONOMICS 2021b). 
Figure 50: Ghana main commodity exports 2020 versus 2019 
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assessing the stronger start in 
January 2020, an impact becomes 
visible. Nevertheless, the decline of 
crude oil exports from February on 
in a context of dropping prices due 
to lower demand for global 
motorized mobility, is the most 
pronounced phenomenon. Despite 
signs of recovery, the export level 
did not rebound entirely yet. 
Overall, a visible impact of global 
C19-related economic dynamics 
on export patterns were noted, yet 
with major differences in 
magnitude between varying 
commodities.  
 
This significant negative growth observed in export figures represents a bigger decline than the 
one that occurred following the global financial crisis and produces a potentially long-term 
momentum towards a reduced production and mobility of goods in the region. GUARA ET AL. (2020) 
outline this phenomenon with the term “scarring”, since long-term effects by short-term external 
shocks impacting the economic conditions have been observed before. In Sierra Leone for instance 
the multidimensional socioeconomic impact of the 2013 Ebola pandemic led indirectly to a 
permanent loss of productive capacity, that made a recovery to the pre-pandemic growth path 
impossible. Scarring is driven by the broadness of the influence of such a public health crisis on a 
society, because of pandemic-related mortality, reduction in average health conditions, capital-
import reductions and debt overhangs are just examples for the multiple factors potentially 
impacting productive capacity. Nevertheless, at least for the year 2020, the impact of COVID-19 
on West African public health was limited, and certain signs of socioeconomic resilience to the 
external shock were to observe, making further research necessary to allow short-term 
fluctuations in flows to be distinguished from long-term trends towards immobilisations. 
However, in addition to the cross-border mobility of goods to and from West Africa, the smaller-
scale flows of goods within the states or the redistributing hubs for goods are also relevant for a 
multiscale approach to dynamics in the political-economic networks. Most of the EMSs ordered 
the closure of marketplaces as these would generally not function in accordance with the 
assembly bans (cf. chapter 5.3). Overall, no ECOWAS member state closed more than 50 per cent 
of all markets, but in some regions between 60 and 100 per cent were temporarily closed (Guinea, 
Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Senegal). In Ouagadougou, all 40 major markets were closed in March, but 
some reopened towards the end of April after violent clashes between police forces and traders 
(BISSON & HAMBLETON 2020: 2). In Guinea, all livestock markets were forced to close in April. 
Measures like this cause substantial immobilisation of goods (in this case interruptions in the 
flows of livestock) as well as people (in this case traders and buyers). By October 2020, the 



















Merchandiese Exports (f.o.b) 2019
Merchandiese Exports (f.o.b) 2020
Figure 51: Ghanaian merchandise trade flows in millions of US Dollars 
Source: Own figure. Data: BANK OF GHANA (2019; 2020). 




highest proportion of livestock markets with reported disruptions due to COVID-19 (22%) (CILSS 
2020: 4). In a survey in Sierra Leone in June 2020, travel restrictions where the second most given 
answer to the question “If you could not access markets in the last 14 days, what was the main 
reason?” followed by lack of money, fears of infection and market closures (FAO 2020: 14). 
A low overall impact on import volumes was observable, yet the impact on export volumes as well 
as on local trade and its structures has been more substantial. Thus, market and area-specific 
shifts were observed for the mobility patterns of goods. However, the specific integration of the 
region into the world market must be emphasised once again, as not only do local mobility 
regimes have an influence on the discussed dynamics of goods, but in particular East Asia with 
regard to imports and Europe with regard to exports have a great influence on developments in 
the ECOWAS region with their respective pandemic regimes. Due to more than 60% of overall 
African value added in global exports being embedded in European production (BANGA ET AL 2020: 
7), a global supply chain perspective emphasizes the worldwide entanglements of local regimes.  
 
6.4 Maritime Freight Mobility 
Container freight moved by vessels represents the dominating transport setting for goods from 
and to Western Africa. Analysing the still comparatively scarce West Africa-specific data available 
and reports on ports reveals an ambiguous picture This chapter is intended to provide a rough 
overview. When no specific data was available for the ECOWAS region. developments in sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole are presented. 
6.4.1 Situating conditions in Africa in global and regional contexts 
In 2018 ports in Africa represented 4% of global containerized trade volume, which represents 
its low integration in world trade networks and thus in global mobility pattern of goods (UNCTAD 
2018). At the same time, Africa heavily relies on shipping, with African ports playing a major role 
for the many countries primarily focussed on commodity exports. According to the most recent 
published data, Western Africa accounts for 27% of Africa’s and 42% of SSA’s maritime trade 
(UNCTAD 2020b) making it the most important region in sub-Saharan Africa for maritime trade. 
This is confirmed by over 20,000 port calls in 2019. In terms of liner shipping connectivity, 
Western Africa hosts two of the three highest ranking ports in SSA (Tema and Lomé) only 
surpassed by Durban. 
6.4.2 Container Vessel Calls (SSA) 
In terms of container vessel calls, one could observe a global COVID-19 related decline in 2020 
with an overall reduction of 3.6% compared to the 2019 level over the first 30 weeks and a 
maximum fall of 15.5% in mid-February due to the outbreak in China (NOTTEBOOM ET AL. 2021: 
20). Worldwide, the strongest impact yet was observed in Q2 2020 with a decline of 6.1% 
compared to the 2019 base, followed by a trend of recovery. Worldwide in the beginning of April 
2020, 41% of ports reported a decline of container and other cargo vessels in a comprehensive 
survey. These numbers peaked in mid-May with 51% for container vessels and 51% for other 
cargo ships. Since then, the situation recovered slowly with still over 30% of ports reporting such 
declines by the end of the year. The majority of ports that reported a decline put it at between 5 
and 25% (NOTTEBOOM & PALLIS 2020b: 3). However, a strong regional variance was observed in 
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these large-scale developments, which is different from, for example, the intentional financial and 
economic crisis of 2008 (NOTTEBOOM ET AL. 2021: 20). Sub-Saharan Africa (-11.3% calls) was 
together with Australasia and Oceania one of the world regions most affected in the initial 
observation period, while the negative effects in Europe and North America only became apparent 
in the second quarter, when their values were below those of Sub-Saharan Africa. SSA was the 
region with the highest weekly declines in the first quarter, down almost 50% in the initial week 
of mid-February and over 25% in the first week of April. A similar pattern can be seen in the data 
for general ship calls, with Sub-Saharan Africa among the biggest losers (-13.4%) after Australasia 
& Oceania (-14.3%), but in the second quarter both regions were at the other end of the scale, with 
SSA showing the biggest decline of all regions (-5.2%). At the same time, Europe and North 
America also recorded their largest declines (-25% and -21.1%) (UNCTAD 2020a: 17). In a global 
comparison of the super-regions, it is therefore possible to report a similarity in the data for Asia 
and SSA and a differentiation from the developments in the western countries. 
Within the described C19-related developments in sub-Saharan Africa there is a significant 
variance observable concerning ship type. Container ship calls for example decreased more than 
wet bulk carriers calls – which even showed growth in Q2. And LNG ship calls decreased 
significantly with -16.8% in the first and the second quarter of 2020, which is the sharpest decline 
of all world regions. Opposed to that, LPG ship calls even grew significantly during the observation 
periods (IBID.: 23ff). Despite that, it must be added that there is also a global trend towards ever 
larger container ships, which has continued during the pandemic. Accordingly, a smaller share of 
the reduced port calls will not only be due to the effects of the pandemic, but also to a general 
rationalization in the sector by means of a reduction of the fleet through the possibility of 
transporting the same amount of containers with fewer but larger vessels (IBID.: 48). It is also 
noteworthy that increasing port calls in certain countries cannot always be understood directly 
as growth in imports for consumption and manufacturing or shipping of products on the export 
trade. In the case of ECOWAS, strong import figures at the beginning of the pandemic in some 
EMSs were also often related to the delivery of medical equipment for C19 mitigation and food 
supplies due to virus-related shortages. 
6.4.3 Container Volumes 
As country-specific data are not yet available, the most recent supra-regional figures will be 
considered with regard to container volumes. For 2020, worldwide container volumes from, to 
and within Sub-Saharan Africa declined by 2% (10.4 mill. TEU). Imports contracted by 2.7% (7.2 
mill. TEU), exports reduced by 0.7% (2.9 mill. TEU) and the comparably marginal intra-regional 
trade even rose by 2.1% (318 k. TEU) (DYNAMAR 2021c: 4). It should be noted, however, that these 
figures are still preliminary and could potentially be subject to change. Regarding the exports, the 
two most important destination regions showed different dynamics: Exports to the Far East (2020 
share 45%) grew by 1.7%, to Europe (2020 share 28%) they contracted by -0.8%, and to the 
Middle East/ISC (2020 share 21%) the decline was more severe at -5.8 percent. For imports, the 
picture is another one with import volumes from the Middle East/ISC growing slightly by 0.8%, 
but the even more important trading regions in terms of volume, Far East and Europe, both 
contract by -2.7% and respectively -5.6% (IBID.). 
 




6.4.4 Global container mobility 
One of the main drivers of the changing maritime trade patterns are disruptions of the container 
mobility itself. Due to disturbances of the global freight logistics and restrictions on the discharge 
and storage of containers in ports connected to pandemic regulations, inferences of for instance 
the orderly return transport of empty containers occurred. The combination of this lack of 
container capacity at the point of need, the conflict of many vessels initially idled by shipping 
companies due to the early spread of the virus, the subsequent rapid ramp-up of Chinese 
production capacity and the changing consume patterns led to acute pressure and breakdowns in 
the global maritime supply chains (cf. LYNCH 2021). Although some of the initial logistical issues 
were resolved during 2020, the continuing "confluence of disruptive forces" (KULISCH 2021), 
which also led to massive congestion in port and hinterland storage capacity, combined with large 
order volumes, led to unprecedented price increases towards the end of the year. Further 
pressure on capacity and prices, including from exceptional adjustments in product levels (cf. 
IBID.), is expected to continue in 2021, affecting West Africa as the sub-region of SSA most 
entangled in global maritime trade dynamics. 
 
6.4.5 Developments of costs and spot rates 
As mentioned in the previous section, the developments of costs and spot rates represent an 
important factor influencing dynamics of freight mobility. The years before the pandemic were 
characterised by price wars between the major carriers, which led to relatively low costs and a 
large global coverage of routes. Major carriers were then able to use the pandemic to 
simultaneously reduce routes and massively increase prices despite falling demand. This has had 
a direct impact on the maritime integration of West Africa, where record prices for certain routes 
were recorded towards the end of the year. The "Shanghai Containerized Freight Index", which 
reflects the overall development of average US$ spot rates on the world's most important shipping 
routes from Shanghai, including to West Africa, has slowly picked up speed since the beginning of 
the pandemic and then accelerated significantly towards the end of the year, culminating in a level 
of over 2800 points at the beginning of 2021 (SSE 2021). In the years before, the index had never 
exceeded a score of 1000. In terms of the FBX index, which has a more universal approach in terms 
of routes, this implies an 80% increase in container shipping prices across the world between 
November 2020 and February 2021 (FREIGHTOS 2021). This massive increase at the end of 2020 
can also be seen in the cost of freight on individual routes, with the Shanghai - Lagos route already 
reaching an unprecedented cost of US$ 3,293 per TEU in October of the previous year (NOTTEBOOM 
ET AL. 2021: 12) and kept on rising. If specifically broken down to the routes to West and East 
Africa, there is an increase in the LSCI of 125% on average from January 2021 to the average score 
in January 2020 (6462 average index score for January 2021 versus 2866 for January 2020) 
(DYNAMAR 2021a). These drastic developments, that are also partly connected to C19-related 
shifting consumption pattern in the Global North – through orders of products for the home partly 
replacing needs that were pre-pandemically met in public consumption spaces (cf. LYNCH 2021) – 
represent a phenomenon which has never been observed in such a magnitude regarding the 
ECOWAS region. The impact of these cost developments on the mobility of goods in West Africa 
cannot yet be quantified but should be further investigated in the coming months and years. 
Current data imply a substantial asymmetry of developments with regard to the directionality of 
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flows: The prices for imports to the so-called Far East from sub-Saharan Africa have even shrunk 
in parallel to the multiplication of export prices (DYNAMAR 2021b: 7) and prices from and to 
Europe have been almost perfectly stable. 
 
6.4.6 Liner Shipping Connectivity 
Despite the described disruptions of the global 
maritime supply chains, the current data on the 
development of liner shipping connectivity does 
not seem to show any major impact of the 
pandemic complex on the situation in the ECOWAS 
region. When using the LSCI (cf. Fig. 52) and its sub-
indexes to examine disruptions in the global liner 
shipping32 logistics that are temporally correlating 
with the pandemic’s spread, major variations 
between different world regions are observable. 
While Asia and Oceania just showed moderate early 
impact, the situation in Northern America and 
especially Europa was more severe. The drops of 
the LSCI’s components were observed later 
compared to the slight ones in China, but they were 
substantial (UNCTAD 2020a: 48). In contrast, 
African ports have performed well and showed 
more signs or resilience regarding liner service 




32 Scheduled freight service wih fixed port rotation. 
Figure 52: List of the individual components of the 
Liner Shipping Connectivity Index 
Source: UNCTAD (2021a). 
 
 
➔ Number of scheduled ship calls per week 
in the country 
➔ Total deployed annual capacity in TEU 
➔ Number of regular liner shipping 
services from and to the country 
➔ Number of liner shipping companies that 
provide services from and to the country 
➔ Average size in TEU (Twenty-Foot-
equivalent Units) of the ships deployed by 
the scheduled service with the largest 
average vessel size 
➔ Number of other countries that are 
connected to the country through direct 
liner shipping services  
LSCI Components 




In terms of the developments within individual ECOWAS member states, the impression of a 
resilient reaction of liner shipping involving the countries’ biggest ports hardens (cf. Fig. 53). 
However, differences can also be 
seen, as the larger ports with a 
higher LSCI (over 15) have 
performed better and have mostly 
grown even during the pandemic. 
In contrast, the majority of smaller 
ports have seen their scores shrink. 
This also reflects a globally 
recognisable trend, as everywhere 
larger ports tended to manage 
better than smaller ones during the 
pandemic in terms of liner shipping 
(NOTTEBOOM ET AL. 2021: 28). One 
can also observe that Cabo Verde 
as the country that was hardest hit 
by the pandemic and that shows 
the highest response stringency 
towards the end of the year 2020 
(cf. chapter 5.1.1) is the EMS with 
the clearest C19 impact, 
considering its comparably stable 
pre-COVID development and the 
significant drop in the first quarter 
of 2020. Yet all in all, the enhancing 
and the restraining impacts of C19 
embedded in general 
developments of global trade seem 
to have sort of balanced out in 
terms of LSCI. The most prominent development that can be observed in the LSCI data shown is 
the almost doubling of the score of Ghana within the observation period. Due to the increase in Q4 
2019, growth cannot be attributed to the pandemic but is most likely connected to an extensive 
development project in the port of Tema (DREDIGINGTODAY 2019). So, if the increase in Ghana is 
not a statistical error, it is likely to be due to the expansion, although the port activity figures 
released by the Bank of Ghana (2021: 15) do not indicate a jump in growth in Tema. Yet, the LSCI 
also includes, for example, the establishment of additional liner routes (cf. Fig. 52, p. 84). Overall, 
one should also take into account that the data presented here merely shows the largest port of 
the respective EMS; in the case of Ghana, for example, the country's second largest port in 
Takoradi experienced significant C19-related declines in parallel to the large growth in Tema 
(GHANAWEB 2021).  
 













LSCI Score of biggest Port
ECOWAS LSCI
2019Q1 2019Q2 2019Q3 2019Q4
2020Q1 2020Q2 2020Q3 2020Q4
Figure 53: Individual EMS LSCI based on the country’s biggest port (For 
NGA mean of Apapa, Lagos and Tin Can Harbour) 
Source: Own Figure. Data: Provided by MDS Transmodal on request. URL: 
mdst.co.uk 
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6.4.7 Port Regimes 
While the previous paragraph showed that 
liner shipping in the biggest ports was not 
heavily affected by the pandemic, this does not 
mean that procedures within the ports were 
unaffected. Regarding the important route 
from Europe to West Africa, a market analysis 
summarises: “Space into West Africa is tight 
and several ports are congested with long 
waiting times for berthing and unloading, 
caused by high season, operational issues and 
COVID-19-related restrictions. Carriers are 
calling for PSS and Emergency Congestion 
Surcharge” (DHL 2020: 14) and adds in a more 
recent edition that PSS and emergency 
congestion surcharges and equipment 
imbalance surcharges were implemented and 
all services regarding WA were highly utilized (DHL 2021: 15). A closer look at the situation in the 
individual ports reveals differences and similarities between the international ports of the 
ECOWAS region (Fig. 55). By the beginning of the year 2021 all EMSs but Cabo Verde with its more 
severe blue border restrictions facilitated unobstructed crew changes to 
enhance seamless cargo operations. Yet in other operational aspect, 
there were more obstacles observable, such as a requirement of 
performing PCR tests with the whole crew for docking in Togo and 
Liberia or the necessity of having been 14-days in row sailing in advance 
for being allowed to moor in Nigeria. According to the source, one had to 
expect port closures in almost all coastal ECOWAS-member states and 
delays in a majority. However, as can be seen in Fig. 54, the postulated 
operational delays have not yet materialised in all of the major ports in 
the form of universal increases in anchorage time. And with the 
exception of Nigeria, where the delay is largely due to structural factors 
other than the pandemic, the increase in median waiting time has not 
been extreme in ports where an upward trend has been observed. 
However, for the largest ports, on average, there was still a 5% increase 
in the median time in port for the first half of 2020 compared to the 
second half of 2019 and as much as 11% compared to the first half of 
2019. It must be assumed that the more severe changes associated with 
the pandemic will not become apparent until the second half of 
2020 or the first half of 2021, for which no figures are currently 
available. It is also noteworthy, however, that if the smaller ports 
in West Africa are included, the average for S2 2019 to S1 2020 
has fallen by 18% (cf. Appendix 10.4), meaning that the delays 
primarily affected larger ports, especially in the first few months 
of the pandemic. But this might partly be due to the bigger ports 
even growing during the pandemic and smaller ones often 
 ECOWAS C19 
Port Implications 
Figure 55: Coronavirus port country 
implications as of January 2021. red 
= yes, green = no, white = no data. 
Crew = Crew change restrictions in 
place? Test = Testing or minimum of 
14 days prior sailing required? List = 
List of previous port calls necessary? 
Close = Port closures to be expected? 
Delay = Delays to be expected? 





















Main Ports Median Mooring Time 
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Figure 54: Semi-annual median time of all ship types 
combined in the major ports in the ECOWAS region (The 
ports that reached a LSCI score of 15 at least once in Fig. 
53, p. 85) 
Source: Own figure. Data: UNCTAD (2021b). 




showed reduced LSCI scores in the first months of the pandemic, and the level of port utilization 
has an impact on possibilities of faster or slower cargo handling. Another factor to be included is 
the impact of the pandemic regimes on the mobility and thus availability of port-related workers. 
Globally, the proportion of ports reporting shortages of dock workers peaked with 22 percent by 
the end of April (NOTTEBOOM & PALLIS 2020a: 3). Afterwards, the situation normalized again 
despite a re-increase to 18% towards the end of the year, which is probably related to the 
reintroduction of lockdown measure in a second wave of infections in many parts of the world. 
Reported shortages in port authority workers were even slightly higher (26% by 27.04.2020).  
Despite greater resilience of the major ports, there has nevertheless been an impact on the process 
structures and the speed of mobility in maritime freight logistics in West Africa and in addition to 
an emerging gap between developments in bigger versus smaller ports. As NOTTEBOOM ET AL. 
(2021: 30) put it: “The large diversity in traffic patterns and connectivity levels among ports 
means that the vulnerability of ports is largely dependent on the cargo mix, the port call choices 
of carriers, and the position of the port in the global shipping network and in its hinterland”. 
 
6.4.8 Nigeria: Case Study 
One case of current developments in ports in the ECOWAS region is Nigeria and the Lagos port 
complex which also includes the Tin Can Island Port and Apapa Port. Until 2018, Nigeria was the 
EMS with the highest container port throughput (cf. Appendix 10.410.4), with Togo and 
potentially also Ghana recently taking over. But still, it represents one of the major freight hubs in 
WA. In contrast to the other two locations mentioned, however, there has been no significant 
growth in the volume of containers handled and the LSCI for years, but rather erratic stagnation. 
Accordingly, the situation in Lagos, which is currently still the most important port complex in the 
country, will be discussed in more detail at this point in order to determine how much of the 
current developments can be seen as pandemic-related and what can be situated and explained 
differently.  
Already reaching back to pre-COVID developments, “the port has become infamous for its 
congestion” (MUMMERY 2020), which is related to a number of long-term structural issues such as 
road conditions, container clearing management, inconsistencies in infrastructure development 
in the hinterland, and a stagnation of ever-announced expansions of technology and port 
capacities resulting in disruptions of container clearing management (MUNSHI 2020). 
Nevertheless, the situation regarding the Lagos port is more complex than that. UNCTAD (2020a: 
43f) considers the Lagos “mainly […] a gateway port for Western Africa” and reports that all the 
LSCI components improved over the first half of 2020. The port showed by far the biggest growth 
of weekly port calls, shipping operators, maximum TEU, and direct calls in the second quarter of 
2020 compared to the major ports of Northern and Southern Africa. The deployed capacity even 
grew by 113%. UNCTAD itself calls for further analysis to understand this since the substantial 
growth takes place while at the same time the previously described problems occur and have 
rather intensified because of the pandemic.  
Towards the end of the year 2020 it sometimes took up to three weeks for the return of empty 
containers due to the high level of congestion, which also led to various surcharges and diversion 
to other ports (MUMMERY 2020). At the same time, the prices for hinterland transportation, 
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especially for the first step right out of the port, multiplied, which further fuelled the disruptions. 
The chapter on hinterland transport (5.6) will further elaborate on this topic. By the end of the 
year, more than 40 ships calling at the Tin Can Island Port were idling in the sea due to a lack in 
the capacity of discharging incoming cargo (NDA-ISAIAH ET AL. 2020). Subsequently, hundreds of 
trucks were stuck in traffic, waiting to exit or enter the port (MUNSHI 2020). These substantial 
delays, growing costs and extortions lead to a major unrest in the Nigerian maritime transport 
industry (SEUN 2020) and a public discourse on port failure (cf. THE NATION 2021). As already 
stated, the sum of the described disturbances also has a cause in the political and economic 
management of the port complex. However, the influence of pandemic circumstances also seems 
to be influential. For example, the lockdowns and curfews have prevented dock workers from 
working as usual (MUNSHI 2020), which has massive implications for a port's internal logistics, 
and the overloading of storage capacity outside the port and hinterland transport are also partly 
due to residual recessions related to COVID-19. The growing number of stranded vessels at sea in 
front of Nigerian ports might be partly caused by the governmental directive, that all ships must 
have been at sea for at least two weeks before being allowed to enter ports (cf. ISS 2021). It seems 
reasonable to assume that the massive growth of shipments towards the port is also related to the 
pandemic-related shifts in the maritime supply chain, but this will have to be evaluated later when 
more data is available. All in all, in terms of port developments in Nigeria until the beginning of 
the year 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic seems to have been a catalyst for overarching structural 
dynamic rooted in pre-pandemic times.  
 
6.4.9 Conclusion 
On the basis of the data reviewed, no strong effects in the form of highly unusual levels of transport 
volumes can be determined, but at the same time one can observe massive global price increases 
that are also affecting WA, shifting ship types, new and sometimes disruptive practices in ports 
and major changes in hinterland transport and storage. The global market reactions to the 
pandemic so far, which have a direct impact on West African conditions on the ground, are mainly 
the initial dramatic drop in oil demand, which affects the oil ports of Nigeria and Ghana in 
particular, the crisis-related drop regarding interest in certain commodities and increased 
interest in others, which affects the operations in West African bulk terminals. And furthermore, 
the disruptions of logistical workflows in terms of the handling of full and empty containers and 
route dynamics put diverse kind of pressures on the global and local dynamics. Still, the direct 
health-related vulnerability regarding infections in operational processes in ports is limited 
because the handling of containers has been depersonalised to such a significant extent, even in 
the West African context where port infrastructure and digitalisation has not yet reached the level 
seen in other parts of the world. 
Yet, one should certainly not conclude that all changes observed since March 2020 are mainly due 
to the pandemic complex – even though it being the dominating force of economic change in 2020 
– but there are other very topical, impactful developments. The West African coast and the Gulf or 
Guinea in particular just recently became the coastal strip with the highest pirate activity in the 




world33, accounting for 90% of global maritime kidnappings in 2020 (ICS 2021). The development 
even intensified towards the end of the year (B&M 2020a) and simultaneously container ships are 
increasingly the target of attacks (MUMMERY 2020). This led the biggest global shipping line to 
publish a distinct call for action in the beginning of 2021 (CLOWES 2021). And also, other 
(geo)political conflicts that are in diverging ways related to the pandemic complex currently 
shape the realities in the ECOWAS, such as the diplomatic tensions between the governments of 
the PR China and Australia after Australia’s demands of further investigation of the Chinese 
government’s responsibilities for the spread of the pandemic that led the Chinese authorities to 
replace Australian commodity imports. This recently led to a substantial growth of iron ore 
exports in Sierra Leone (DAYE 2021). Further statements about the structural, and also potentially 
lasting effects of C19 require future research. For initial developments until mid-2020, the marine 
intelligence company DYNAMAR (2020) concludes in terms of conducted trade: “container shipping 
to and from this part of the world had not really appeared to be impacted by the Covid-19 
pandemic”. 
 
6.5 Air Cargo Mobility 
The data on air transport specifically in the ECOWAS region is so far even more limited than for 
maritime transport. Air cargo is also significantly less important in terms of total freight volumes. 
Nevertheless, some developments that point to certain shifts within the hierarchy of global 
transport structures can already be identified. When approaching COVID-19-related global de-
velopments, a similarly inconclusive picture emerges compared to the previously discussed 
maritime trade. Because of the limited data availability, this chapter will draw mainly on data 
regarding the entire continent of Africa. In contrast to maritime transport, West Africa plays a less 
important position for Air Cargo compared to other sub-regions of SSA (cf. WORLD BANK 2021a). 
In 2016, only Lagos airport (LOS) was in the top 5 largest cargo airports in Africa and only Accra 
(ACC) (9th) and Abidjan (ABJ) (15th) were also in the top 15 (ICAO 2017: 9). Accordingly, the 
developments discussed here should not be directly understood as having taken place in EMSs as 
well, but at present there are overarching dynamics that suggest they have also taken place in WA. 
 
 
33 Although, of course, possible links to, for example, C19-related socio-economic crisis as a trigger for 
increased attractiveness of the practice of piracy must also be discussed, and the C19 regime restrictions 
also indirectly affect this field (Cf. e.g., SAFETY4SEA 2020). 
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As observable in Fig. 56, the pandemic complex impacted air cargo capacity as well as demand in 
a significant way. This applies to both the overall global dynamic and the specific one in Africa, 
which, however, stands out from 
most other regions in terms of 
demand. The overall 
developments in capacity in 
relation to demand indicates a 
significant pressure on the sector. 
Worldwide, and even with higher 
pace in the African context, 
demand recovered from the initial 
drop caused by the implications of 
the pandemic’s spread. Air 
transport demand in Africa 
already grew on a year-on-year 
basis in September 2020 again and 
the global air trade was almost 
back on pre-pandemic level with 
just 2% year-on-year loss 
(ACCENTURE 2021). This 
comparably fast increase of 
customers who ask for 
transportation of goods by air after 
the initial drop seems to be due to 
mainly three reasons: changing 
consumption patterns discussed in 
chapter 5.4, disruptions of 
maritime transport networks, 
leading to an attempted switch to 
air freight of certain orders 
(KULISCH 2021) and beyond that, 
this type of transport continues to 
play a special role during the pandemic, since large quantities of medical equipment had to be 
transported at relatively short notice to partly remote locations. The transport of substantial 
amounts of C19 vaccines, which has begun in West Africa in 2021, can in part also only take place 
by air freight due to their special storage requirements (cf. NAIR 2020a). This indicates further 
shifts in short-term mobility pattern, because the COVAX intervention regarding vaccine delivery 
“will require what is likely to be the largest cold chain air bridge to Africa ever seen”. (IBID.: 6). 
However, the situation on the supply side is very tight, albeit with some inconsistencies. There are 
still harsh capacity restraints, as in September 2020 just 22.6% of global airfreight belly cargo was 
still in operation due to mobility restrictions (GLOBAL INDUSTRY ANALYSTS 2020). The throughput 
of Ghana’s most important ground handling institutions for example was well below expectations 
for the first quarter of 2020 but did not collapse (Nair 2020b: 19). Yet, the massive collapse of the 
available capacities, that at all times significantly underscored the demand (cf. Fig. 56), has been 
Figure 56: IATA monthly year-on-year air cargo capacity and demand 
growth as measured in freight tonne kilometres by region 


























































































































































Air Cargo Capacity Growth
North America Middle East Latin America
Europe Asia Pacific Total Market
Africa




tempered by some other phenomena that need to be further studied to see the extent to which 
they are already reflected in the available data. The severe restrictions on passenger mobility in 
the airspace have led to a temporary standstill of a large part of the global passenger aircraft fleet. 
This allowed airlines to use passenger aircraft to transport cargo instead. As a result, the total 
number of cargo flights increased significantly compared to passenger flights and was 35% above 
the previous year's level in April 2020 (ICAO 2020: 153). The fact that air cargo is doing 
significantly better in terms of mobility and economic resilience than passenger transport, lead to 
it accounting for a much larger part of airline revenue and becoming a determining factor for 
making it possible to “sustain their skeleton international networks” (EZZE 2021: 18). Estimates 
suggest that this share will have increased from 12% of revenue in 2019 to 36% in 2020 (IBID.).  
This high pressure on the industry combined with the increased power of the freight companies 
in terms of pricing led to an unprecedented increase in freight prices. The Baltic Exchange 
Airfreight Index (BAI) showed a first massive price increase from February to April 2020, which 
roughly represented a short-term doubling of prices per transported kilogram on the most 
important routes. After a short consolidation phase, prices rose again towards the end of the year 
(AirCargoNews 2021b). And this trend is predicted to intensify further in the short to medium 
term (KULISCH 2021) and seems to have also affected Western Africa in a particular manner. For 
example, there are reports of offers for the air transport of goods from the USA to Sierra Leone for 
over US$ 100 per kilogram, whereas a usual price is US$ 4-6 (NEBEHAY 2020). These extensive cost 
increases are predicted to negatively influence opportunities for the distribution of C19-related 
medical equipment and vaccines (IBID.).  
How exactly all these developments will materialise as mobility patterns remains to be seen. But 
one can already identify some responses to the dynamics in the ECOWAS region, such as the 
establishment of an extraordinary weekly air cargo service between West Africa and Europe by 
Bollore Logistics in June 2020 (NAIR 2020b: 19). What can be noted so far as macro developments 
on the African continent, is that the African share in global air cargo has remained stable at 2% in 
both 2019 and 2020. And that in terms of cargo volume, Africa has seen one of the smallest 
declines of any region in the world, but this is primarily due to investments from China, while 
former key routes such as to and from the Middle East and Europe have continued to shrink 
significantly (Ezze 2021: 18). Thus, in terms of air transport mobility patterns, shifts were to be 
monitored, and even though EMS-specific data is still lacking, at least temporary significant 
disruptions in all parts of West Africa seem likely based on the recorded overall African demand 
and capacity dynamics and the enormous impacts on the strongly with air cargo interwoven air 
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6.6 Hinterland Transport 
After assessing border-related restrictions and maritime as well as air transport we outline recent 
dynamics in hinterland transport touching again upon border issues as key for hinterland 
transport in a region in which few seaports and airports receive the bulk imports for distribution 
to far less integrated hinterlands. Several African countries experienced major disruptions in 
hinterland logistics following the C19 outbreak. The major disrupting factor seems to have been 
border regulations and differing approaches of neighbouring countries, followed by intranational 
regime-related immobilisations. 
WA-specific data is rare, but all in all worldwide, ports reported hinterland transport delays in the 
context of the pandemic. Regarding delays with cross-border road transport, the proportion of all 
surveyed ports peaked in the beginning of April with almost half of them reporting delays (cf. Fig. 
57). Yet, the internal impacts of mobility regimes were also almost as strong in this regard, with 
just 6% less ports stating, that they are witnessing delays with trucks arriving and leaving the 
ports. Globally, rail services were impacted less but still substantially, and in the inland barge 
services about as strong as road transport in April. The developments towards the end regarding 
all means of transport also indicate, that even though an adaption to C19 measures happened over 
time, the focus of main impacts should solely be on the first months, but a second wave of impact 
towards be beginning of 2021 is taking shape. Especially towards the end of April, almost a 
quarter of globally surveyed ports reported shortages of truck drivers due to the C19 restrictions, 
implying also impacts of intranational regimes immobilising people as potential workforce 
(NOTTEBOOM & PALLIS 2021: 3).  
 
Figure 57: Proportion of surveyed ports facing hinterland transport delays concerning the last week of operation 
compared to normal conditions. Participating ports form the Americas, Africa, Europe, and Asia. 
Source: NOTTEBOOM & PALLIS (2021: 3).  
In several countries a heavily congestion of hinterland connections was observed (UNCTAD 
2020a: 44). Measures such as 14-days quarantine for truck drivers had an especially amplified 
influence in West Africa, where mayor trade corridors run along the coastline, and in 
contradistinction, the country's borders in West Africa tend to extend away from the shore and 
have only a narrower border on the coastal side. Accordingly, trucks for large-scale transnational 
transports often have to cross various countries for relatively short distances, which leads to a 
multiplication of the different regimes of bordering states. Subsequently, several African ports 
also reported administrative problems in the coordination of hinterland traffic (IBID.: 44). Overall, 
delays in the freight mobility and disruptions in hinterland warehouse logistics were observed. 
Overall, the goods transport revenue is expected to shrink by 11% in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2020, 
Week 15 (’20) 19 (’20) 25 (’20) 41 (’20) 50 (’20) 6 (’21) 
Trucks (cross-border) 43% 38% 28% 0% 15% 20% 
Trucks (in/out port) 37% 16% 11% 6% 13% 13% 
Rail services 28% 22% 13% 5% 11% 19% 
Inland barge services 41% 19% 18% 4% 3% 30% 




which is slightly less than in all other regions. In comparison, the MENA region is expected to be 
hardest hit with 22 percent decrease (IRU 2020: 5). 
Regarding recent disruptions in hinterland transport in and from Nigeria, the pandemic is not the 
causal factor, but seems to have been a catalyst to amplify magnitude and pace of occurring 
pricing- and mobility-related phenomena. The most noticeable dynamic in Nigerian hinterland 
transport is an extreme rise in costs. In December 2020, the price for a 20km transport of a 
standard container into the Nigerian mainland was sometimes more than US$ 4,000, which is 
about as much as shipping a 40ft container from Shanghai to Lagos in 2020 (MUNSHI 2020). Also, 
the small-scale inter-port road transport within Lagos between Tin Can and Apapa costed about 
1.5 million Naira (approx. US$ 4,000) by the end of the year (MEGBOLU 2020). This is due to 
complications related to the pandemic, but also more long-term issues such as stagnation in 
expansion of port capacities and technology, the recent unrests in Nigeria, costs of road access 
and bribes, and inconsistencies in hinterland infrastructure development (cf. B&M 2020b, B&M 
2020c) and container clearing management. In a setting, where about 80% of cargo is moved by 
road (YUSUF 2019) and the described structural obstructions influences logistics processes, a 
complex mobility regime that is immobilising people and decelerates operations comes with 
significant implications for the flows of goods through a bottleneck such as Lagos. but this is not a 
phenomenon that has occurred exclusively in Lagos, which provides a direct link to the C19 
restrictions: NWOKEDI ET AL. (2021) studied the implications of the pandemic-related movement 
restriction policies on hinterland transport form Onne seaport on last mile corridors towards 
several hinterland markets and found a significant increase of TEU transportation costs in that 
regard (IBID.: 8). This in combination with the border regulation disputed with Benin, where 
despite the partial reopening in December, heavy-goods vehicles are still not making cross-border 
trips34 (MILLECAMPS 2021), creates an impression of a significantly disrupted logistical network in 
Nigeria.  
Thus, on the one hand, a strong but rather short-term influence on freight-related hinterland 
mobility patterns can be noted, but above all also a clear amplifying effect of the pandemic 
complex on pre-existing transport practices and infrastructural phenomena, where either 








34 According to the cited report (MILLECAMPS 2021) seemingly, trucks belonging to the Dangote Group are 
the exception and are allowed to pass, which, regardless of whether the information is actually valid, once 
again directs the focus to the embedding of immobilising regimes in the respective political context. 
Regimes not only exercise power, they also operate in framing power relations, and the materialised 
application of immobilisation depends on the power position of the mobile actor. 
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6.7 Initial Outline: Pandemic (Im)mobility Regimes and Goods 
The powers that impact on entangled commodity mobility in West Africa operate in a situation of 
conflict of interest, between restricting people’s (cross border) mobility and the simultaneous 
dependency on goods moving in global capitalist networks, despite progressive depersonalisation 
in cargo handling. Accordingly, tensions arise, for example, due to the mobility restrictions of dock 
workers, which lead to disruptions in West African ports that currently compete with each other. 
This could lead to an extension of the concept of immobility regime, as it seeks to explore the 
relationship between privileged and co-dependent, but forbidden, movements. Where the regime 
has broadened the categorisation of unwanted mobilities of people to include biohazards, as 
outlined in chapter 5.6, it seeks an approach whereby people’s movements in general are to be 
suppressed but the movement of goods is to be enabled. Thus, it might be understood by the 
general population - with some power-hierarchy related exceptions - that in this regard goods 
take up the role of the privileged. Global capitalism without circulating commodities seems 
unimaginable. Movements of people involved in logistical processes necessary for moving goods 
is perceived as an unpleasant side-phenomenon. 
The complex local and transnational logistical interdependencies in ECOWAS adds to the 
previously outlined contradictions. As shown in the case of Nigerian border closures, a complex 
multitude of factors shape border-related (im)mobility regimes and complex, but yet direct 
interactions between the regulation of human mobility and that of commodities in the pandemic 
context. At the same time, European and Asian mobility regimes may have a greater influence on 
the mobility of goods to and from West Africa than local ones. Mobility regimes in West African 
coastal states that are strongly integrated into global logistical flows have a greater influence on 
the mobility of goods in their hinterlands than those of landlocked countries themselves. A set of 
actors, policies, networks of communication, institutions, technologies, practices, powers, and 















  (Im)mobilities of capital 
In what follows, we focus on the location and flows of money. Drawing on the conceptualization 
applied to the immobilities of people and goods, immobility should not be understood as a tying 
up but as the absence of movement. The bigger picture of global flows of money is an ambivalent 
one. On the one hand, the world must deal with an imminent economic crisis induced by the 
pandemic and the severe regulations adopted as responses. Even if most recent estimates from 
2021 toned down the previously even stronger expected contraction, global growth is still 
predicted to shrink by -3.5% (IMF 2021) or -3.4% (OECD 2021) in 2020 and the recovery is 
projected to be a very gradual one35 (IMF 2020b). On the other hand, governments all over the 
globe developed fiscal and monetary policy responses to mitigate the negative economic impacts 
of lockdowns. These often came in the shape of stimulus packages and, in many cases, they 
represented the biggest stimuli ever in the respective states, representing an enormous extent of 
mobilized capital.  
IMF (2020c) estimates state that the global economy will lose US$ 12 trillion due to the pandemic, 
but at the same time the expected total of already implemented governmental emergency 
programmes add up to US$ 18 trillion (GATES & GATES 2020). This leads to the unforeseen situation 
of increased, instead of decreased, amounts of circulating money during an economic crisis. At the 
same time, there is a sharp decrease in terms of supply and demand in the real economy, and 
stimulus capital is primarily leading to massive growth in the global financial sector but, 
potentially, also to over-accumulation crises (ROBINSON 2020).  
What do these recent developments in the global economy mean for the ECOWAS region? 
Especially when considering that, on the one hand, the vast majority of these stimuli packages, 
and thus the enhanced capital availability, originated from states in the Global North, and, even 
relative to their GDP, African states spend considerably smaller amounts (MADDEN 2020). On the 
other hand, in contrast, the GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa decreased (-2.6%, IMF 2021: 4). In the 
following section we approach this question based on the perspectives of mobility patterns and 




35 Nevertheless, publications described the rebound from the pandemic as “faster than expected” (OECD 
2021: 4). However, just a 0.4 percent drop in global economic growth amounts to almost 3.5 trillion U.S. 
dollars in lost economic output (STATISTA 2021). And if the goal is to reach the economic output level of 2019 
again, percentage GDP growth would need to rise even more to compensate. Additionally, the unexpected 
faster recovery came with a stronger than expected variation in individual Q3 and Q4 developments (OECD 
2021: 7), which means an unequal dynamic is taking place.  
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7.1 Broad Money 
For a quantification of the circulating money, we use IMF data on broad money to include narrow 
money as well as liquid financial instruments (cf. IMF 2017: 180ff). ECOWAS shows significant 
differences for broad money growth (2020 estimates for Ghana: +22.8%, Côte d’Ivoire: -5.9%), 
also in comparison to the level of 2019 (y-o-y difference Côte d’Ivoire: -27.9%, Burkina Faso: 
+5.5%). Nevertheless, it can be seen that the broad money base and growth is highly volatile when 
the previous years are included (cf. IMF 2020d: 18) and when contrasting the broad money base 
with the  GDP, no exceptionally pronounced increases or decrease show for 2020. This is to be 
seen when assessing the ECOWAS region as a whole (Fig. 58, p. 96) as well as the individual EMSs 
(cf. IMF 2020d: 17).  
The key finding is the absence of significant changes in the pandemic timeframe. Neither major 
increases nor decreases simply reflect lower economic leverage of African countries and the 
globally uneven shifts of capital movements. In Europe, for instance, the economic and policy 
reactions to the pandemic led to significantly higher growth in broad money (cf. MARMEFELT 2020: 
20), and in the US growth reached the highest ever recorded rate (GOODHART 2020).  
Nevertheless, the perspective on broad money only highlights total money availability, not its 
mobility or distribution. When assessing monetary flows towards households in Nigeria for May 
2020, 79% stated, that income decreased in comparison to pre-C19 levels (WORLD BANK 2020d: 
1). That ratio diminished to 38% in the period from August 2020 to January 2021 (WORLD BANK 
2021d: 1). Compared to a pre-pandemic baseline, even though the situation is tending to 
normalize, capital movements towards individual households are still inhibited. In addition, this 
is presumably causing also less outflows and is thus changing the map of capital movements when 



























Figure 58: Broad Money as proportion of gross domestic product 
Source: Own figure. Data: IMF (2020d). 





After outlining local broad money bases, investments represent a key factor for mapping mobility 
patterns of capital in West Africa and its situatedness in the world. The most recent Regional 
Economic Outlook for SSA of IMF (2020e: 2) puts the area-specific megatrend related to C19 as: 
“Globally, the key components of capital flows to the region, including foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and other investment flows, are at historical lows, and these may take longer to recover than 
portfolio flows.” Thus, when assessing supraregional capital movements from an ECOWAS-related 




When approaching total investment dynamics in the sense of flows resulting in new gross capital 
formation, an overall drop (-3.2%) in total investments in the ECOWAS region can be observed. 
After two years of fast increase this is a clear trend reversal. Yet, in the previous years, even more 
extreme decreases where observed, for instance -20% in 2011 and compared with the entire Sub-
Saharan region (-5.6%), the decline in the ECOWAS region is less pronounced. Notably, the 
WAEMU states altogether experienced the C19-related impact and the fast increase in the years 
before with less intensity. There, a growth rate of 2.3% could be observed from 2019 to 2020 (cf. 
Fig. 59, p. 97). Yet, when examining the developments of the individual states, there is no evident 
relation of geographical location or membership in an economic subgroup. Instead, a significant 
scattering emerges when comparing neighbouring countries. The overall negative score of the 
ECOWAS is related to the significant decrease of investments in Ghana (-21.7%) and the slight 
overall increase of the WAEMU states is mainly driven by the 31.3% increase in Togo (y-o-y). But 
within both groups – WAEMU and non-WAEMU states – one can find countries with increasing 
and decreasing estimations in varying extents (Fig. 60, p. 98). The two mentioned countries 
represent the most extreme changes, with the majority (8/14) of covered EMSs are in positive 
growth range compared to the previous year and overall half of the countries being in a less 





















Figure 59: Development of Investments as proportion of GDP, years of 2004 until 2008 
averaged for first data point 
Source: Own figure. Data: IMF (2020d). 
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For this heterogeneous situation, on balance, a contraction of capital mobility as investment for 
the entire ECOWAS is to be expected. The contraction is nevertheless less drastic than for instance 
the one estimated regarding Europe (cf. EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK 2021: 57). 
 
7.2.1 FDI 
UNCTAD (2020d) initially estimated the foreign direct investment in African countries to drop by 
25 to 40 percent in 2020, after a precedent fall by 10 percent in 2019. The dynamics observed in 
the first months of the pandemic give the impression of a drastic development regarding the 
capital mobility patterns in the Global South with international investors pulling back US$ 80 
billion from emerging market economies (VASUDEVAN 2020: 26). Nevertheless, more recent 
reports state, that FDI flows to so-called developing economies decreased by a total of 12 %, and 
in Africa by 18 % (UNCATD 2021g). This underlines reports from Q4 2020 on faster recoveries 
than estimated, but also a significant difference between the Global South and the North. Total 
global FDI collapsed in 2020 by 42%, representing a drastic change in global transnational capital 
mobility pattern with flows reduced from US$ 1.5 trillion (2019) to US$ 859 billion in 2020 (IBID.). 
However, the lack of capital movements to countries in the so-called developed world accounted 
for the bulk of this, with a 69% y-o-y reduction. 
Total Investments vs. GDP 
Figure 60: Heatmap of total investments for each ECOWAS member state as percentage of the GDP. 2020 and 
2021 figures are estimates from Q3 2020. Source does not include data on Liberia 
Source: Illustration by Jannis Viola. Data: IMF (2020d). 




When scaling down to West Africa, the most 
recent country-level estimations released by 
the IMF36 indicate a significant decrease of 
the FDI-to-GDP ratio from 1.5% in 2019 to 
0.9% in 2020 (Fig. 61). This is in line with the 
ratio decline of the WAEMU states as a 
subgroup - albeit from a slightly higher level - 
but is greater than the decline of SSA as a 
whole. Thus, the interregional comparison 
indicates an above-average impact on the 
ECOWAS region. However, when looking at 
the individual EMSs, large differences 
between countries become apparent as well. 
Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire are estimated to 
approach zero (0.1% for 2020), while Nigeria 
was as 0.4% and Senegal at 1.9% for 2019. 
Niger is the only EMS to even increase its ratio 
(from 3.7% to 4.8%). Some of the EMS, where 
FDI accounts for a particularly large share of 
GDP, have seen significant reductions of the 
FDI-to-GDP ratio (e.g., Sierra Leone). While 
for other countries the level remained almost 
stable (e.g., Liberia). Overall, also here a 
complex landscape of flows can be discerned, 
which is, however, dominated by the 
tendency to show significantly fewer 
incoming capital movements in 2020 and 
then to forecast a significant increase again 
for 2021. 
Foreign direct investment is just one form of 
capital inflow, yet for most EMSs it represents 
the most important one. But other forms 
should be assessed as well, as in Nigeria, 
where the y-o-y FDI with regard only to the 
second quarter 2020 declined by -30.7%, the 
FPI (Foreign Portfolio Investments) dropped 
by -91.1% for the same period. This results in 
the total capital import declining by -78.6% y-
o-y for that quarter (PROSHARE 2020). This 
 
 
36 Based on the mentioned adjustments in global predictions from Q4 2020 and Q1 2021, the IMF 
predictions might be overly negative, yet more topical country-specific data was not published while this 































































Figure 61: Annual Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows 
for individual ECOWAS member states (sorted by amount 
of share) and regional comparison as percentage of GDP. 
2020 and 2021 figures are estimates from Q3 2020 
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represents an enormous change in capital mobility pattern when assessing Nigeria-related cross-
border flows. These massive declines have been reported for most countries of the Global South 
(OECD 2020b: 2). Thus, overall foreign investment dynamics especially in the first months of the 
pandemics imply a drastic change in the capital-related global networks interlinking West Africa. 
 
7.3 Government spending 
Apart from foreign movements of capital coming in, the spending of West African Governments 
also represents a vital measure for approaching capital mobilities. As to be seen in Fig. 62, overall 
West African spending is estimated to increase in relation to the GDP from 15.3% in 2019 to 
16.9%. On the other hand, GDP is expected to shrink by 2.5% as the basis for calculation in the 
same publication (IMF 2020d: 5).  
However, if one considers the total figures (IMF 2021) and compared to 2019 government 
spending in national currencies has increased in all EMS except for Liberia. If the previous years 
are also taken into account, it becomes 
clear that in most cases these increases 
are not exceptionally extreme. 
Nevertheless, despite an economic 
shock and declining government 
revenues an increase in internal capital 
movements by government institutions is 
evident. The magnitude of the 
development can be seen by contrasting 
all values (spending vs. GDP) of the 
individual member states from 2004 to 
2019 to the ones 2020 (Fig. 63, p. 101). 
The heatmap shows a clear difference in 
the shared dynamics from 2019 to 2020 

















Government Expenditure vs. GDP
ECOWAS WAEMU Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 62: Annual government expenditure as percentage of GDP. 
2020 and 2021 figures are estimates from Q3 2020 
Source: Own figure. Data: IMF (2020d). 





However, it is also necessary to contextualise to where the capital flows are directed. In the 
example of Nigeria, the reduction in government revenue discussed in chapter 6.2 led to a 
reduction in the health budget, but it should be noted that 60% of the total government budget 
was already earmarked for debt servicing before the pandemic (UNCTAD 2020c). The bottom line 
is that government flows have increased, but here, too, a consideration of directionality plays a 
central role in understanding patterns of mobility. 
 
7.3.1 Country economic stimulus 
Increased government spending throughout the pandemic is linked to the economic packages set 
up by governments to respond to the socio-economic crisis triggered by the pandemic complex. 
These potentially represent a novel as stated in the introduction to the chapter, the overall 
economic stimuli have reached unprecedented levels in the world and, according to the 
projections, their monetary magnitude more than compensates for the global monetary losses 
incurred so far as a result of the crisis. 
Government Expenditure vs. GDP 
Figure 63: Heatmap of annual governmental expenditure of each ECOWAS member state as percentage of the 
GDP. 2020 and 2021 figures are estimates from Q3 2020 
Source: Illustration by Jannis Viola. Data: IMF (2020d). 
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To outline the direct capital 
flows towards individuals as a 
first step, economic instru-
ments chosen by the EMSs’ 
governments in terms of 
income and household support 
are examined. The tilemaps in 
Fig. 64 visualise records of 
whether the individual 
government have set up 
policies including a freezing of 
financial obligations for 
households (e.g. stopping loan 
repayments, preventing the 
discontinuation of services 
such as water distribution in 
the event of a payment 
shortfall, or banning evictions) 
and records regarding whether 
the government is providing 
direct cash payments to people 
who lose their jobs or cannot 
work due to the pandemic (cf. 
OxCGRT 2021a). It is apparent 
that in the ECOWAS region, 
with the exception of Benin, 
there has been no longer-term 
framework for a more 
comprehensive state relief of 
pandemic-related income 
shortfalls. However, in light of 
the funding strength of West 
African social systems, but also with regard to the predominance of informal wage earners, this is 
in essence a category that has not been designed for the West African context. Nonetheless, it is 
worth noting that half of the EMSs represented have introduced a policy that is intended to 
compensate for at least a small part of wage losses or consisted of a one-time payment that was 
less than 50% of the median salary. Regarding the second category of debt relief or contract 
deferral options, more West African countries have introduced a policy. Half of the countries had 
at least temporary policies that were classified as broad, such as subsidizing 100% of water bills 
(e.g., Ghana) or postponing tax payment deadlines (e.g., Côte d’Ivoire). It is beyond the scope of 
this study to specifically approach the individual economic measures listed in the appendix (10.6). 
However, there are certain actions worth highlighting such as a suspension of charge on imported 
goods in Liberia, cash transfers to 240,000 households in Guinea, and the removing of charges on 
ECOWAS Debt / Contract Relief Policy 
Figure 64: Tilemaps according to the principle of the previous ones. Above: 
C19 governmental direct cash payments to people who lose their jobs or 
cannot work (0: none; 1: less than 50% of lost salary; 2: 50% or more of lost 
salary) and bottom: governmental freezing of financial obligations for 
households (0: none; 1: narrow relief, specific to one kind of contract; 2: 
broad debt/contract relief)  
Source: Illustration by Jannis Viola. Data: OxCGRT (2021c). 
 
ECOWAS Income Support Policy 




mobile phone cash transfers in Ghana. These examples might be understood as hints towards a 
new mobility pattern in different shapes, impacting new types of capital transfer mediums, the 
interaction of mobility of capital and goods and forms of widely distributed, small-scale capital 
movements. 
However, these policies should not detract from the fact that all in all even in relation to GDP or 
population size, all EMSs have introduced significantly smaller stimulus packages compared to 
the Global North but also compared to the ones of the so-called emerging economies. When 
assessing the total monetary scope of initially introduced economic stimuli policies37 in relation 
to GDP (until August 2020), Senegal is the EMS with the biggest overall size (6.8%) followed by 
Cabo Verde and Nigeria, while most EMS remain below the 3%-threshold. For comparison, the 
ones introduced in India summed up to 10.3%, in Brazil 27.2% and the biggest one at that time 
was Japan with 68.9% (RAGA 2020: 1). 
When approached in relationship with capita, Cabo Verde has the biggest spending recorded with 
US$ 169 per inhabitant, followed by Senegal (104) and Nigeria (92). In comparison, the G20 
country with the lowest spending per capita at that time was India (207) and the one with the 
highest Japan (US$ 27,056) (IBID.: 2). In terms of mobility pattern, this emphasizes a global unequal 
spread of induced capital flows.  
Nevertheless, the introduced economic measures hint at temporal shifts in the capital landscape, 
but the impact on actual regional capital flows must be further examined due to the large variety 
of fiscal instruments and policy aims addressed by the stimulus packages – they sometimes also 
included special commitments such as the Senegalese governments 12.5 billion FCFA fiscal 
stimulus for the Senegalese diaspora (RAGA 2020: 68). Given their large economic leverage, this 
chapter has focussed on governmental fiscal interventions. However, there were also private 
economic actions. One example is the “Coalition against COVID-19”, which was formed by more 
than 100 private sector actors and which raised almost 80 million dollars until February 2021 to 
“support the government’s response” to the pandemic in Nigeria (cf. MADDEN 2020, CACOVID 
2021). 
 
7.4 Developments in Rating 
In terms of global capital mobility, international rating agencies represent an important 
regulatory regime. Initial reactions to the pandemic’s spread regarding the so-called emerging 
markets reveal a massive row of downgrades. There was an above average focus on oil exporting 
nations, but none-oil-states were hit as well (IMF 2020f: 7). Until June alone there have been more 
than 30 downgrades concerning African countries. All of the biggest economies of sub-Saharan 
Africa got outlooks changed to negative or downgrades within the first months of COVID-19 
(NAIDOO 2020). Based on a perspective of how nation state refinancing works in the interaction 
with the private markets in financialised global capitalism, this represents a massive impact of a 
 
 
37 “Economic stimulus packages announced in 2020 in response to Covid-19. Fiscal stimulus includes aid, 
grants, and guarantees. Monetary stimuli include sonly central banks’ explicit monetary liquidity injection” 
(RAGA 2020: 1). 
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regime on West African actors regarding their possibilities of shaping capital mobility in the 
region. Due to the significant influence of the agencies' ratings on the economic room for 
manoeuvre of the African states, there were calls for a temporary suspension of all ratings in the 
context of the pandemic crisis (MOFEP 2020). The rating agencies not only reacted negatively to 
plans by West African governments to spend more money in the form of economic support 
programmes to cushion the impact of the pandemic complex in general, but also, for example, to 
the participation of EMS in supranational programmes designed to mitigate the negative 
economic impact of C19 in the Global South. For example, Moody's downgraded Côte d'Ivoire and 
Senegal because they wanted to participate in the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (MUTIZE 
2020). The dynamics pressure on EMS governments because when they increase stringency, their 
rating drops, but with less stringency they also unsettle investors (KIZYS ET AL. 2021). BALAJEE ET 
AL. (2020. 13) propose a direct link to the smaller size of economic measures in countries of the 
Global South: “Using a cross-section of countries, we find that fear of rating downgrades is an 
important driver that is preventing countries from providing stimulus. Furthermore, countries 
that face tighter funding conditions due to fear of credit downgrades also delay the fiscal 
stimulus.” 
For West Africa in particular, all but one EMS that was reconsidered by one of the three big rating 
agencies in terms of sovereign credit ratings got at least a worse outlook, if not a downgrade (cf. 
Appendix 10.5). The majority of these negative reassessments took place in April, which implies 
a direct link to C19, and this was also reflected in the rating agencies' justifications of the 
downvotes. Overall, these downgrades by the influential rating agencies will have a significant 
impact on the (im)mobilities of capital in West Africa through changes in the flows of credit. At 
the same time, lower ratings mean that the EMS will be less likely to refinance themselves on the 
international credit market, as interest rates will become less affordable, leading to a potential 
reduction in capital flows to the states. At the same time, all EMS are already heavily or even very 
heavily indebted, and if governments want to continue to service their debts, new loans will 
usually have to be taken out to cover the repayments. However, the conditions for the new loans 
will be worse due to the downgrading, which is reflected in a potentially higher capital outflow 
from the sovereigns due to the rising interest rates. 
 
7.5 Remittances 
Remittances represent an important economic pillar in West Africa, with Gambia even are among 
the biggest receivers as share of total GDP worldwide (cf. UNCTAD 2020e: 58). Remittances to 
low- and middle-income countries are projected to decline by almost 20% in 2020 (UNCTAD 
2020e: 23). Remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa are expected to decrease by around 9% when 
comparing 2019 levels to 2020 estimates (GMDAC 2021). This is mainly due to the exceptional 
economic impact of the pandemic complex in the most important countries in terms of remittance 
outflows of the Global North. The production of immobility to mitigate pandemic has direct 
implications for flows of capital towards West Africa. Yet the scope of these implications varies 
due to the differences in dependency on remittances within West Africa. Compared to other world 
regions, the estimated decrease puts SSA in the middle in terms of magnitude. Nevertheless, 
remittances to the global South are expected to remain larger in terms of monetary volume than 
foreign direct investments and official development assistance for 2020 and 2021 (KNOMAD 




2020: 8). According to research on recent global remittance flows these types of movements of 
capital have usually been counter cyclical in the sense that workers sent home more money home 
at times of crisis. Yet due to the comprehensiveness of economic disturbances connected to 
COVID-19, this does not seem to have materialized in the first months of the pandemic (UNCTAD 
2020e: 23). Nevertheless, a globally more nuanced dynamic with partially faster rebounds was 
recorded (GMDAC 2021).  
Data on the individual EMS' remittance inward flows and the overall ECOWAS region figures 
support the impression of a decrease from the 2019 level to 2020 (Fig. 65, pp. 105-106). It is not 
the magnitude of the decrease that is indicating an overarching negative impact, since the volumes 
were also subject to significant, usually even greater fluctuations in previous years than between 
2019 and 2020. But there is a shared downward direction regarding inward flows to all EMSs at 
the same time, which has never been the case before. Due to the clearly low variance, it can 
therefore be assumed that the C19 complex has an overarching influence also for the particular 
local realities in Western Africa. This also becomes clear when assessing the overall median to the 
average. These behave quite differently before 2020, with the average mainly reflecting the great 
influence of Nigeria due to its much larger total income. Yet, 2020 shows a shared direction. A 
minor but notable factor might also be disruptions in the functionality of migration-relevant 
capital channels. 8% of surveyed migrants in western Africa indicated a higher difficulty in the 
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Even if more recent statistics on global economic impacts of C19 imply a medium-term 
contraction that is less severe than initially predicted, the already statistically reliable economic 
contraction in Q2 2020 and the associated abrupt global developments must nevertheless be seen 
as at least a temporary major change in migrant capital flow patterns concerning in the WA 
context. The figures suggest that the decline in mobile remittance flows to WA, at least for the 
whole of 2020, has not reached extreme levels that have not been observed before in most EMSs, 
but it is important not to forget its enormous scale, that this largest form of capital source for the 
Global South has now reached (which in absolute terms nevertheless speaks for an enormous 
change within the global capital flow networks) and the local differences within the ECOWAS 
region regarding the extent of inflows and the extent of socio-economic dependence on this type 
of flows.  
Figure 65:Development of remittances flowing to individual EMS over time. Sort by descending 
groups with similar inflow levels. Completed by the overall average and median of ECOWAS. Annual 
data updated as of October 2020 

























































































7.6 Development of commodity prices 
Because of its export orientated economies which can be mainly traced back to the political 
economy of colonialism, all West African states still depend to varying degrees on commodity 
prices on the international market. The development of these prices is powerfully influencing 
capital mobility as it determines state finances in many EMSs. In this chapter we provide an 
overview of price changes during the initial phase of the pandemic to complement the 
perspectives on (im)mobilities of capital in West Africa and contextualize figures on exports. 
Regarding such commodities that represent important shares in West African total exports, the 
dynamics since February 2020 were ambiguous. Of the major mineral commodities, from January 
until April 2020, only gold was showing an increase in prices (+12.8%) (GARSIDE 2020). When 
considering the usual attractiveness of gold during economic crises, the price experienced an 
unconditionally high volatility in the first quarter 2020 (BOURAIMA ET AL. 2020). However, the 
overall dynamics represented its traditional safe-haven function with a substantial y-o-y growth 
rise with a peak in the beginning of August 2020. Afterwards, with the partial recovery of the 
global economy, the price started to decrease again, yet not significantly compared to the previous 
year’s levels.  
Oil, on the other hand, showed 
significant price declines in direct 
temporal correlation to the 
pandemic outbreak. This mirrors 
economic dynamics and the 
globally dropping demand for 
motorized mobility due to the 
immobilizations by the pandemic 
regimes. Oil trade functions as an 
indicator of investors’ confidence 
in the functioning of the global 
capitalist machinery. Collapsing 
prices had direct implications for 
the governments of Nigeria and 
Ghana in particular facing a 
limitation of fiscal space (AfDB 
2020: xiii). In relation to 2019 
Nigeria experienced a decline of 
close to 30% in the indicator established by the Institute of International Finance that indicates 
export share-weighted change in price of total exports (HILGENSTOCK & SEZERCAN 2021: 3). Yet, 
these developments always represent a twofold issue since ECOWAS net oil importing countries 
benefit from lower oil prices (AFDB 2020: xiii). In Ghana, increased gold price seems to have 
overcompensated oil losses in terms of an exports-share weighted perspective (HILGENSTOCK & 
SEZERCAN 2021:3) although oil revenues are more directly integrated in state funding.  
Also for cocoa, a decline in price was observed, even though to a lesser extent. In January 2020, 
international prices started on a higher level than in the beginning of 2019, but then declined with 
the outbreak, particularly impacting Côte d’Ivoire as world’s biggest cocoa producer (cf. BOURAIMA 
Figure 66: International prices a published by the BOG, monthly 
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ET AL. 2020). With a higher temporal resolution of the core commodity price instead of the monthly 
CSCE price shown in Fig. 66 (p. 107), one can observer a substantial increase in volatility and a 
short-term collapse beginning of June to the lowest level of the last 3 years, to then increase again 
but still with a high fluctuation (cf. MARKETSINSIDER 2021).  
Cotton as another important commodity mostly for WAEMU states, showed the same 
development but with an even more extreme drop in April and a sharper rise afterwards with less 
fluctuation. For Benin, with cotton products resembling more than 50% of its total goods exports 
(BOURAIMA ET AL. 2020: 407), this represents an abrupt momentum of crisis which, at least in terms 
of prices, turned into a benefit over the months. As described in chapter 6.1, cashew prices 
followed a similar trend. 
Commodity price dynamics followed first of all a similar trend of reacting abruptly with significant 
reduction and afterwards increased again and most indexes saw a C19-related growth in volatility 
as well. In a perspective on mobility networks, this results in less steady patterns. Secondly, these 
patterns have implications for mobility relations in capital flows as well as flows of goods due to 
pricing having an intermediary role regarding both. And at the same time, they are impacted by 
immobility regimes, for instance regarding crude oil prices. This is especially relevant for West 
Africa with its high share in commodity exports. 
 
7.7 Debt Dynamics 
Debt might be understood as the counterpart to the previously discussed inflows with regard to 
directionality of capital mobility. Global debt jumped to a new all-time high of US$ 24 trillion as a 
result of the pandemic complex. With the economic contradiction this translates to a drastic surge 
in debt-to-GDP ratio (cf. TIFTIK ET AL. 2021: 1). However, this development was primarily driven 
by the countries of the Global North, and despite debt-to-GDP ratios that are also rising for the 
large African economies, most of them end up at the bottom of the global comparison of C19-
related increases of debt ratios (IBID.: 2). 
Regarding ECOWAS, a significant 
widening of the public deficit is 
projected in connection to COVID-
19. As a whole, it is expected to 
reach 6.4% in 2020, which 
represents a substantial growth 
compared to the previous years. 
“The region's budget deficit in 
2020 reflects a general worsening 
in all countries” (WFP ET AL. 2020: 
3). The total external debt (Fig. 
67) of the ECOWAS region in 
relation to GDP is expected to 
grow substantially from 14.4% in 






















Figure 67: Total annual external debt (official debt, debtor based) 
recorded for the ECOWAS region and regional comparisons, in relation to 
GDP. 2020 and 2021 figures are estimates from October 2020 
Source: Own figure. Data: IMF (2020d). 




growth rate is the same as the one for overall Sub-Saharan Africa (+120% y-o-y) and slightly 
higher than the one estimated for exclusively the WAEMU region (+113%), which implies a 
focus of negative performance in the bigger non-WAEMU states.  
 
Nevertheless, the pressure debt burden puts on national governments varies significantly. 
According to the Jubilee Debt Campaign Categorisation, 5 EMSs (Ghana, Cabo Verde, The Gambia, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone) were in a debt crisis in 2020, and all other but two (Guinea, Nigeria) are 
labelled as being in risk of a public and/or private debt crisis (JUBILEE 2021). Ghana is by far the 
EMS with the highest share of government revenue spend for debt repayment in 2020 (50.2%) 
followed by Gambia (26.6%), Sierra Leone (18.1%) and Senegal (16.1%) (IBID.). On the other side, 
Burkina Faso was the EMS with the lowest share in 2020 (5.6%). Globally, there is a total of 52 
countries, that spend more than 15% of the governmental revenue for debt burden in 2020, in 
2018 that number was at 31 and in 2015 at 22. This implies, that the pandemic complex is mainly 
enhancing a trend, that was already observable before. Regarding the total external debt in 
relation to economic output (Fig. 68), the biggest growth when relating the 2020 figures to the 
2019 baseline is reported for Guinea (154%), followed by Togo (134%) and Nigeria (127%). 
Senegal was the one with the lowest growth (104%). Magnitude varies, but the tendency is shared. 
Furthermore, it is not the EMSs which are already in a debt crisis38, that saw the biggest debt 
growth rates during the pandemic, but other ones. 
 
 




























Figure 68: Total annual external debt (official debt, debtor based) recorded for the individual ECOWAS 
member states, in relation to GDP. Cabo Verde not included due to significantly higher values. 2020 and 
2021 figures are estimates from October 2020 
Source: Own figure. Data: IMF (2020d). 
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In the context of debt dynamics, however, the pandemic complex seems to have catalysed and 
unified pre-existing developments of increasing capital mobility out of the EMS towards external 
debtors, adding another element to the overall map of capital mobility patterns and their links to 
the pandemic complex. 
 
7.8 Initial Outline: Pandemic (Im)mobility Regimes and Capital 
Due to the varying embeddedness of capital flow with regard to the political economy and the role 
of human interaction, capital mobility regimes follow a fundamentally different logic than the ones 
concerning people’s movements. Capital flows, like flows of goods, are key for global capitalism. 
From the regime's point of view, capital mobility is especially worth promoting in times of crisis. 
As capital movements are widely depersonalised, they are to be fostered from the perspective of 
the regimes’ political-economic logics. Since the production of immobility of people, and, as has 
been shown, the disruption of flows of goods also have negative implications for the production 
and flows of capital, at least with regard to the real economy, there is a clash of interests from the 
pandemic regimes’ point of view. Overall, however, it should be noted that, there is an interest in 
protecting and strengthening pre-pandemic capital mobility patterns and this is also the case in 
the context of West Africa.  
Yet these particular regimes are also embedded in the global power hierarchies. As during the 
financial crisis of 2008, the response by Western governments is to raise enormous amounts of 
money which benefit selected parts of the economy and can lead to the state of massive and broad 
capital movements in the financialised economies and to rising stock market prices, despite a 
crisis-ridden real economy. In ECOWAS there is no financialised superstructure complementing 
the real economy that could be similarly flooded with money. And there is little room for 
manoeuvre to influence capital mobility to a comparable extent. This is mainly because the 
erosion of the austerity paradigm, which has been seen since the financial crisis, for instance in 
the European centres, is not granted to the states of West Africa by the global financial policy 
regimes. This interference with West African regimes, in the sense of not permitting 
interventionism, involves many aspects, which in turn can be understood as facets of a global 
capital regime. Such aspects for instance include: 
◼ Influence of rating agencies (cf. chapter 7.4),  
◼ Monetary policy interventions aimed at maintaining the capital mobility landscape in the 
Global North (cf. VASUDEVAN 2020) carried out by hegemonic nation-state actors of the 
North and supranational institutions, 
◼ Market logics following responses to the economic weakness of southern states by 
private-sector capital actors, 
◼ and globally impactful ideologies that influence economic policy and economic behaviour. 
The result of the imbalance, as described, is the severe limitation of the influence of local capital 
mobility regimes (cf. chapter 7.1), and, in return, a greater influence, for example, of the US repo 
facility set up in the course of the pandemic (cf. IBID.), on West African mobility realities compared 
to local interventions.  




Small scale capital flows during the pandemic led to a global increase in the use of "mobile money" 
(cf. BAZARBASH ET AL. 2020), i.e., telephone-based transfers without conventional banking. Such 
developments should be further researched regarding their linkages to power structures when 
the immobilisation of people increases the need for capital movements independent of physical 
movements. 
Abrupt and drastic changes in the mapping of global and West Africa-specific capital mobility 
pattern were evident. However, these changes mostly came in the form of an intensification of 
pre-existing trends and not novel phenomena. Despite these drastic changes, the most recent 
statistics on developments regarding the landscape of capital mobility rather imply a faster-then-
expected global rebound. New findings also suggest an increase of inequalities and non-
simultaneity between the movements of capital within and towards the Global North and South. 
Apart from this, certain economic effects of the pandemic complex will not develop their full 
impact until 2021. 
 
 Conclusion 
The global spread of the novel coronavirus caused massive and abrupt disruptions of various 
mobility patterns within the networks studied here, showing both the emergence of new types of 
steering mechanisms and the amplification of existing ones. 
Across the majority of topics covered in this study, significant changes in mobility patterns were 
evident in the wake of government responses to COVID-19. Impacts are most evident on human 
mobility. Practices of governing mobility and stasis differ significantly. The diversity and 
complexity of mobility regimes in ECOWAS do not allow for generalizations of impacts. However, 
the data collected in this study can provide a basis for future typification of the mobility regimes 
that have emerged in the context of the pandemic in West Africa. These regimes are shaped both 
by global political and geo-economic entanglements and very place-specific conditions, limiting 
or amplifying directionality, pace, and extent of movements of bodies and things.  
Three different but entangled spheres were brought together in the framework of global 
capitalism and its local formations. The food sector in ECOWAS, as the largest economic sector in 
West Africa, with a share of 40% of the regional gross domestic product (OECD 2019), can be used 
as an example. Not only is this sector of particular importance, but it is also incorporated in a 
variety of ways into different flows and socio-economic structures that shape the mobilities of 
people, goods, and capital. Thus, it is impacted in different ways by the pandemic complex, but, at 
the same time, also contributes to the production of pandemic realities. According to the OECD 
(2020c), “in the food sector alone […] more than 82 million jobs will be directly affected by 
mobility restrictions”. Mobility restrictions will and already have heavily impacted agricultural 
production and processing, as well as the movement of food products. With regard to the 
important internal migration as a key feature of West African food systems (IBID.), changing 
production patterns impact human mobility, too. Additionally, this is all embedded in a market 
framework in which flows of capital determine the production of the products, and the circulation 
of those kinds of commodities produces capital flows reciprocally. Thus, all types of mobility 
discussed in this study are directly relevant for the food sector and therefore also for the regimes. 
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And these are just some examples of the manifold embeddedness of the regional food sector, to 
illustrate the interconnectivity of the different spheres of mobility, suggesting an overarching 
reading of the developments described in this study.  
To summarize some macro-trends of human mobility patterns: 
◼ There were, in locally diverging degrees, severe immobilisations until June 2020 with a 
peak in May, followed by a continuous decline towards the pre-pandemic baseline. 
Towards the end of the year, there were signs of both overcompensation and a second, 
smaller wave of immobilisations.  
◼ Cross-border mobility was and is heavily restricted with an underlying tendency of 
significantly prioritizing the opening of airports and maritime border points over land 
borders within the ECOWAS.  
◼ Asynchronicity shapes the way pandemic regimes affect individual lives a year after the 
outbreak. While many people returned to January 2020 levels of mobility and public 
transport usage those depending on cross-border movements still experience substantial 
restrictions.  
(Im)mobilities of goods:  
◼ Here, in contrast to the mobilities of people, a clear distinction has developed between 
mobilities that are strongly affected and mobilities that are scarcely affected at all. 
◼ Maritime mobility of goods and cross-border hinterland transports were unevenly 
impacted. Shipping of goods towards and from West Africa seems, by and large, less 
affected than overland transport that struggles with border restrictions in the ECOWAS 
region.  
◼ Overall, exports from West Africa are significantly more impacted by the pandemic 
complex than imports. Yet, when assessing recent numbers of total trade volumes for Sub-
Saharan Africa, imports are more impacted - which illustrates the complexity of recent 
trends. 
 (Im)mobilities of capital:  
◼ There is a substantial increase in unequal developments39 in terms of capital flows and 
distribution when comparing cross-regionally or between different parts of the economy.  
◼ Despite internal differences, there is a regional macro-trend of significantly shrinking 
movements of external capital flows towards West Africa while internal expenditure grew, 
both connected to the pandemic complex. Even though all types of inflows were declining 
in 2020, with outflows (debts) growing, local governments were not able to set up 
 
 
39 From a global perspective, this inequality in developments might be framed as the seemingly 
contradictory simultaneity of the first increase of extreme poverty since 1998 (WORLD BANK 2020e) and a 
booming financial market and all-time stock market peaks in the Global North after an initial short-term 
drop (cf. MCKINSEY 2021). 




regulatory regimes comparable to those in the Global North that are efficient enough to 
substantially mitigate negative impacts on capital dynamics.  
◼ In terms of mobility patterns, the supraregional dynamics as described might be 
apprehended as an enhanced tendency of a decoupling of the spheres of capital flows 
connected to the Global North, with its C19-related governmentally subsidised 
financialised corporations, and the Global South, with its limited possibilities for 
interventions. In terms of geographical capital distribution this might be understood as an 
overall growing capital base in the Global North, due to the magnitude of the stimuli 
overcompensating for the negative impacts of the pandemic complex (cf. chapter 7), and 
a shrunk base in the Global South and, specifically in West Africa40.  
All in all, we revealed a more nuanced picture with significant variations for most subtopics in this 





40 The conditions shaping these phenomena were discussed in an article by Ghana’s Finance Minister Ofori-
Atta in the FINANCIAL TIMES (2020), in which he proposed a coordination of African actors for a push towards 
a restructuring of the global financial architecture according to the needs of countries in the Global South. 
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 Appendix 
 
10.1 ECOWAS OxCGRT ‘C’ Sub-Indexes (Containment and Closure Policies) 
 
Figure 69: Tilemaps of each OxCGRT sub-index regarding containment and closure policies and below a breakdown of 
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ECOWAS International Travel Policies 




Codebook regarding the preceding tilemaps: 








0 - no measures  
1 - recommend closing or all schools open with 
alterations resulting in significant differences 
compared to non-Covid-19 operations  
2 - require closing (only some levels or categories, e.g. 
just high school, or just public schools)  
3 - require closing all levels  







0 - no measures  
1 - recommend closing (or recommend work from 
home)  
2 - require closing (or work from home) for some 
sectors or categories of workers  
3 - require closing (or work from home) for all-but-
essential workplaces (e.g. grocery stores, doctors)  








0 - no measures  
1 - recommend cancelling  
2 - require cancelling  
Blank - no data 
C4 C4_Restrictions 
on gatherings 




0 - no restrictions  
1 - restrictions on very large gatherings (the limit is 
above 1000 people)  
2 - restrictions on gatherings between 101-1000 
people  
3 - restrictions on gatherings between 11-100 people  
4 - restrictions on gatherings of 10 people or less  
Blank - no data 
C5 C5_Close public 
transport 




0 - no measures  
1 - recommend closing (or significantly reduce 
volume/route/means of transport available)  
2 - require closing (or prohibit most citizens from 
using it)  
Blank - no data 
C6 C6_Stay at home 
requirements 








0 - no measures  
1 - recommend not leaving house  
2 - require not leaving house with exceptions for daily 
exercise, grocery shopping, and 'essential' trips  
3 - require not leaving house with minimal exceptions 
(e.g. allowed to leave once a week, or only one person 
can leave at a time, etc.)  












0 - no measures  
1 - recommend not to travel between regions/cities  
2 - internal movement restrictions in place  










0 - no restrictions  
1 - screening arrivals  
2 - quarantine arrivals from some or all regions  
3 - ban arrivals from some regions  
4 - ban on all regions or total border closure  
Blank - no data 
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10.2 ECOWAS OxCGRT ‘H’ Sub-Indexes (Health System Policies) 
 
Figure 70: Tilemaps of each OxCGRT sub-index regarding health system policies and below a breakdown of the coding 
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Codebook regarding the preceding tilemaps: 








Ordinal scale 0 - no Covid-19 public information campaign  
1 - public officials urging caution about Covid-
19  
2- coordinated public information campaign 
(e.g. across traditional and social media)  





policy on who 




Ordinal scale 0 - no testing policy  
1 - only those who both (a) have symptoms 
AND (b) meet specific criteria (e.g. key 
workers, admitted to hospital, came into 
contact with a known case, returned from 
overseas)  
2 - testing of anyone showing Covid-19 
symptoms  
3 - open public testing (eg "drive through" 
testing available to asymptomatic people)  











Bluetooth apps)  
Ordinal scale 0 - no contact tracing  
1 - limited contact tracing; not done for all 
cases  









Ordinal scale 0 - No policy  
1 - Recommended  
2 - Required in some specified shared/public 
spaces outside the home with other people 
present, or some situations when social 
distancing not possible  
3 - Required in all shared/public spaces 
outside the home with other people present or 
all situations when social distancing not 
possible  
4 - Required outside the home at all times 








Ordinal scale 0 - No availability  
1 - Availability for ONE of following: key 
workers/ clinically vulnerable groups / elderly 
groups  
2 - Availability for TWO of following: key 
workers/ clinically vulnerable groups / elderly 
groups  
3 - Availability for ALL of following: key 
workers/ clinically vulnerable groups / elderly 
groups  
4 - Availability for all three plus partial 
additional availability (select broad 
groups/ages)  
5 - Universal availability 
 




10.3 EMS Individual RoOI Risk Profiles 
 
Figure 71: Heatmaps of each OxCGRT Risk of Openness Sub-index and the index itself regarding each individual EMS. 
Variables: (1.) ‘Infect’: RoOi Sub-Index ‘cases controlled’. A metric between 0 and 1 based on new confirmed cases 
each day; (2.) ‘Info’: RoOi Sub-Index ‘community’. A metric between 0 and 1 based on whether a country has a public 
information campaign and the level of mobility reduction, weighted for current transmission risk; (3) ‘Move’: RoOi 
Sub-Index ‘manage imported cases’. A metric between 0 and 1 based on the stringency of the country’s restrictions on 
travel arrivals (does not measure risk of exporting cases); (4.) ‘Trace’: RoOi Sub-Index ‘test and trace’. A metric 
between 0 and 1, half based on testing and contact tracing policy, and half based on the number of tests-per-case a 
country has conducted (does not measure isolation) and (5.) ‘RoOI’: Combined Risk of Openness Index (Including 
‘endemic factor’). 
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10.4 Freight Data 
 
 
Figure 72: Semi-annual median time of all ship types combined in ports in the ECOWAS region. 
Source: Own figure. Data: UNCTAD (2021b). 
 
 
Figure 73: Annual container port throughput in West Africa. 
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Figure 74: Changes of Sovereign Credit Ratings regarding EMSs during the first months of the pandemic. 
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10.6 ECOWAS Economic Stimuli / Policy Responses 
 RAGA 2020 (until August) AFDB 2020 (until June)  
BEN • $128.5 mill. (CFAF 74.12 Bn.) for 
informal business support 
• Extension of tax filing deadlines 
• CFAF 60 Bn. For medical response 




• Response plan $672 million (4.2% of GDP) 
• Supporting the most vulnerable social strata and businesses in the most severely affected industries (hotels, 
restaurants, transport,  
• and leisure) 
• reducing 50% of the tax on motor vehicles, 25% of the cost of licenses for passenger transport companies, 50% of the 
daily space charges for traders in major markets. 
• postponing the payment of taxes, duties, and social security contributions for companies in the most affected sectors 
• reducing salary costs for six months benefiting smaller enterprises affiliated with the National Social Security Fund 
• reducing customs duties on basic food products (CFAF 4.6 billion) 
(p. 57) 
BFA  • 394 billion CFA emergency plan  
• creation of a solidarity fund for informal traders of fruits and vegetables,  
• acquisition of agricultural output and animal fodder to support pastoralists 
(p. 59) 
CPV • Total fiscal stimulus $91.7 mill. 
• $29.8 mill. to support businesses in 
loan guarantees, tax facilities 
• $39.4 mill. credit line for all firms 
• $21.7 mill. for the most vulnerable 
• $0.7 mill. to an emergency plan 
covering new heath care needs 
(p. 58) 
• Government deferred tax payments until December 2020  
• Approved €36 million in state-guaranteed lines of credit to protect private businesses 
• Central bank reduced its benchmark interest rate, dropped the permanent credit liquidity facility, approved special 
credit line of €400 million to commercial banks  
• Government approved €369,000 for 8,000 households in extreme poverty 
• €2.7 million targeting 30,000 informal sector workers,  
• Food assistance for 22,500 families  
• Enhanced social protection for the elderly 
(p. 61) 
CIV  • Government adopted an FCFA 95.9 billion public health response plan  
• Additionally, an FCFA 1,700.9 billion economic, social, and humanitarian support plan including private sector 
support measures (e.g., postponing tax payment deadlines for retailers and support fund for informal sector) and 
social measures (e.g. temporary payment of electricity bills (April to July 2020) and water bills (May to August 2020) 
for the most disadvantaged))  
(p. 67) 
GHA • Total fiscal stimulus: $2 Bn. 
• BOG C19 relief bond $1.8 Bn. 
• $107 mill. stimulus package for SMEs 
• $178 mill. support to industries 
(p. 60) 
 
• Monetary policy measures (e.g., reduction of policy rate from 16% to 14.5%, removing charges on mobile money 
transactions below GH¢100 for three months to end-June, lowering the reserve requirement ratio from 10% to 8% 
and cutting the conservation buffer for banks from 3% to 1.5%) 
• Fiscal measures (Coronavirus Alleviation Program, $219 million + National Trust Fund (COVID–19 Fund) + Ghana 
COVID–19 Private Sector Fund)  
• subsidizing water bills by 100% and electricity bills by 50%, from April to June 2020 
• special life insurance cover and other pay incentives for frontline health professionals  
(p. 76) 




GMB  • Health  sector  spending  was  increased by GMD 0.5 billion (0.5% of GDP) (COVID–19 Pandemic Action Plan)  
• Government adjusted domestic fuel prices  
• Central bank reduced its policy rate an increased the standing deposit facility rate  
• providing food aid to vulnerable (a bag of rice, a bag of sugar, and 10 liters of cooking oil) 
• coverage of salaries of workers in the tourism sector for three months (April–June 2020)  
• Extensions for VAT tax returns for businesses 
(p. 75) 
GIN  • Emergency Response Plan (Ministry of Health)  
• Economic Recovery Plan (Prime Minister’s Office 
• Distribution of protection kits 
• Cash transfers to 240,000 households,  
• Free water and electricity from April to June 2020. 
• Reducing the financial and tax burdens (e.g. for tourism industry 
• (p. 77) 
GNB • Total fiscal stimulus: $2.1 mill. 
• $0.8 mill. to supply the Ministries of 
Health, Home Affairs and Defence 
• $0.9 mill. to distribute 20,000 bags of 
rice and 10,000 bags of sugar 
throughout the country 
(p. 61) 
 
• No specific macroeconomic measures were adopted, as the country remains mired in political deadlock with no clear 
policy direction. 
(p. 78) 
LBR  • Food distribution to the poor (US$ 25m),  
• Free water & electricity,  
• Suspension of charge on imported goods 
• No preshipment penalty 
(p. 81) 
MLI • Total fiscal stimulus: $67 mill. 
• Introduced temporary tax incentives 
• $67 mill. In revised budget for health 
expenditure 
(p. 64) 
• Special fund of FCFA 100 billion for supporting the most vulnerable households, strengthening price controls to avoid 
price gouging, 
• Free distribution of 56,000 tons of grain and 16,000 tons of livestock feed. 
(p. 85) 
NER  • Removing taxes and duties on products related to pandemic mitigation and on intercity ground transportation 
• Reduction of taxes for imports and hospitality sector 
• Enlargement of support plan for vulnerable populations 
(p. 91) 
NGA • Total fiscal stimulus: $4.8 Bn. 
• $3.3 Bn. from government; $1.1 Bn. 
[sic] via central bank 
• NGN 500 billion ($1.4 billion) credit facility health care facilities support, relief for taxpayers, employers incentivize)  
• Conditional cash transfers to extra 1 mio. household 
• NGN 50 billion ($139 million) targeted credit facility 
• Liquidity injection of NGN 3.6 trillion (2.4% of GDP) into the banking system 
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• $1.4 Bn. has been approved to support 
healthcare facilities, provide relief for 
taxpayers, and incentivize employers 




• Reduction of interest rates from 9% to 5%  
• Central bank coordinated private sector special intervention targeting NGN 120 billion ($333 million) 
(p.92) 
SEN • Total fiscal stimulus: $1.65 Bn. 
• FCFA100 Bn. for hard-hit sectors such 
as tourism and transport 
• credit guarantee of FCFA 200 Bn. 
• FCFA 69 Bn. for urgent food aid and 
essential medical supplies 
• FCFA 15 Bn. will for suspension of 
utility payments for poorer customers 




• Response and solidarity fund of CFAC 1 trillion  
• Accelerate payments to private sector state suppliers (CFAF 302 billion)   
• Tax measures to support the formal sector 
(p. 95) 
SLE • Total fiscal stimulus: $123 mill. 
• Le 298.3 Bn. for SME financing & social 
safety net 
• tax rebate for health workers covering 
a 3-months period, and insurance 
cover for front line workers 
(p. 69) 
 
• COVID–19 Quick Action Economic Response Program (25 March 2020)  
• Building stock of essential commodities and stabilizing prices  
• Business support (e.g., avert layoffs of employees) 
• Provide assistance for local production and processing of staple food items 
(p. 97) 
TGO  • NOVISSI cash transfer scheme for the most vulnerable  
• Providing free water and electricity for the subsidized tranche sociale category for a period of three months.  
• Disbursing CFAF 2 billion for the initial economic measures  
• National solidarity and economic recovery fund of CFAF 400 billion 
(p. 104) 
Figure 75: Listing of major economic measures taken by the EMSs in response to the pandemic. 
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